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SUMMARY 
 
 
Cognitive process accounts of the advantages conferred by diagrams in problem solving 
and reasoning have typically attempted to explain an idealised user or a reasoning system 
that has equivalent to practised knowledge of the task with the target representation. The 
thesis investigates the question of how diagrams support users in the process of solving 
unpractised problems in the domain of probability. The research question is addressed 
by the design and analysis of an empirical study and cognitive model. 
  
The main experiment required participants (N=8) to solve a set of unpractised probability 
problems presented by combined text and diagram. Think-aloud and eye-movement 
protocols together with given solutions were used to infer the content and process of 
problem interpretation, solution interpretation and task execution strategies employed by 
participants. The data suggested that the diagram was used to facilitate problem solving 
in three different ways by: (a) supporting sub-problem identification, (b) supporting prior 
knowledge of diagrammatic sub-schemes used for interpreting a solution and (c) 
supporting the process of interpreting and testing the specific meaning of given problem 
instructions and self-generated solution instructions. 
  
These empirical data were used to develop cognitive models of canonical strategies of 
the three identified phenomena: 
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• Sub-problem identification advantages are accounted for by proposing that the 
spatial semantics of diagrams coupled with competences of the visual-spatial 
processing system and opportunities for demonstrative interpretation strategies 
increase the probability of goal-relevant data being made available to central 
cognition for further processing. 
• Framing advantages are accounted for by proposing that represented 
diagrammatic sub-schemes (e.g. part-whole portions, icon-arrays, 2D containers 
etc.) facilitate access to existing prior knowledge used to frame, derive, and 
reason about information analogically within that scheme. 
• Advantages in instruction interpretation are related to the specificity of diagrams 
which support the opportunity to demonstratively test and evaluate the referential 
meaning of an instruction.   
   
The cognitive model also investigates and evaluates assumptions about the prior 
knowledge for solving unpractised probability problems; a representational scheme for 
addressing the co-ordination of sub-goals; a deictic problem representation to support 
online processing of environmental information, a meta-cognitive processing scheme to 
address self-argumentation and intention tracking and visual and spatial competences to 
address the requirements of diagrammatic reasoning.  The implications of the cognitive 
model are discussed with regard to existing accounts of diagrammatic reasoning, 
probability problem solving (PPS), and unpractised problem solving. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Substantial research has been conducted on the advantages of using diagrams in 
reasoning and problem solving tasks. This research has typically focused on the 
information processing efficiency of diagrams for practised or equivalent to practised 
tasks.  A number of factors have been uncovered identifying explanations of processing 
efficiency, including how diagrams allow inferences to be externally offloaded (e.g., 
Larkin & Simon, 1987; Shimojima, 1996; Stenning, Inder & Neilson, 1995; Lindsay, 
1995); reduce the size of the search space or reasoning cases (e.g., Koedinger & 
Anderson; 1990; Stenning & Oberlander, 1995; Lane, Cheng & Gobet, 2000), facilitate 
recognition  (Larkin & Simon, 1987; Koedinger & Anderson, 1990; Zhang, 1997); and 
limit visual search and the use of working memory (e.g., Larkin & Simon, 1995). 
 
The cognitive benefits of diagrams arguably extend beyond their processing efficiency 
in executing a practised task. Diagrams, including visualisations of various kinds, are 
used as modelling tools in design domains such as architecture, engineering and 
computer programming; in domains of investigation and discovery in mathematics and 
science; and in teaching and demonstrating principles in science and mathematics. A 
general characteristic of all these problem contexts is that the target user (i.e. designer, 
investigator or learner) is typically employing the diagram to help support the process of 
interpreting the form of a solution by establishing how it follows from constraints of the 
problem.   
 
Research on this issue from an information processing perspective appears to be less 
prevalent and well developed.  Researchers in artificial intelligence and logic have long 
considered how diagrams are used as proofs or demonstration of the validity of 
abstractions because they possess constraints that allow what is possible to be directly 
observed (e.g., Sloman 1971; Lindsey 2002; Shimojima 2001b, Pylyshyn 2003). In a 
series of studies Cheng has provided empirical evidence that diagrams designed to model 
structural constraints in domains such as science and maths facilitate learning of the 
fundamental concepts and laws that underpin the target domain compared to 
representations that lack this property (Cheng 2002, 2011).  Factors in the processing 
efficiency of diagrams (as described above) have been proposed to explain the cognitive 
support conferred by diagrams in related higher-order cognitive activities such as self-
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explanation (Ainsworth & Loizou, 2003), abduction (Thagard & Shelley, 1997) and 
discovery (Cheng & Simon, 1995), but this research is less developed. 
 
In investigating this issue, the thesis focuses on the role of diagrams in supporting users 
in determining the form of a solution procedure to a set of probability word problems. 
To be clear, a solution procedure reflects the constraints or criteria used to determine the 
values of a solution for a particular problem instance that may be executed using different 
strategies. To make the research issues concrete, consider the following probability 
problem shown in Figure 1.1. Conditional probability problems are an interesting case 
because a large body of research has shown that the probability of non-expert 
participants deriving correct solutions is highly sensitive to manipulations of the 
presentation of the problem including the presence and the particular form of the 
representation of the problem situation (e.g., Gigerenzer & Hoffrage 1995; Brase 2009; 
Fox, & Levav 2004; Yamagishi 2003; Sloman, Over, Slovak, Stibel 2003). 
 
The problem scenario, data structure and linguistic framing of the problem in Figure 1.1 
is simpler and more intuitive than the typical conditional probability word problems 
tested and reported in the research literature; however, these problems still elicited 
incorrect solution procedure interpretations in a substantial proportion of participants 
tested. The correct answer to the problem is 1/3.  The correct solution procedure can be 
expressed using the notation |A∩C|/|C| where A are members of the queried category 
(i.e. small), C are members of the conditional category (i.e. red) and the vertical symbols 
| | are notation for the cardinality of a set. The common incorrect solution procedure 
employed by participants for this problem can be described as |A∩C|/|U| where U is the 
universal set. The solution interpretation results from an omission in ruling out 
possibilities in the set U that are not in the set C. The role of this diagram in supporting 
interpretation of the correct solution procedure is potentially manifested in the presence 
and accessibility of the set structure and relative frequency between solution relevant 
sets A, C and U (i.e. subset & less than (A, C), subset & less than (C, U)). Such structural 
information may be less explicit and need to be inferred rather than observed in 
alternative problem presentation formats.   
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Figure 1.1.  A conditional probability problem taken from the problems used in the 
main experiment. 
 
1.1 Objectives 
 
The main research question was to understand how diagrams support the process of 
determining the form of a solution procedure from the structural constraints of the 
problem in the domain of probability. The thesis reports empirical studies of participants 
solving a set of probability word problems with diagrams, who were relatively unfamiliar 
or unpractised at the task. Think-aloud protocols and eye-movement data were used to 
develop a cognitive model of the process of solving the problems and assess assumptions 
required to explain the nature of the problem solving observed. 
 
The thesis considers existing evidence suggesting that the structural constraints of 
diagrams and the accessibility of information in diagrammatic formats support the 
interpretation of solutions.  Diagrammatic accessibility can be viewed as a multifaceted 
and externally distributed phenomenon - depending on how properties of the external 
representation are coupled to exploit visual-spatial and high-level cognitive 
competences. The research requires accounting for how structural constraints of 
diagrams and different accessibility advantages are exploited by participants to support 
the interpretation of a solution procedure. 
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The research project addresses the research question in the domain of solving probability 
problems because a substantial research literature already exists which demonstrates the 
effects of a representation in determining the form of a solution procedure (e.g., 
Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995; Yamagishi, 2003; Sloman, Over, Slovak & Stibel, 2003; 
Brase, 2009). Much of the research has focused on conditional probability problems and 
testing predictions of theories of probability problem solving (PPS) on representational 
effects. The thesis assumes that conditional probability problems involve the use of 
general knowledge and cognitive resources common to other probability problems and 
domains, and that the kinds of cognitive support of diagrams would therefore occur in 
other problems and task domains. The thesis therefore addresses the role of structural 
constraints and accessibility more broadly with different types of probability problems. 
 
The project investigates a task context where participants have not learnt the required 
solution procedure for the class of problem instructions and are therefore required to 
adapt their existing knowledge to the problem. Addressing problem novelty in the 
particular context poses a greater requirement on higher-level cognitive activities such 
as meta-cognition, reasoning and sense-making (e.g., Klein, Phillips & Peluso, 2007; 
Tabachneck-Schijf, Koedinger & Nathan, 1994). The research requires identifying and 
accounting for these cognitive competencies through detailed empirical analysis of task 
performance and cognitive process modelling. 
 
Addressing the research question requires the use and integration of the results of 
different methodologies including the analysis of external representations, task analysis 
of the problem, detailed protocol analysis (verbal and eye-movement) of participants 
solving the experimental problems and the development of explicit computational 
cognitive models. This kind of convergent methodology that is common in cognitive 
science research has not been fully adopted in the various strands of research on 
probability problem solving. Existing confusion and controversy in the research 
literature concerning what represented information is causally responsible for 
performance facilitation and what kinds of cognitive processes are involved; are 
considered to result from a lack of clarity and specificity about the nature of the 
representation, task and the process of problem solving. This assumption is an important 
motivation for the research undertaken for this thesis. 
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1.2 Outline 
 
The thesis will be structured in the following way. There are two review chapters. 
Chapter 2 reviews research on diagrammatic representation and reasoning and Chapter 
3 on PPS and the role of internal and external representation in cognitive accounts.  In 
Chapter 4, the nature of the problems and task to be employed in the experiments and 
subsequently modelled will be outlined. Chapter 5 reports in abstract the preliminary 
findings of a pilot experiment. Chapter 6 reports in detail the findings of a main 
experiment which was later used for cognitive modelling. Chapter 7 provides an 
introduction to the ACT-R cognitive architecture used in the cognitive modelling 
research. Chapter 8 reports the design, analysis, simulation and evaluation of the 
cognitive model of participants solving the experimental problems detailed in Chapter 
6. Chapter 9 reviews and discusses the research findings and implications of the research.   
 
Chapter 2: Diagrammatic Cognition The aim of the chapter is to survey research 
related to the research goals. The chapter begins by discussing key informational 
properties of diagrams resulting from their structural constraints and how these 
properties can be seen to impact on interpretation and reasoning. The next section 
provides an overview of the cognitive support given by diagrams. The section is 
organised into three subsections: (1) accounts concerning the computational tractability 
of reasoning with diagrams, (2) factors associated with the potential accessibility of 
diagrams, and (3) research related to how people use diagrams in unfamiliar/unpractised 
contexts to understand a problem. The remaining section considers research on cognitive 
models and artificial intelligence frameworks for diagrammatic reasoning as a 
foundation to the cognitive modelling activities. The review suggests an absence of 
research providing an account of how diagrams are used in unpractised contexts; further, 
that computational accounts of diagrammatic reasoning have tended to be limited to 
highly abstract characterisations. 
   
Chapter 3: External Representation in Probability Problem Solving The chapter 
details these different theoretical accounts or approaches to PPS including ecological 
rationality, the mental models theory, nested set and dual processing accounts. This is 
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done as a prerequisite to scaffolding a review of the relevant set of research studies.  This 
section is followed by a review of research studies that demonstrate experimental effects 
of the manipulation of the presentation of problem information. The review reveals a 
complex characterisation of effects of accessibility, which depend on the abstract 
features of the problem and the structure accessible in alternative 
presentations/representations of the problem. The thesis proposes that such effects are 
not specific to existing theoretical accounts of PPS, but instead consistent with a general 
information processing characterisation of problem solving and reasoning with external 
representations. The last section reviews empirical research that provide constraints on 
performance models of novice PPS participants. The aim of the review is to determine 
what empirical constraints exist on how novice participants actually go about solving 
PPS tasks in order to inform the development of cognitive models reported in this 
research. 
 
Chapter 4: Problems and Tasks The chapter discusses the problems, representation and 
task used in the experiment and subsequently modelled.  One purpose of the chapter is 
to comprehensively specify the rationale for choosing the problems and its particular 
attributes including the problem scenario, types of problem instructions being used, types 
of data structure employed and their mode of presentation/representation. The design of 
the problems and representations used in the experiment are motivated by a number of 
theoretical and methodological constraints.  The chapter outlines constraints that are 
concerned with overcoming limitations on the theoretical interpretation of performance 
and constraints that are concerned with scaling down the complexity of the problem so 
that the behavioural data of the problem solving process is realistically tractable to 
analyse, interpret and be modelled in real time. A second purpose of the chapter is to 
outline a conceptual analysis of the problems, semantic analysis of the representation 
and analysis of the task in order to explicate how the research would be predicted to 
address the central research issues. 
 
Chapter 5:  Pilot Experiment The chapter discusses an initial pilot study designed to 
investigate the process of a solution procedure formulation (SPF). The chapter reports 
information on the types of solution procedure errors generated, time scale of problem 
solving and the nature of external visual attention strategies. The results of the pilot 
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study, which are described in abstract, were used to assess the general feasibility of the 
experimental design and motivate subsequent changes for the main experiment.   
 
Chapter 6: Main Experiment The chapter discusses the design of the main experiment. 
Verbal and eye-movement protocols are analysed to derive details about scheduling of 
subtasks, external attention and the internal process of interpretation, and reasoning. 
Several classes of errors in interpreting the required solution procedure using verbal 
protocols and the resulting solutions are analysed. Detailed examination of the process 
of participants’ protocols reveal three important cases of the role of the diagram in 
determining the solution procedure employed: (1) in supporting recognition of 
unconsidered problem features that have implications on the form of the solution 
procedure, (2) facilitating existing prior knowledge of diagrammatic schemes used for 
framing the form of a solution procedure and (3) in supporting an interpretation of the 
correct meaning of an instruction. 
 
Chapter 7: ACT-R Cognitive Architecture The chapter gives an overview of the ACT-
R cognitive architecture and the rationale for its use in the research. This includes the 
types of knowledge considered and the structure and functions of different processing 
modules. 
 
Chapter 8: Modelling Diagrammatic Reasoning about Probability The chapter 
begins by discussing the particular aims of the modelling research. The task model is 
then described hierarchically in terms of times scales of operation. The specification 
begins with the representational schemes and strategic knowledge involved in generic 
cognitive, meta-cognitive, visual and spatial processing routines. This is followed by a 
description of models of subtasks that supports activities such as comprehending the 
problem instructions, identifying sets, inferring possibilities, counting sets and 
formulating proportions. The subsequent sections describe how the component task 
knowledge comes together in solving the different problems and describes a model of 
canonical performance for each of the problems. The model is evaluated in terms of its 
competence, depth, generality, parsimony and functional coherence as well as its ability 
to reproduce consistent timings of the task performance and visual attention. The chapter 
then discusses implications and limitations of the model in its characterisation of 
diagrammatic accessibility, interpretation of solution procedures, the process of solving 
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unpractised problems, visual spatial processing and diagrammatic reasoning, and its task 
knowledge for solving probability word problems. 
 
Chapter 9: Conclusions The final chapter reviews the research and discusses broader 
implications and limitations. This chapter includes the scope and limitations of the main 
findings concerning the abstract roles of the diagrams in supporting the PPS task, and 
discusses the key finding on accessibility. The final section discusses the implications of 
additional findings concerning the nature of diagrammatic reasoning, unpractised 
problem solving and PPS.   
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Chapter 2: Diagrammatic Cognition 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The overarching aim of the chapter is to review existing research relevant to 
understanding the benefits of diagrams in formulating solution procedures in unfamiliar 
or unpractised problem solving tasks. The chapter has three component objectives. The 
first is to introduce the reader to key theoretical concepts in the study of representational 
systems. The purpose of the first objective is to lay the conceptual groundwork to 
critically and coherently evaluate existing research and to introduce concepts that will 
be referred to throughout the thesis. The second objective is to provide an overview of 
cognitive processing accounts for the support given by diagrammatic representations in 
problem solving tasks. These advantages are organised into three sections: the 
computational tractability of reasoning with diagrams, factors associated with the 
potential accessibility of diagrams, and existing research addressing how people use 
diagrams in unfamiliar/unpractised contexts to formulate solution procedures. The 
remaining section will outline general abstractions about cognitive models and artificial 
intelligence (AI) frameworks for diagrammatic reasoning. The aim of this section is to 
identify and assess key ideas critical to computational/information processing accounts 
of the cognitive benefits of diagrams and to identify their limitations, some of which will 
be addressed in this thesis. 
 
2.1.1 Research on diagrammatic reasoning 
 
The study of diagrammatic reasoning is an interdisciplinary field combining research 
from Psychology, Cognitive Science, Logic, Semiotics, Philosophy, AI, Information 
Visualization amongst others. Research on diagrammatic reasoning in Psychology and 
Cognitive Science has been directed towards a number of research goals. The list below 
includes some of the common research aims that can be derived from a broad literature 
review.   
 
• General theories or accounts explaining why diagrams are more efficient for 
particular tasks than sentential representations (e.g., Larkin & Simon, 1987; 
Stenning & Oberlander, 1995). 
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• Cognitive accounts of using particular classes of diagrams in particular task 
domains such as data interpretation with graphs, theorem proving with geometry 
diagrams, mechanical reasoning with iconic diagrams (e.g., Pinker, 1990; 
Koedinger & Anderson 1990; Hegarty, 1992; Narayanan, Suwa & Motoda, 
1995). 
• Studies investigating which kinds of diagrams are better than others for certain 
kinds of tasks and why (e.g., Peebles & Cheng 2002). 
• Individual differences in the preferences and efficacy of using diagrams 
compared to other representations (e.g., Cox, 1999; Hegarty & Sims, 1994). 
• Principles and guidelines for the design and selection of representations (e.g., 
Cheng, 2002; Cheng, 2011; Kosslyn, 1989; Narayanan & Hegarty, 2002). 
 
One important character of cognitive research in diagrammatic reasoning is that any 
cognitive processing account requires consideration of the interdependent relationship 
between representation, task and knowledge of the user. It is difficult to draw coherent 
conclusions without broader consideration of these factors. This is perhaps why 
methodologies employed in studies such as those cited above typically involve 
integrating experimental research findings with the outcomes of representational 
analysis, task analysis and/or computational cognitive modelling. It is also why 
interdisciplinary considerations are important to the cognitive study of diagrams. For 
these reasons the research reviewed in this chapter, as with the approach taken in this 
thesis, also adopts these converging methodologies. 
 
2.2 Properties of diagrams related to processing advantages 
 
Explaining how diagrams are processed depends on understanding the properties of 
diagrams. Classes of external representations (ERs) vary in complex multidimensional 
ways and are notoriously difficult to characterise. Many properties and perspectives of 
ERs have been discerned by researchers in the fields of Philosophy, Semantics, Artificial 
Intelligence and Cognitive Science. The thesis will address a subset of these issues 
relevant to the goals of the research. The section outlines three representational 
properties that have been considered central to explanations of the efficacy of diagrams. 
These properties are: (1) information and computational equivalence, (2) token and (3) 
constraint representation. 
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2.2.1 Information and computation 
 
Larkin and Simon (1987) distinguished between informational and computational 
equivalence of representations. Whilst alternative representations may contain the same 
represented information, the computations required to process some expression of 
information may differ significantly between them. A representation contains 
information, if that information can be recovered from the representation through 
computations however elaborate. According to Larkin and Simon computational 
equivalence between representations can be seen to hold when the representations are 
informationally equivalent and the same information can be drawn with comparable ease 
and speed. Computational efficiency thus depends on the existence and speed by which 
operators processes the target information.  
 
2.2.2 External representation of tokens 
 
Probably the most general property of diagrams is that they use token symbols to model 
represented tokens. The term “model” is critical because the sense in which a diagram is 
intuitively viewed as a model is arguably based on the fact that representing tokens can 
be treated by a user as the represented tokens. There does not need to be a literal 
correspondence of modelled tokens. In iconic diagrams, it is typically the case that token 
symbols stand in for tokens in the represented state of affairs. However in abstract 
diagrams, token symbols do not necessarily have a literal token correspondence in the 
represented state of affairs, but may be transplanted in a system of ER to restructure 
relational information (e.g., tuples of data values as attributes of token points in a 
Cartesian graph, predicates as arcs in semantic networks, semantic classes as token 
regions in Euler diagrams, etc.).    
 
The distinct way of representing tokens can be appreciated when contrasted with token 
representation using systems of a more sentential variety. For example, Figure 2.1a 
shows a PS-diagram (probability space diagram) of the same spinner situation. Each sub-
unit stands in for a possible outcome on the spinner. Now consider Figure 2.1b in which 
the same state of affairs is described by a list of quasi-linguistic statements. The 
representation of tokens is different in Figure 2.1 because tokens are referred to by types 
of labels (e.g., let-1, let-2). In this case each token label does not actually stand in for a 
represented token. This distinguishing referential property of diagrams has been noted 
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by a number of authors. Barwise and Etchemendy (1995) characterise the relation as part 
of a more general homomorphism between representing and represented. Stenning, Inder 
and Neilson (1995) call systems that represent tokens by tokens as token reference 
systems, and systems which represent tokens by labels (or descriptions) as type reference 
systems. 
 
Some key properties of token reference systems (and diagrams) include the following. 
They involve using a single symbol for each represented token whereas type reference 
systems often require repeating the referring symbol in each expression of an attribution 
or relation. In token reference systems attributes of represented tokens are represented 
by attributes of tokens whereas this does not occur and is incompatible with type 
reference systems. Token symbols in token reference systems are the demonstrative 
subjects of represented semantic content. In type reference systems this is not normally 
the case. For example, in the PS-diagram, if you make the derivation that the K outcome 
has greater probability than the Q outcome, it is the token units in the diagram the relation 
is being made about. 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Representations of properties of outcomes of a letter spinner:  (a) A PS-
diagram in which each token outcome is represented by a sub-unit/letter token (e.g., 
token reference) and (b) a notation in which token outcomes are referred to by labels 
such as let-1 (i.e. type reference). 
 
2.2.3 Representation of constraints 
 
The representation of constraints in diagrams has been widely discussed by researchers 
and broadly interpreted as an important factor contributing to the efficiency of diagrams 
for certain kinds of tasks. There have been many different ways of characterising how 
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constraints are represented in diagrams and other ERs. For example Palmer (1978) 
distinguished between intrinsic and extrinsic representation of relations. A representing 
relation is intrinsic if it has the same inherent logical constraints as the relation it 
represents. For example, transitivity would be intrinsic to the spatial containment relation 
when representing set membership. A relation is extrinsic if the constraints of the 
representing relation are not inherent to the representing relation and thus need to be 
imposed. Building on the analysis of Palmer, Shimojima (2001a) proposes the distinction 
of nomic and stipulative constraints that determine the states of affairs holding in a 
representation. A constraint between representing and represented state of affairs is a 
nomic constraint if it results from “natural laws” of the representation which include 
topological, geometric or physical laws. A constraint is stipulative if it results from a rule 
such as a condition on syntactic well-formedness. The differences between 
representations possessing nomic and stipulative constraints are proposed to closely 
mirror intuitive categorisations of diagrammatic and sentential systems of 
representations. Cheng (1996) considers constraints in terms of represented laws 
encoded within diagrams and appeals to how such laws are manifested in different cases 
or instantiations in which the relations of a law are represented. Stenning and Oberlander 
(1995) have framed the issue of constraints in terms of the general notion of 
representational specificity. According to these authors, the specificity of a 
representation corresponds to the extent to which it can express certain classes of 
information independently of expressing others. Linguistics systems are capable of 
expressing abstractions whereas constraints in diagrams typically limit this capacity.  
Researchers have also attempted to abstract different effects of constraints (e.g., Palmer, 
1978; Barwise & Etchemendy, 1995; Stenning, Inder & Neilson, 1995; Shimojima, 
1996; Shimojima, 2001a). 
 
Constraints advantages resulting from modelling operations include updates to 
dependent attributes/relations that occur when modifications to representing attributes 
values of tokens are made (e.g., Palmer, 1978; Lindsay, 1995; Shimojima, 1996; 
Stenning, et al., 1995). As an example, consider changing the probability of outcome A 
(i.e. changing its width) in the PS-diagram of (1) of figure 2.2 such that its probability is 
set to twice its current probability as in (2) of figure 2.2. One can observe from (2) of 
Figure 2.2 the updated relations that indirectly occur. These effects occur for quantitative 
relations. For example, the probability of A is now larger than the outcomes C and D, 
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G’s probability becomes the same as A, the relative probability of each outcome C and 
D have changed from 1/5 to 1/6, and the probability of letters A and G are now 1/3. They 
also occur for qualitative relations. For example, if the letter C has its colour changed to 
blue as in (3) of Figure 2.2 then updated set relations between highlighted blue and 
consonant letter sets now partially overlap and all vowel letters are now a subset of blue 
letters. The updated attributes/relations that might otherwise need to be inferred are often 
described as being given for free in the representation. These updates can be observed in 
a wide variety of graphical representations and are often called free-rides (Shimojima, 
1996).   
 
 
Figure 2.2. Updates to the values of attributes and relations as a result of modelling 
operations (i.e. free rides). 
 
 
Free-rides reduce the inferential work that would otherwise be required to manually 
update relations using an alternative representation that lack such constraints (e.g., 
Lindsay, 1995; Shimojima, 1996). Free-rides in diagrams may also facilitate recognition 
of the consequences of edits to a representation and support look-ahead in problems that 
require consideration of complex dependencies (e.g., Barone & Cheng, 2005). 
 
Another modelling advantage of constraints in diagrams has been called auto-
consistency (or self-consistency) (e.g., Barwise & Etchemendy, 1995; Stenning, et al., 
1995). This effect concerns enforcement of consistent expressions within a 
representation. For example, consider the axiom in probability theory that the probability 
of all outcomes must amount to one. The PS-diagram in Figure 2.3 (right) shows self-
consistency with respect to this law because it is not possible in the correct use of the 
scheme to formulate probability values that are inconsistent with the law. This occurs 
because probability is modelled as the relative distance of part-whole relations between 
the sum and composite outcomes. The constraint is absent in the contingency table (left) 
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and network diagram (middle) of figure 2.3, which employ numerical probability values, 
because there is nothing in the representing scheme that guarantees that the law holds in 
a specific instance. A representation that has auto-consistency with respect to certain 
classes of relations is synonymous with what Cheng (1996) calls Law Encoding 
Diagrams. The effects of auto-consistency in modelling restricts a user from formulating 
inconsistent expressions (e.g., Stenning, Inder & Neilson, 1995).        
 
 
Figure 2.3. The law of that the probability of all outcomes must add to one is not 
encoded in and contingency table (left) or network diagram (middle) where numbers 
are used to designate probability values. The law is however encoded geometrically 
and is therfore auto-consistent in the PS-diagram (right) 
 
Another advantage of constraints in diagrams concerns how their structure can be seen 
to demonstrate or explain why some abstraction must hold. For example, in the PS-
diagram (Figure 2.3) the geometrical proportion that can be derived from the horizontal 
extent of the blue outcomes to the whole outcome space (i.e. 1/2) is equivalent to the 
proportion of the frequency of equal units that fall under the same categories (e.g., 3/6).  
The structure of the diagram arguably shows why this equivalence is the case and would 
hold for any instance. There are many contexts where diagrammatic structure supports 
the application of laws or universals, for example: in geometry theorem proving, where 
combinations of abstractions about parts of a configuration imply more general 
abstractions about the whole of a configuration (e.g., Koedinger & Anderson, 1990); and 
in representations of simple games, where geometrical properties of a configuration 
object imply winning opportunities in the game (e.g., Zhang 1997). 
 
 
2.3 Computational tractability 
 
An important component in understanding the effectiveness of diagrams in reasoning is 
their computational tractability, an issue which has been referred to by many researchers 
working in AI and cognitive science. Diagram configurations like visual scene 
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configurations or pictures are rich in information, that is, they typically constrain many 
combinations of abstract relations such as those used in natural language and notations. 
If a system reasons with diagram configurations rather than abstract relations, it can 
exploit many more information constraints on each reasoning step to determine 
subsequent inferences. This inferential tractability requires that a cognitive or AI system 
has exemplar knowledge or instances of particular diagram configurations. The extent to 
which a cognitive system exploits these constraints is an empirical matter. The section 
discusses three accounts which indicate inferential tractability of diagrams in three 
different reasoning contexts: (1) inferring categorical abstractions in geometrical 
theorem proving, (2) inferring categories and values in corresponding representations, 
and (3) inferring diagram models of formal logic expressions.         
 
2.3.1 Constraints on inferring abstractions in geometry 
 
Koedinger and Anderson (1990) reported empirical data of students using diagrams to 
prove theorems in geometry. The verbal protocols they collected from participants 
formulating proofs suggested that skilled students were able to use geometry diagrams 
to focus on critical inferences and skip less important ones. 
 
The authors developed a process model to explain the inferential efficiency of skilled 
students. The process model assumes that configurations in diagrams cue chunks in 
memory that function as operators for constructing the proof.  The configuration chunks 
allow many steps to be executed in a single inference thereby explaining the inference 
skipping. They call these chunks diagram configuration schemas (DC-schema). Each 
DC-schema links a prototypical image of a diagram configuration, with a collection of 
facts about the configuration and a set of conditions for fact proving. The facts include a 
set of part-statements and a single whole-statement that hold about the particular 
configuration prototype. The part-statements are facts about local/part relations of a 
configuration, whereas the whole-statement is a global relation that holds about the 
whole of the configuration. The proof conditions in the schema specify the combinations 
of the partial set of part-statements that can be used to prove the remaining part-
statements and whole-statements. The proof conditions therefore capture the constraints 
between part-whole relations of a geometrical configuration. 
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Establishing a proof is modelled as a process in which the system incrementally 
determines which set of DC-schemas hold starting from an initial set of premises. The 
initial premises are used to infer a lower order DC-schemas then, in a sequence of 
inferential steps, one DC-schema is used to prove another until a higher-order schema 
corresponding to the goal statement is established. Search though the space of DC-
schemas is controlled by a set of heuristics. The authors claim that the model solves the 
problem in a diagrammatic search space that is both considerably smaller and more 
compact (it does not lead to dead ends) than other search spaces such as those implicated 
by the use of algebraic notations. 
 
2.3.2 Inferring representation correspondences   
 
Another example of computational tractability of diagrams comes from work on 
mapping between alternative diagrammatic representations. Lane, Cheng and Gobet 
(2000) report a model addressing how participants learn to re-represent circuit diagrams 
in an alternative system called AVOW diagrams. AVOW diagrams were designed by 
Cheng (2002) to support conceptual learning and allow exploitation of more effective 
problem solving strategies than other systems such as algebra.  The modelled task 
requires that students re-represent a circuit diagram as an AVOW diagram in order to 
answer questions about the represented circuit which involves reading of information 
that occurs as a side effect in the AVOW diagram. 
 
The authors report a model of student performance in the task using a cognitive 
architecture called CHREST+. In short, the architecture comprises of a discrimination 
network account of memory, which organises memorial instances into a collection of 
chunks. Each chunk is represented by a node. Nodes are linked together hierarchically 
based on their feature overlap, so that features of a particular instance are distributed 
across nodes. Chunk retrieval via recognition occurs by a similarity based search through 
the network of nodes/chunks until the most specific match is found. Perceptual chunks 
from instances of both diagrams are stored in the CHREST+ discrimination network. 
The model assumes that participants learn to associate perceptual chunks of the circuit 
and AVOW diagram configuration through equivalence links between nodes of 
corresponding networks, which allow retrieval of the corresponding AVOW diagram 
given successful identification of the circuit diagram. An important property of the 
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mapping concerns the fact that distinct classes of circuit diagram configurations 
correspond in a one-to-one fashion to distinct AVOW diagram configurations. The 
property affords the cognitive system to learn relatively unambiguous mapping between 
the two forms of representations based on their visual structure.  An important claim 
made by the authors is that the model is said to exhibit step skipping behaviour because 
configuration chunks can be drawn based on partial quantities of the diagrams 
configuration (e.g., electrical current or voltage). 
 
2.3.3 Inferring possible models 
 
Another account of the inferential tractability of diagrammatic representations comes 
from the work of Stenning and Oberlander (1995), who consider the issue in the context 
of model construction. The authors proposed a general theory of the differences between 
diagrams and sentential representations in reasoning. They claim that diagrams can be 
easier to reason with because they tend to be more specific systems of representation. 
Specific representations cannot represent some information abstraction without 
expressing other interdependent information due to representing constraints in the 
medium such as those discussed in Section 2.2.3. 
 
The authors propose a computational explanation of why specific ERs, like diagrams, 
can be more efficient representations to reason with. Firstly, they draw on the analysis 
of Levesque (1988) to propose that a key property of making a system inferential 
tractability is limiting the number of cases (i.e. problem states) required to achieve some 
reasoning task. The authors suggest that because diagrams are specific, they can be 
represented as agglomerated diagram configurations (i.e. complete bindings of 
configuration attributes) rather than partial abstractions.  This would limit the number of 
cases in an inferential task and the space of inferential alternatives at a given problem 
state. The argument is taken to provide a computational account of why reasoning should 
be more tractable with diagrams than sentential representations. Secondly, the authors 
propose a cognitive account of the computational arguments illustrated in the case of 
syllogistic reasoning with Euler circles. Their account assumes working memory 
systems also tends to use specific representations. In support of this claim they consider 
empirical evidence, which is often taken as support for imagistic representations or 
mental models, such as research on the n-term series problem. They suggest that the 
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reason for the specificity of working memory representations is because they are 
implemented in neural networks. In support of this claim, the authors consider modelling 
research demonstrating that artificial neural networks (ANNs) are constraint satisfaction 
systems that enforce the specification of agglomerated representations they are trained 
on. 
 
The authors also describe a particular kind of specificity that they consider critical to 
explaining the inferential efficiency of Euler circles using a reasoning strategy in which 
a conclusion is selected that involves minimal changes to topological relations between 
premise and conclusion diagrams. In doing so, they make the analogy between minimal 
transitions between problem states in this Euler circle problem space, and the so called 
continuity of content addressable representations coded in ANNs. Continuity in ANNs 
corresponds to the property that overlapping representations have closer hamming 
distances in the multi-dimensional coding space. ANNs trained on these neighbouring 
problems state configurations (i.e. ones that overlap or have minimal changes) would 
exhibit this semantic continuity. The researchers do not actually report the 
implementation of such models, but instead (see Stenning & Oberlander, 1994) 
abstractly describe a hybrid framework in which a rule based system would supervise 
strategic access to agglomerated patterns in a neural network memory module.      
 
Two significant limitations of Stenning and Oberlander’s (1994) account are worth 
noting. Firstly, given that most cognitive processing in the human mind is concerned 
with the construction and manipulation of abstract information used to control thought 
and action rather than just models of states of affairs in the world, the proposal that 
representational specificity results from a generic property of neural networks seems 
implausible. Stenning and Oberlander actually note this possible problem in relation to 
representations held by the articulatory loop. However, the main limitation of their 
theory is that it says nothing about accessibility of diagrammatic representations. Just 
because an ER enforces constraints on represented information does not guarantee that 
those constraints can be accessed and exploited by the cognitive system. 
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2.3.4 Summary 
 
These three different accounts assume that efficiency in inferential tractability results 
from the system being able to represent problem states that correspond to diagram 
configurations and exploit inferential constraints on those configurations. The accounts 
(must) assume that inferential constraints on problem states are exploited in parallel (i.e. 
as combinations of satisfied part statements or through distributed constraints in ANNs). 
The accounts contrast in terms of the different cognitive processing context in which 
computational tractability is realised. These contexts are not exhaustive; there are other 
cognitive models and AI frameworks that report similar effects. One important difference 
between the accounts is that in Koedinger and Anderson's (1990) theory the 
computational tractability of problem states is exploited in process of deriving 
abstractions; whereas in Stenning and Oberlander’s (1994) and Lane, Cheng and Gobet’s 
(2000) model the effect occurs in the generation of models. The distinction highlights 
the fact that computational tractability of diagrammatic problem states can participate in 
explaining the effects of constraints in model construction and derivation contexts.   
 
2.4 Accessibility 
 
The accessibility of represented states and laws in diagrams are generally considered 
important factor in explaining their efficiency. Intuitive notions about accessibility of 
diagrams often appeal to vague visual processing explanations, but close analysis 
suggests that the issue is more complicated. Research within Psychology and Cognitive 
Science suggests different reasons, explanations and perspectives on the accessibility of 
diagrams. The section reviews research suggesting different possible accounts and 
components explaining diagrammatic accessibility including perceptual factors, 
recognition factors, search and memory, prior knowledge and skill, analogical 
correspondence, direct interpretation and visual abduction.   
 
2.4.1 Perceptual salience of data 
 
Several authors refer to mechanisms of perceptual grouping and salience effects of pre-
attentive processing, in making relevant information accessible particular in 
diagrammatic representation of statistical data (e.g., Pinker, 1990).  Perceptual grouping 
is automatically performed by the visual system, is bottom up or data driven and is 
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normally impenetrable or unaffected by cognition and follows gestalt principles of 
perceptual organization such as similarity, continuity, common fate, etc. It has been taken 
as an important component in accounts of graph comprehension in which patterns of 
data points have meaningful interpretations (e.g., Pinker, 1990). Not all perceptual 
configurations convey meaning within a diagram. Perceptual grouping is exploited in 
diagrammatic semantics when the visual object processing system is used in the service 
of simplifying and substituting the representation of complex relation(s) with reified 
perceptual object configurations. Such configurations can be seen to support the 
accessibility of high-order expressions sometimes referred to as derivative meaning 
(Shimojima, 1999). Despite this, semantic bearing perceptual groupings may support, be 
irrelevant and even have negative effects on problem solving in a task (e.g., Ali & 
Peebles, 2013). These perceptual factors depend on the architecture of the visual 
processing system. The role of perceptual grouping in making meaning accessible in 
diagrams occurs only when perceptual groupings convey meaning about modelled 
objects and relations. The implication is that differences in accessibility based on 
perceptual salience only apply in this way to token reference systems such as diagrams 
that provide conditions for derivative meaning (Shimojima, 1999).   
 
2.4.2 Recognition factors 
 
Larkin and Simon (1989) claimed that diagrams can often provide superior support in 
the recognition of information because such information may often be represented 
“explicitly” in diagrams compared to sentences. The recognition argument relates to the 
fact that abstract represented relations or attributes can be encoded as visual or spatial 
attributes of tokens in diagrams. This in turn allows them to be recognised as graphical 
attributes of visual objects. As an example, they consider how the emergent point of 
intersection between lines in a Cartesian graph of supply demand data conveys the 
equilibrium between the two variables. As a contrast, they consider the qualitative 
differences in accessing the implicitly represented information in an information 
equivalent table. In the graph case they suggest that the information would be 
automatically recognised by pattern specific productions, whereas the table would 
require numerous production steps to elaborate. They, however, point out that 
efficiencies in recognition depend on the possession of the relevant productions. Hence, 
quick and efficient recognition of equilibrium information in a graph is only likely to 
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occur if a user has leant and practised this in the past and thus have the relevant 
productions.   
 
A further related recognition advantages can be seen in cueing accounts of diagram 
configuration originally proposed by Koedinger and Anderson (1990). Recall that, in 
Koedinger and Anderson’s (1990) model DC-schemas include reference to a prototype 
image, which can be matched against diagram configurations. In their model the image 
of a diagram configuration cues access to DC-schemas. Other accounts such as Lane, 
Cheng and Gobet's (2000) CHREST+ model also suggest that diagram configurations 
cue access to chunks.  In their model, the chunk cueing occurs in the service of accessing 
a corresponding schema chunk for constructing a configuration in an alternative system 
of representation. It is worth noting that similar effects are also widely reported in chess 
playing in which expert chess players are able to select successful moves from game 
configurations without having to look-ahead through the many combinations of 
possibilities. Research suggests that they are able to do this by exploiting an extensive 
memory of different chess configurations (e.g., Chase & Simon, 1973). Perceptual 
chunking is a commonly considered basis for accessibility effects in diagrammatic 
reasoning, but is arguably limited to explanations of practised/expert problem solving 
behaviour. 
 
An alternative perspective on recognition effects of alternative representations comes 
from the work of Zhang (1997). Zhang frames graphical cognition in a distributed 
cognition framework that proposes that: (1) structure and knowledge in ER tasks is 
distributed across internal and external ERs; (2) structure in ERs can be directly picked 
up by perceptual operators and acted on without deliberative processing or holding an 
internal model of represented information; and (3) ERs influence “what information can 
be perceived, what processes can be activated, and what structures can be discovered” 
(p.  179, Zhang, 1997). 
 
In one study Zhang (1997) conducted a series of experiments using different 
isomorphisms of the tic tac toe (or noughts and crosses) problem. In the normal 
representation of the problem (Figure 2.4a), different classes of positions have different 
structural properties that can be exploited in game playing. Namely, certain sets of 
positions are visually symmetrical (i.e. corners, sides, centre); sets of visually 
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symmetrical positions have the same number of winning opportunities (e.g., any corner 
has three possible ways of being in a win) and different symmetry groups have different 
numbers of winning opportunities (e.g., the centre position can win in four ways 
compared to three ways for corners and two ways for sides).   
 
Zhang (1997) considers the symmetry of groups and number of winning opportunities 
associated with them to be perceptual invariants that provide action affordances; 
therefore, framing ER properties in terms of the ecological theory of vision (Gibson, 
1986). One critical affordance proposed to be elicited by the standard representation is a 
choice strategy for selecting positions that have the most wins. Zhang created alternative 
isomorphic representations which carry the same structural information using 
combinations of different visual, spatial and semantic properties.  As a result, the 
different isomorphisms vary in terms of their accessibility of different problem critical 
classes of information. The different isomorphisms are shown below in Figure 2.4. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4. Tic Tac Toe isomorphism used in Zhang’s (1997) study (p. 188). Each 
isomorphism differs in the accessibility of task relevant invariants. 
 
Zhang (1997) tested participants playing against a computer program. In different 
experiments the strategy of the computer program was varied in terms of whether the 
bias afforded by the representation was consistent or not with preventing the opponent 
program from winning. One of the key findings was that the accessibility of invariant 
information in the different isomorphisms tended to be associated with eliciting the 
hypothesised biases. These biases occurred in experiments where they were either 
consistent or partially inconsistent with the opponent’s game playing strategy. In short, 
Zhang argued that the findings support the view that invariant structure elicit strategic 
biases and that the claims were consistent with the distributed cognition framework of 
ER based problem solving outlined above. 
(a) (b) (c) (d) 
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What Zhang’s (1997) research suggests is that the cognitive system can learn to anchor 
intentions and actions on perceptual configurations in an ER. When information in a 
representation has no direct perceptual correspondence or the correspondence has low 
salience then the formulation and/or subsequent selection of a strategy is less likely to 
occur. Zhang does not give an explicit model of the internal representations (i.e. 
perceptual) and processes that are supposed to occur in the recruitment of affordances.  
It has been suggested that affordances, in the sense used by Zhang, can be modelled by 
productions that have perceptual patterns as conditions as described by Vera and Simon 
(1993). If viewed in this way, Zhang’s perceptual affordance account does not seem 
distinguishable from perceptual chunking accounts of recognition used to explain 
processing advantages of (learnt) diagram use (e.g., Larkin & Simon, 1987; Koedinger 
& Anderson, 1990).      
 
Superior accessibility effects of perceptual chunking of diagram configurations is 
complicated by the fact that expressions of notations are also configurations which can 
be learnt perceptually and schematised like diagram configurations. Indeed, there is 
evidence and process models which also assume that users are able to recognise notation 
configurations and access relevant task knowledge accordingly (e.g., Anderson, 2005). 
There are, however, more important differences such as the fact that diagram 
configurations typically allow large amounts of information to be coded in a perceptually 
simple and distinct way. Mathematical expressions of equivalent information content 
involve complex arrangements of alphanumeric symbols that may often be too 
complicated to perceptually chunk. The combinatorial space of distinct expression in 
notational systems may also often be too vast for instance learning to be exploited to the 
same extent. 
 
2.4.3 Search and working memory 
 
The class of possible accessibility effects worthy of consideration include more indirect 
effects than those resulting from perceptual and recognising processes. Other effects also 
result from search and memory requirements. Larkin and Simon (1987) claimed that 
diagrams often limit the amount of search for information because different attributes of 
representing tokens that need to be used together are available at the same token location 
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in diagrams. This is because diagrams are token reference systems. This can be 
contrasted with sentential representations in which symbols denoting different attributes 
of a represented token may be embedded in different sentences at different spatial 
locations. In comparable information integration tasks, sentential representation may 
often require matching extracted attributions about an individual across different 
sentences. Larkin and Simon’s argument is concerned primarily with the search 
requirements. There are also factors relating to expectations about how relational 
information is manifested in token situations compared to sentential structures which 
may also be relevant to explaining search advantages.   
 
Many researchers claim that diagrams and other ERs can function as memory aids (e.g., 
Larkin & Simon, 1987; Zhang, 1997). The availability of memory resources may also be 
considered an indirect factor in accessibility of a representation. Encoding of expressions 
typically involves some degree of serial or piecemeal processing of representing symbols 
that contribute to an expression. Accessibility is compromised when memory resources 
are not available to encode and interrelate expressions. Pylyshyn (2003) proposes that 
mechanisms of spatial indexes are exploited in visual reasoning and contribute to the 
efficiency of using diagrams because they allow the cognitive system to keep track of 
referents without the need to internally represent their contents in working memory. 
Other researchers have also developed similar accounts of spatial indexing to explain 
computational offloading in the environment (Ballard, Hayhoe, Pook & Rao, 1997).  
However, like other perceptual effects, the advantage is only meaningful in the space of 
token reference systems. 
 
2.4.4 Prior knowledge and skill 
 
Larkin and Simon (1987) make the general claim that diagrams often support perceptual 
inferences that are easy for the cognitive system to processes. In many cases they claim 
that these inferences depend on primitive visual spatial productions that, through high 
levels of practice, allow inferences to be made with very little effort. Their claim about 
visual inferences is independent of whether the inferred content is visual spatial or 
conceptual. Perceptual inferences are thus about the perceptual production conditions 
for inference and therefore related to the issue of recognition. As the efficacy of 
perceptual inference in diagrams is claimed to be based on having the necessary 
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productions acquired through learning and practice, alternative non diagrammatic forms 
of representation may also have the potential to support highly efficient inferences. As 
an example, Larkin and Simon consider the case of a logician given extended practice in 
the use of logical notations, who could arguably make logical inferences from such 
expressions with comparable computational efficiency.   
 
As noted earlier, Stenning and Oberlander’s (1995) theory was basically silent about the 
arguably important role of accessibility in explaining advantages of diagrams in 
reasoning. In a subsequent article, Stenning, et al., (1995) seems to address this issue 
arguing that any account of the computational complexity of representations must be 
“supplemented” by an account of the availability of constraints that limit their 
expressiveness. The authors seem to propose that diagrams (presumably the representing 
ontology) allow users to tap into prior knowledge given only a few basic facts about the 
system such as meta-logical properties like transitivity of spatial containment. They 
claim, however, that systems which use an abstract syntax (i.e. maths notations) require 
extensive learning to exploit their expressiveness. They suggest that the availability of 
constraints in diagrams explains why they are often employed by student in early stages 
of learning about abstract mathematical domains, but that students often switch to more 
powerful abstract notations when they become knowledgeable of them and the domain. 
Larkin and Simon (1987) also seem to make a similar point. Recall that the authors argue 
that highly efficient perceptual inferences in diagrammatic reasoning are dependent on 
practice. They also suggest that such inferences are likely to occur with notations given 
sufficient practice and expertise. The kind of prior knowledge these authors appear to be 
appealing to is visual spatial knowledge that underpins peoples' ability to reason about 
relations such as containment and linear ordering (although they are admittedly less than 
explicit about what they mean). 
 
Prior knowledge of how to reason in visual spatial domains is not only predicted from 
people's continual engagement in everyday physical activities, but by a considered 
recognition that a significant amount of abstract thought seems to involve visual spatial 
domains. According to cognitive linguistics and some psychologists, spatial cognitive 
domains for thinking about containment, paths, and so on, are used ubiquitously to 
conceptualise and reason about abstract domains. Lakoff and Johnson (1999) claim that 
people employ spatial schemas like containment to think about abstract relationships like 
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class membership in order to project and exploit structural constraints available in the 
spatial domain, which are supposedly lacking in the abstract domains (for example, the 
authors consider the transitive structure of spatial containment to reason about sets). 
Lakoff and Nuñez (2000) propose a cognitive semantics account of mathematical 
concepts. Although the authors do not explicitly address diagrammatic reasoning, many 
of their assumptions about the structure and origin of mathematical concepts are based 
on integrated spatial domains in diagrammatic representations. The authors claim that 
mathematical concepts are constructed by conceptual blending of so called image 
schemas concerned with conceptual domains such as containment, paths, linear scales, 
orientations, etc. Independently of the reasons why spatial domains are apparently so 
ubiquitous in thought, the assertion that they are suggests some prior foundation for 
familiarity, particularly in the exploitation of structural constraints as suggested by 
Stenning, Inder and Neilson (1995). 
 
Another kind of effect of prior knowledge in diagrammatic reasoning occurs in the use 
of iconic diagrams which depict physical objects configurations in recognizable forms. 
Research by Narayanan, et al. (1995) investigated these issues in the context of 
mechanical reasoning about labelled iconic diagrams. The authors reported research in a 
task that required predicting the mechanical operations of a device by incrementally 
hypothesising the interaction of casually connected components in the system.  The task 
examines the use of prior knowledge not represented in the diagram such as the causal 
behaviour of components. The authors developed a task analysis and then collected data 
of a small number of participants solving the problem. The experimental task employed 
mixed protocols including verbal reports, pointing/tracing gestures, as well as drawing. 
The authors then developed a cognitive process model of their behaviour and evaluated 
it against the data. The task analysis and models explored assumptions about how the 
depicted information could be used to infer the sequence of processes in the device. The 
authors claimed that the task analysis and behavioural protocols supported the view that 
diagrams helped guide users' attention to causally related/connected components in 
reasoning about consequential behaviour of components; they also supported access to 
conceptual knowledge about represented mechanical components, inferred hypotheses 
about their behaviour, and helped users visualise/animate components in the diagram. 
Iconic diagrams are a class of ERs in which prior knowledge is purposefully exploited 
in making conceptual knowledge accessible about represented information. 
  
43 
 
2.4.5 Token reference & direct conceptualisation 
 
Another reason why diagrams may have favourable accessibility in contrast to sentence 
based systems is because represented tokens in diagrams are directly conceptualised, 
whereas this is rarely the case in sentence based representations. Direct conceptualisation 
of represented tokens is typically afforded in diagrams because they are normally token 
reference systems in contrast to sentences, which are normally type reference systems. 
There are additional processing requirements implied in interpreting model information 
from type reference systems, including the necessary abstract syntactic processing and 
the requirement to internally represent individuals and selected relations between them 
(as opposed to perceiving them). These additional processing requirements in type 
reference systems arguably differentiate the accessibility of acquiring information 
compared to when the same information is represented in a token reference system. 
 
2.4.6 Analogical correspondence 
 
The view that diagrammatic ERs are analogical representations because they embody 
systematic structural correspondences to what they represent is widely discussed in the 
literature (e.g., Cheng, 2002; Myers & Konolige, 1995; Sloman, 1971; Gurr, 1998; 
Stenning, 2002). Some research suggests that the degree of structure correspondence 
between the diagram and its represented domain may contribute to the accessibility of 
diagrams.  In research investigating the effectiveness of ERs for problem solving Cheng 
(2002) has proposed designing representations that closely model the conceptual 
structure of the represented domain because, according to the author, such 
representations will tend to be semantically transparent. Cheng uses the term semantic 
transparency as a synonym to the notion of semantic accessibility. Cheng's view of 
semantic transparency is not about visual properties of a representation, but about the 
interdependent system of correspondences that hold between the diagram and its 
represented domain – in other words, its analogical correspondence. Similar views come 
from the work of Stenning (2002). These authors also appeal to the systematicity 
property of analogical correspondence in diagrams. Systematicity is a term used in 
theories of analogy to refer to the depth of structural dependencies shared between two 
analogues. The correspondence property is interesting because research in analogical 
reasoning suggests that analogies are preferred when there is a systematic relation 
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between them (e.g., Gentner, 1983). This would make sense because being able to reason 
validly in a representing domain about a represented domain depends on the 
systematicity that holds between the two analogues.     
 
2.4.7 Visual abduction 
 
There are perhaps more elusive aspects of the visual systems that are at work and are 
being exploited in diagrammatic reasoning. Pylyshyn (2003) alludes to the capacity of 
the visual system to make abductions from instances of diagrammatic representations.  
He claims that people are able to “see” universal properties that hold over a given set of 
instances (i.e. laws) from a single instance of a representation.  For example, consider 
Figure 2.5 in which according to Pylyshyn one can see that if a line is drawn from the 
bottom vertices (D and C) to any point on the opposite side the line will intersect either 
at or below the mid-line of (m-m'). One can establish that this holds for any rectangle. 
Pylyshyn (2003) argues that the involvement of the visual systems in such activities 
“goes beyond recognising that a certain pattern or property is present in a particular 
instance... visual perception appears to be the source of the generalization in the first 
instance” (p. 447). Pylyshyn points out that going from particular instances to universals 
is a general property of the visual information processing system. He suggests that such 
computations are at work when people perceive and exploit visual spatial generalisation 
in diagrammatic reasoning.      
 
Figure 2.5.  A simple demonstration of the capacity to apprehend universal constraints 
in diagrams. If a line is drawn from the bottom vertices (D and C) to any point on the 
opposite side, the line will intersect either at or below the mid-line of (m-m'). 
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2.5 Abduction and Evaluation 
 
An overarching objective of this research is to explore the hypothesis that diagrams help 
a user to figure out how to go about solving a problem (i.e. formulate a solution 
procedure). A central proposal is that diagrams confer processing advantages in 
facilitating the construction and evaluation of hypotheses, particularly of an explanatory 
nature. Explanation is not a monolithic phenomenon, but applies to different kinds of 
domain knowledge. Diagrams or representations that function as models more generally 
are used to support a kind of structural explanation in which structural constraints of the 
representation explain possibilities of a represented system (e.g., a Euler diagram may 
be used to explain why a conclusion logically follows from a set of premises).          
 
There are a number of areas of diagrammatic reasoning research where abduction and 
evaluation of an explanatory hypothesis have been considered including learning, 
discovery, informal and formal contexts for making proofs. Whilst intuitions about the 
advantages of diagrams in supporting figuring out what to do are common, there have 
been no coherent cognitive models of such phenomena in the Cognitive Science 
literature. The following section will review research and accounts of related 
phenomena. These include research on the role of abduction in discovery with diagrams, 
adduction in the context of learning with diagrams, and the role of diagrams in evaluating 
the validity of hypotheses. 
 
2.5.1 Abduction in discovery 
 
Cheng and Simon (1995) reported a system called HUYGENS that simulates the process 
of law induction from diagrammatic representations. The idea is motivated by the 
conjecture that diagrammatic representations may have played an important role in 
helping early scientists like Huygens discover laws such as momentum conservation. 
The central argument is that constraints in the diagrams, which model laws of a domain, 
may have been abstracted in the course of experimentation and analysis with 
representations of different data sets. The authors developed the HUYGENS system in 
order to investigate and evaluate the hypothesis. HUYGENS discovers the law of 
momentum conservation from a class of 1-D diagrams. The diagrammatic scheme used 
models the variables (i.e. mass and velocity) and relations of a particular collision 
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between two objects. The length of parallel line segments are used to represent the 
proportional mass of objects and their velocity before and after the collision.   
 
HUYGENS models the process of constructing diagrams from data and comparing high-
order relations of the represented data to find underlying laws, which it can formulate in 
algebraic terms. The HUYGENS system comprises diagrammatic data structures, 
operators for constructing and modifying diagrams, regularity spotters and heuristics for 
controlling search. The system has operators that generate and modify diagrammatic 
representations to reveal relations between variables. Operators plot variables such as 
line segments, determine arithmetic relations by arranging lines in geometrical 
configurations (e.g., the add operator redraws lines end to end), and re-represent diagram 
configurations as normalised variables. Regularity spotters identify relations that are 
common to different data sets represented in diagrams, such as whether differences 
between types of lines are constant, equal or involve the same relative quantity to other 
lines, etc. HUYGENS discovers the law of momentum conservation in a series of cycles 
of operator application and regularity spotting. When a pattern is detected, the system 
infers a law about the pattern. The system uses several domain specific heuristics to 
select data and operators. 
 
The authors claim that the efficiency of the induction process is facilitated by 
accessibility advantages in search and recognition afforded by the diagram. The system 
is able to exploit powerful operators and regularity spotters, such as considering triplets 
of lines in one go. The authors claim that the power of these rules reduce the size of the 
search space relative to the search space implicated by the use of algebraic notations. 
The HUYGENS system does not explicitly commit to any empirical constraints on 
cognitive processing or attempt to model how in real time a scientist could make such a 
discovery. Whilst the authors explicate the operators and patterns-spotters used in the 
model, no qualification is given about how cognitively realistic they are intended to be.   
 
 
2.5.2 Abduction in learning 
 
Another context where abductive reasoning is exploited with diagrammatic ERs is in 
learning. One line of research is the so called self-explaining effect. Self-explaining was 
a term employed by Chi, Bassok, Lewis, Reimann and Glaser (1989) to describe the 
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meta-cognitive strategies of students who, in the course of learning, are more likely to 
engage in explaining ideas, justifying solution procedures and monitoring their own 
problem solving behaviour. The research of Chi et al. (1989) suggest that students who 
engage in self-explaining behaviour typically perform better in learning tasks than 
students who do not. Self-explaining is not a very well defined psychological construct. 
Attempts at explicating exactly what the process of self-explaining entails was addressed 
in computational modelling research reported by VanLehn, Jones and Chi (1992), who 
modelled self-explaining as involving abductive reasoning. 
 
Although initial research on self-explaining effects were not about diagrammatic 
representations, the research prompted others to connect the findings of Chi, et al. (1989) 
with observations about diagrammatic reasoning, resulting in conjectures that diagrams 
may facilitate self-explanation in the process of learning (Cox, 1999; Brna, Cox & Good, 
2001).  Empirical evidence in support of this hypothesis comes from a study reported by 
Ainsworth and Loizou (2003). In their experiment, two groups of participants studied 
the human circulatory system. One group received exclusively text based learning 
materials, whereas the other group received materials that included a labelled iconic 
diagram. The authors found that the students who received the materials with a 
diagrammatic illustration performed better in the post test and developed more self-
explanations than those students who received text only materials. The authors claim that 
their findings support the view that diagrams promote self-explaining and suggest 
several possible reasons including freeing up cognitive resources (e.g., working 
memory), the specificity of the representations and making critical information (e.g., 
causal) available that would otherwise need to be inferred from text. 
 
Another line of research relevant to this issue is work on learning with Law Encoding 
Diagrams (LEDs). Cheng (1996) proposed that represented laws encoded by constraints 
in diagrams support learning in abstract domains such as Mathematics and Physics. 
Cheng hypothesised that advantages of law encoding diagrams exploited by scientists in 
discovery may also generalise to conceptual learning. He claims that law encoding 
diagrams support learning of coherent networks of knowledge because they allow users 
to apprehend the laws of the domain from different instances of represented situations 
and from the different perspectives normally available in complex diagrams. Cheng is 
therefore referring to is a capacity of LEDs to support modelling and abstraction 
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activities that are explained by laws modelled by the diagrammatic system. Several 
empirical studies with novel LEDs give some support to these arguments. These studies 
involved comparisons of LEDs with traditional ERs often involving mathematical 
notations based on a combination of semantic analyses and longitudinal learning 
experiments. Cheng appeals to notions of conceptual integration and explanatory 
coherence in attempting to frame why such benefits may occur, but provides no process 
explanation of the abductive component of learning with LEDs. 
 
2.5.3 Evaluation: Testing and verification 
 
Another important function of diagrams concerns the evaluation or verification of 
inferences about abstractions that hold in some represented model. According to Peirce's 
framework, inferred explanatory hypotheses are subsequently verified by deductive 
methods. A canonical context of verifying abstractions using diagrams occurs in cases 
of demonstrating a visual proof in domains such as Geometry. A simple example 
illustrated by Lindsay (2002) is the visual proof of Pythagoras such that the area of a 
parallelogram equals the product of its height and base length as shown below. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.6.  A simple visual proof demonstrating that the area of a parallelogram is the 
product of the length of its height and base. 
 
The above example shows a classical diagrammatic proof which involves manipulating 
the structure of the diagrams, which can be done by redrawing or mental animation.  
According to traditional views on mathematical reasoning, only proofs expressed in 
precise formal languages are valid. Under this view, diagrams are apparently unsound 
for making proofs despite the fact that diagrams are widely used in mathematical 
demonstrations. According to Barwise and Etchemendy (1995), this view occurred 
because of errors made by earlier mathematicians that were incorrectly attributed to the 
accompanying diagrams used in the proof rather than human error. This assumption has 
been challenged by a number of researchers working on diagrammatic reasoning in fields 
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of logic and AI (e.g., Sloman, 1971; Barwise & Etchemendy, 1995; Stenning & 
Oberlander 1995). 
 
Researchers contest to the view that diagrams are ubiquitously employed as proofs of 
the consistency of represented information (Lindsay, 2002; Shimojima, 2001b) more 
often than formal proofs (e.g. Barwise & Etchemendy, 1995). Using diagrams to access 
and verify explanatory hypotheses is not only confined to the mathematicians’ goals of 
proof formulation, but is more generally employed in contexts of diagrammatic 
cognition in which solution procedures are not known to a user (at least with some level 
of certainty). These include the contexts of learning and discovery, as well as unfamiliar 
or unpractised problem solving contexts. In each case, explanatory hypotheses need to 
be verified.    
 
Some researchers have considered the use of diagrams in evaluating the validity of 
inferences as qualitatively different to establishing validity using sentential ERs. For 
example, Sloman (1971) identifies different senses of truth, a logical sense which can be 
established by the form of sentential expressions and a sense which is established by 
observing the way things are in the world. The observational sense of truth comes in to 
play when using diagrams to verify the validity of some inference.  Lindsay (2002) also 
distinguishes between the formal sense of demonstrating a proof from demonstrating a 
proof with diagrams. Lindsay characterises the diagrammatic sense of proof as a way of 
allowing a user to understand the validity of a proof in an “experiential” way.   
 
What is it about diagrams that support this sense of establishing the validity of some 
inference? Shimojima (2001b) provides one of the most elaborate discussions on this 
issue. He uses the term consistency proof to describe the use of diagrams in 
demonstrating valid state of affairs and discusses several examples. A canonical case 
described is the context of planning the layout of furniture in a room using a scaled iconic 
diagram. Shimojima’s main aim is to propose a logical account of the semantic 
mechanisms that underpin why diagrams satisfy this activity. He attributes this capacity 
in diagrams as being dependent on the auto-consistency property as discussed 
previously. Recall that auto-consistency concerns a capacity exclusive to certain classes 
of diagrams to maintain that its expressions are logically consistent. This occurs for 
different kinds of relations including set and arithmetic. According to Shimojima, the 
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auto-consistency property depends on particular types of matching constraints between 
the representation and the modelled state of affairs. Shimojima also suggests that the 
operations involved in using diagrams as consistency proofs involve what Magnani's 
(2001) calls manipulative abductions, which is a term used to refer to the manipulation 
of scientific devices including diagrams to formulate explanatory hypotheses. 
 
As apprehending the consistency of expressions of an ER is a basis for judging the 
validity of an interpretation, then the property is a plausible determinant of the evaluative 
utility of diagrams in reasoning. The representational account proposed by Shimojima 
(2001b) is also consistent with other accounts of the efficiency of reasoning with 
diagrams (e.g., Sloman, 1971; Stenning, Inder & Neilson, 1995). Shimojima questions 
why diagrammatic models are readily taken as valid given that they are only 
representations after all. As auto-consistency is an information property of diagrams, a 
cognitive explanation of its exploitation needs to account for its accessibility as 
suggested by Stenning, et al., (1995). How and in what way users understand the 
consistency property of diagrams appears to be an elusive and interesting question. 
 
Understanding properties such as auto-consistency is also viewed as depending on 
having something like a theory of the system of the representation. The theory is what 
allows the diagram to be used as an explanation support tool. The theory would allow 
one to understand how different expressive possibilities are constrained by the system. 
This kind of assumption is explicit in a program reported by Lindsay (2002), which uses 
diagrams to demonstrate theorems in Geometry. Lindsay construes the system as a 
competence model claiming that its understanding of a proof can be characterised as “the 
process of confirming that transformations of representations are correct with respect to 
the system’s underlying repertoire of permitted transformations, and thus that the 
situation, fact, or event that is understood is consistent with the system’s “theory” of the 
subject” (p. 267). 
 
Some researchers have also appealed to the nature of the visual system in attempting to 
shed light on consistency proof properties of diagrams. As discussed earlier, Pylyshyn 
(2003) claimed that the visual system plays a role in determining generalisation that 
holds from particular diagrammatic instances. Lindsay (2002) also suggests that 
diagrams exploit evolutionary adapted abilities to process physical laws or constraints. 
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These kinds of claims are not uncommon and there is clearly intuitive appeal to these 
ideas, but they are difficult to evaluate without explicit analytical demonstrations and 
modelling which are invariably lacking.      
 
2.5.4 Meta-cognitive activities and cognitive resources   
 
The capacity of diagrams to support abduction, hypothesise evaluation and other meta-
cognitive activities may also be related to possible reduced cognitive demands of using 
diagrams. For example, Thagard and Shelley (1997) suggest that performing abduction 
through visual reasoning, including the use of diagrams, may have stronger advantages 
over sentential reasoning. They claim that pictorial or diagrammatic representations may 
limit the amount of search for relevant inferences about an explanatory hypothesis 
compared to sentential rule based representations. The authors envisage processing 
advantages in terms production rules that infer the transformation of one graphical state 
to another as visualisations/mental animations. This is compatible with the claims of 
Cheng & Simon (1995), who also report search and recognition advantages in the 
HUYGENS model. Formulating and evaluating alternative explanatory hypotheses are 
likely to depend heavily on executive resources and working memory. If many basic 
operations on diagrams free-up cognitive resources then these resources may be more 
likely to be made available to engage in meta-cognitive activities. 
 
2.6 Cognitive architecture of diagrammatic reasoning 
 
The purpose of this section is to summarize some basic developments in AI research and 
cognitive modelling and identify abstractions about the nature of representation and 
processing in diagrammatic reasoning. 
 
2.6.1 AI systems 
 
A number of researchers in AI have proposed computational frameworks for 
diagrammatic reasoning. Ideas in AI research have been used to inform and constrain 
cognitive theorising and modelling. Early research by Funt (1980) reported a system 
called WHISPER which was capable of inferring the trajectory of a collapsing physical 
structure by a cyclical process of modifying and encoding changes to a diagrammatic 
representation. The system uses a retina consisting of a collection of spatially arranged 
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processors that compute parts of a diagram in parallel, and perceptual primitives, which 
perform tests on image input. Glasgow and Papadias (1995) proposed an array based 
formalism for representing the spatial structure of visual images. The formalism has been 
used to justify and inspire the use of array representations in the cognitive modelling of 
diagrammatic reasoning (e.g., Narayanan, et al., 1995).  Lindsay (1995) proposed a 
knowledge representation ontology for diagrams comprising of a broad set of 
construction and retrieval processes, which have been used as a foundation for 
subsequent proposals. Chandrasekaran et al. (2004) have proposed a general framework 
they call the diagrammatic representational system, which was initially developed in the 
context of applied AI, but has been adopted by some researchers in models developed in 
cognitive architectures such as SOAR and ACT-R. The framework includes a visual 
object ontology including points, curves and regions, and routines which extract 
qualitative and quantitative spatial relations between tokens, project non-veridical 
objects on represented scenes and manipulate the state of the representation. The 
framework is proposed to be uncommitted to what kinds of data structure/ format are 
used to represent the diagrammatic information.   
 
2.6.2 Cognitive models with weak architectural commitments 
 
As described, a number of cognitive models of diagrammatic reasoning have also been 
developed that have made weak commitments about the underlying cognitive 
architecture. For example, Larkin & Simon (1987) employed an abstract production 
system modelling framework using predicate data structures to model both sentential 
and diagrammatic information. Cheng and Simon's (1995) HUYGENS model uses 
attribute value triples to represent 1-d line segments, which are organised recursively in 
accordance with the structure of the modelled diagram. The system includes production 
based operators for constructing and modifying diagrams and domain specific pattern 
matchers for detecting relations between diagrams. The model by Narayanan, et al. 
(1995) used a spatial array representation to model low level “depictive” features of the 
diagram and “descriptive” frames to model higher-level diagrammatic relations. The 
array representation in their model is specified by filling array locations with symbolic 
labels thus, according to the authors, giving rise to its “shape, geometry and 
configuration”. Diagrams frames encode attributes of object such as point, lines and 
areas and conceptual frames represent conceptual attributes of objects. The system also 
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has a number of operators for reading, writing, indexing, scanning and visualisation 
operations. Koedinger and Anderson’s (1990) diagram configuration schemas models 
relations and constraints configuration prototypes. The schemas can be viewed as 
mapping between perceptual representations (i.e. image slots), semantic knowledge (i.e. 
part-whole relations) and operators (i.e. condition to prove) associated with their use. 
Lane, Cheng and Gobet’s (2000) CHREST+ model has a simulated visual attention 
mechanism, which can encode limited information from a diagram and has limited 
capacity short term memory. Chunks akin to diagram configuration schemas are 
modelled in a discrimination network, although details about the information content of 
chunks are not reported. 
 
2.6.3 Cognitive models with stronger architectural commitments 
 
There are also recent models of diagrammatic reasoning reported in literature that 
integrate explicit assumptions about the architectures, particularly of the visual 
processing system. For example, the CAMERA architecture includes a visual iconic 
buffer and distinct what and where buffers. The visual spatial system has its own specific 
operators modelled by production rules. The visual iconic buffer is modelled using a bit 
map representation and associated operators are used to extract visual and spatial 
predicate representations (or node link structures), which are subsequently placed in the 
what and where buffers. The what and where buffers and associated operators function 
as a visual short term memory system. The buffers do not have any capacity limits so the 
system may maintain an unrealistic description of a diagram in problem solving. 
 
Several models of diagrammatic reasoning have been implemented in ACT-R, such as 
models of graph based reasoning (Peebles & Cheng, 2002), and Geometry problem 
solving (Stocco & Anderson, 2008). The standard ACT-R architecture shares visual 
spatial processing components with CAMERA and other general cognitive architectures. 
The architecture consists of a visual module, which contains what and where processing 
systems, including buffers and associated processing functions. It also has an imaginal 
module, which is typically used to model the maintenance and manipulation of visual 
spatial representations. Unlike the visual module, the imaginal module does not have a 
committed chunk ontology or fixed processing functions. ACT-R also has an iconic 
visual memory in which pre-attentive features of object bindings are represented in a 
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retinotopic frame of reference. ACT-R can only attend/process a single visual or spatial 
object chunk at a time. Higher order chunks representing spatial and visual relations 
between attended or imagined objects need to be processed in the imaginal buffer. ACT-
R's visual module thus has resource limitation on the attention and maintenances of 
visual spatial object representations. All operations are initiated by a central production 
system. These models, which inherit the constraints of a developed cognitive 
architecture, have been relatively unspecific about general knowledge ontologies for 
diagrammatic reasoning – with perhaps the exception of Matessa, Archer and Mui 
(2007), who take ideas from the DRS framework. 
 
Mimicking spatial constraints 
Many of the models or systems discussed commit to a base level representation. Such 
representations are either implicit models of spatial coordinate systems or explicit data 
structures that subsume a spatial co-ordinate system (e.g., bitmap, array etc.). In some 
models, the level of representation is also taken to model a more specific cognitive 
structure hypothesised from empirical research such as CAMERA's bitmap model of the 
visual icon buffer. The purpose of these representations, arguably, is to replicate the 
effects of constraints resulting from the spatial properties of diagrams, so that certain 
computations are offloaded on the internal representation of the diagram (e.g., free rides). 
The spatial coordinate systems are of course modelled by numerical co-ordinate systems. 
There are a couple of points worth noting here. Possible constraints in an internal 
representation of space need not exploit anything spatial in the representing medium. 
Indeed, whether assumptions about constraints in an internal representation result from 
properties of the representing medium or are constructed by inferential processes cannot 
be established in any straight forward way. Inferential efficiency of internal 
diagrammatic representations (e.g., free rides in mental animations) may have more to 
do with automaticity or minimal control requirements than the information structure of 
internal representation.   
 
Exploiting inheritance 
Any picture/diagram contains many combinations of relations between representing 
objects. For any given task, a cognitive system will encode, represent or memorise only 
a small subset of those available. Many cognitive models, cognitive architectures and AI 
frameworks assume that visual and spatial relations are locally derived from a base level 
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representation on a need-be basis. The base level representation, as stated, may have a 
coordinate system, which provides the necessary constraints on implicated objects' 
relations. This avoids a combinatorial explosion in relations that a cognitive system 
would have to deal with and maintain. It is also broadly consistent with research 
suggesting that what information is processed and retained in visual spatial tasks is more 
limited and goal directed than suggested by phenomenological impressions.   
 
2.7 Summary and conclusion 
 
The review of research suggests that understanding advantages of reasoning with 
diagrams requires consideration of different interdependent components of a user, task 
and representation. ERs differ in complex multidimensional ways, but there are key 
properties of diagrams that appear to be critical in general explanations of their 
efficiency. 
 
 Diagrammatic systems are typically more inferentially tractable than sentential 
systems from a computation perspective. Inferential tractability results from the 
amount of information in a representation. This tractability is realised in 
modelling and derivation activities. The inferential efficacy of diagrams has been 
demonstrated in research on AI, via task and representational analysis observed 
experimentally with users and has been modelled computationally in various 
contexts. The inferential tractability of a representation does not by itself 
guarantee its cognitive exploitation. 
 The accessibility of information expressed by diagrammatic systems is also a 
critical factor in explaining their processing efficiency. The kinds of information 
accessible in diagrams includes represented states of affairs, transformational 
possibilities and laws that underpin the represented model. Accessibility in 
diagrams and ERs more generally is a multifaceted phenomena in which different 
combinations of representational properties, perceptual and cognitive processing 
may combine in explaining the processes of accessibility. Accessibility 
mechanisms play a role in explaining how the inferential tractability of diagrams 
can be exploited.    
 The hypothesised cognitive benefits of diagrams in the formulation and 
evaluation of solution procedures (i.e. figuring out what to do) appears to depend 
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on the meta-cognitive opportunities they confer. These meta-cognitive 
opportunities derive from representational properties such as auto-consistency 
and relate to the capacity to access and evaluate explanatory hypothesis. The 
suggested benefits of abductive reasoning is a common theme in accounts of 
diagrammatic reasoning, where solution procedures are unknown to the user such 
as in learning and discovery. Opportunities to evaluate explanatory hypotheses 
arise through the capacity to “demonstratively” test and verify them on the 
representation. Such activities exploit a user theory of its consistency and 
(perhaps) assumptions about physical laws that are built in to the visual spatial 
processing system. Other indirect effects may arise through the computational 
efficiency in carrying out solution procedures with diagrams, which free up 
processing resources for meta-cognitive activities.       
 
The research review highlights some general limitations and corresponding requirements 
for the future study of diagrammatic reasoning. These include (a) principled modelling 
of diagrammatic reasoning in empirically constrained cognitive architectures, (b) 
empirical study and computational model of abductive and verification based cognition 
with diagrams, and (c) the study of the process of accessibility and inferential tractability 
in unpractised/unfamiliar diagrammatic problem solving. 
 
 Many of the computational accounts of diagrammatic reasoning reported in the 
literature are abstract or implemented in general cognitive architectures that 
enforce empirically informed constraints on processing. In particular, realistic 
commitments about working memory limitations, visual spatial processing and 
cognitive control are typically limited. There have been models in empirically 
grounded architectures such as ACT-R, but these models are largely uncommitted 
about the underlying ontology and architecture for reasoning with diagrams. A 
timely contribution will be to explicitly evaluate commitments to modelling 
diagrammatic cognition in principled and more empirically constrained 
architectures and models.    
 
 Although abduction and verification is an important theme in work on 
diagrammatic reasoning, little cognitive research has been done examining in 
detail how such processing is interleaved in unpractised/unfamiliar problem 
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solving contexts. Existing empirical cognitive research on these issues appears 
to be confined to learning (e.g., Ainsworth & Loizou, 2003), whereas contexts 
such as discovery (e.g., Cheng & Simon, 1995) and mathematical reasoning (e.g., 
Lindsay, 2002) have been approached from analytical, AI and modelling 
perspectives.  Research on the use abduction and verification in unpractised 
diagrammatic problem solving tasks will complement research and address more 
generic assumptions about advantages of diagrams that have been assumed by 
researchers. 
 
 Conceptual or computational modelling in diagrammatic reasoning has tended to 
focus on models of practised problem solving behaviour for example, in the case 
of modelling domain experts (e.g., Koedinger & Anderson, 1990), students that 
have undergone training with a diagrammatic system (Lane, Cheng & Gobet, 
2000), participants that have undergone repeated experimental trials (Peebles & 
Cheng, 2002; Zhang, 1997) or competence models of effective strategies that 
would, if performed, take a user practice to master (e.g., Stenning & Oberlander, 
1995; Lindsay, 2002). Other models simulate the computational requirements of 
performing a task in a manner that abstracts over factors that would differentiate 
levels of learning or expertise (e.g., Larkin & Simon, 1987; Cheng & Simon, 
1995). The upshot is that research that comprehensively examines accessibility 
mechanisms and inferential efficiencies in unfamiliar and unpractised problem 
solving contexts where solution procedures are not known to participants would 
be a timely activity. 
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Chapter 3: External Representation in Probability 
Problem Solving 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
3.1.1 Aims & motivation 
 
The general research question of how diagrams confer advantages on the formulation of 
solution procedures through semantic accessibility applies to a range of different 
domains. The research project chose to focus on the domain of probability problem 
solving (PPS) because it satisfies several important or necessary conditions relevant to 
addressing the research question.  These include: 
 
Problem properties 
 Problems afford analytical formulation of solution procedures. PPS problems are 
a characterisable class of convergent mathematical problems in which correct 
solutions depend on the logical structure of the problem data.  Probability 
problems therefore afford logical composition of solution procedures with a 
derivable explanatory structure (i.e. a proof either visual or formal). 
 Problems are sufficiently challenging for investigating solution procedure 
formulation. The domain of PPS appears to be abstract and notoriously difficult 
for students to learn, reflect on and correctly put to use. Research has also 
appealed to the counter intuitive nature of many classes of problems in PPS (e.g., 
Shimojo & Ichikawa, 1989; Fox & Levav, 2004). People’s general knowledge of 
PPS and domains used in PPS (e.g., intuitive set theory) are typically considered 
partially coherent, even following tutoring (e.g., Corter & Zahner, 2007; 
O’Connell, 1999; Cheng 2011). 
 
User requirement 
 Novice participants have sufficient knowledge and skills to formulate solution 
procedures. Individuals, at least in developed civilizations, have a rudimentary 
competence for PPS which they acquire as children (e.g., Piaget & Inhelder, 
1975; Girotto & Gonzales 2008; Falk & Wilkening, 1998). The knowledge 
required to formulate solution procedures depend on general abstract domains 
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for which novice participants possess naive theories or schemas (i.e. chance, sets 
theory, arithmetic and belief modelling). 
 
External representation 
 PPS tasks are supported by diagrams. PPS tasks typically require the 
specification of a model of the problem situation in terms of classes of 
information (i.e. set structure, proportional magnitudes) that diagrams are well 
suited and conventionally used to represent. Indeed, the dependence of PPS on 
external representations is evident by the variety of diagrams and graphics that 
are conditionally used in teaching probability such as Venn diagrams, network 
diagrams, outcome lists and contingency tables (e.g., Cheng, 2011; Corter & 
Zahner, 2007). 
 PPS tasks elicit accessibility effects. There exists a significant body of 
experimental research demonstrating that PPS is notoriously sensitive to the way 
the problems are presented, including linguistic framing and numerical 
representation (e.g., Fox & Levav, 2004; Sloman, Over, Slovak & Stibel, 2003; 
Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995; Girotto & Gonzalez, 2001). Amongst this research 
are a number of studies which appear to show effects of diagrams or graphics on 
the correct formulation of solution procedures (e.g., Brase 2009; Cheng, 2011; 
Yamagishi, 2003; Sloman, et al., 2003). 
 
Taken collectively these facts suggest that PPS is an ideal task domain for investigating 
the research question. 
 
3.1.2 Cognitive research on probability 
 
Written characterisations about probability can be traced as far back to philosophical 
writings of Aristotle. However, it apparently was not until the 17th century that formal 
conceptions of probability began to appear (e.g., Good, 1959).  Hence, probability at 
least in the mathematical sense is a recent cultural development. Indeed, informal 
assessment of chance and possibility is likely to implicate knowledge and skills that are 
fundamental to everyday thinking and independent of recent cultural developments in 
probability.   
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What probability is and how it should be conceptualised has and continues to be a subject 
of debate by philosophers and mathematicians. According to Good (1959), several 
different ways of thinking about probability have been developed over the last few 
hundred years. One common distinction that is made is between subjective sense of 
probability (in which probability is understood in terms of degrees of belief assigned to 
propositions) and the so called frequentist sense of probability (in which probability is 
understood objectively in terms of outcome frequencies that result in experimental 
setups). 
 
Mixed interpretations and debates about the proper characterisation of probability have 
also arguably been reflected in cognitive psychological characterisations of probability, 
perhaps, in part, because of its conceptually elusive nature. There are, however, other 
factors about probability and cognition that have also introduced confusion and varied 
opinions, including the distinction between people's cognitive theories/schemas of 
probability, and systems of the cognitive architectural that learn and respond according 
to probabilities of sampled distributions (e.g., declarative memory). 
 
Cognitive research on reasoning about probability has focused on a number of areas 
typically implicating researchers from different academic backgrounds.   
 
 Research investigating strategies and errors in heuristic approaches to making 
probability judgements are often called non-extensional reasoning about 
probabilities (Tversky & Kanehman, 1974). This research has aimed at deriving 
implications for understanding errors in probability judgements in natural and 
critical decision making contexts such as medical, legal and financial domains.   
 Research examining the development of children’s understanding and 
competence of probability at different stages of intellectual development (e.g., 
Piaget & Inhelder, 1975; Falk & Wilkening, 1998; Girotto & Gonzalez, 2008). 
The research has been used to constrain theoretical accounts of the source and 
nature of knowledge and processes that underpin reasoning and judgements 
about probability. 
 Educationally oriented research investigating the relationship problem 
representation and performance in PPS tasks (e.g., Cheng, 2011; Corter & 
Zahner, 2007; O’Connell 1999).  Such research tends to be directed at deriving 
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pedagogical implications about the nature of task and representation in teaching 
and learning. 
 Research oriented an understanding why certain classes of probability problems 
are difficult or counter intuitive for individuals (e.g., Shimojo & Ichikawa, 1989). 
Many classes of problems that tend to elicit certain errors have been identified 
often involving conditional probabilities (e.g., Prisoner problem, Monty Hall 
Dilemma). This research is mainly directed at determining theoretical accounts 
of reasoning about probability, although pedagogical implications may 
sometimes be appealed to (e.g., Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi, Girotto, Legrenzi & 
Caverni, 1999; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995). 
 
This excludes for consideration research that is not strictly about PPS in the 
mathematical sense. The relevant distinction is often called extensional or non-
extensional reasoning about probability.     
 
3.1.3 Extensional vs. non-extensional reasoning 
 
Extensional reasoning1 about probability may be ‘roughly’ considered a mathematical or 
analytical approach to determining probability of some possibility. Johnson-Laird, et al., 
(1999) eloquently define extensional reasoning about probability as “inferring the 
probability of an event from the different ways it could occur” (p. 63). Extensional 
reasoning therefore assumes that the problem solver needs to exhaustively represent the 
set of relevant outcomes (i.e. extension) to determine a calculated solution. Extensional 
reasoning is notably considered to depend in part on deductive rather than inductive 
reasoning (e.g., Johnson-Laird, et al., 1999). 
 
Extensional reasoning about probabilities can be distinguished from non-extensional 
reasoning about probability, which does not require modelling sets of relevant 
possibilities. Examples of such research come from influential studies of Tversky and 
Kanheman (e.g., Tversky & Kanheman , 1974).  Their research aimed at determining to 
what extent human reasoning about probabilities accords with the results of Bayesian 
                                                 
1 In this thesis we also use the term probability problem solving (e.g., Corter & Zahner, 2007) to involve 
extensional rather than non-extensional reasoning about probability. The term ‘problem solving’ highlights 
the broad cognitive requirements of the probability tasks, which are a more realistic characterisation. 
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Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in Philosophy. As a 
student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice, and also 
participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations. 
 
Which is more probable?  
 Linda is a bank teller. 
 Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement. 
calculus. Tversky and Kanheman (1983) observed that participants often made errors in 
their probability judgements that appeared to be consistent with the use of heuristics 
strategies. Their studies identified a number of different types of errors or biases based 
on different heuristics such as the representativeness and availability heuristics. As an 
example, consider the canonical problem below, which is known to elicit the so called 
conjunction fallacy.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 3.1. The Linda problem known to elicit the conjunction fallacy. 
 
Tversky and Kanheman (1983) found that when participants were given this problem 
information 85% of them considered the second option (i.e. Linda is a bank teller and 
active in the feminist movement) as being more probable. The popular answer is 
incorrect because of set constraints. A conjunction of outcomes cannot have a greater 
probability than any of the single outcomes alone because the conjunction set must be in 
either of the sets of its conjuncts. In this particular example, the researchers suggested 
that participants employ a representativeness heuristic to make intuitive judgements. 
That is, participants judge the incorrect hypothesis as being more probable because it is 
more representative of the assumed data (i.e. the description of Linda). Such reasoning 
strategies are often characterised as inductive in contrast to the proposed deductive 
approach of extensional reasoning (e.g., Johnson-Laird, et al., 1999). 
 
An important question, which has been raised by a number of authors, concerns the 
conditions in which participants choose to employ extensional strategies rather than non-
extensional reasoning strategies (e.g., Johnson-Laid, et al., 1999). Problems used in 
empirical studies invoking extensional reasoning often involve a numerical specification 
of problem data, whereas problems invoking non-extensional reasoning do not and may 
also request judgements rather than calculated values. In addition, assumption about 
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participant knowledge of the data in the problem description also appears to be a critical 
factor. Problems that evoke non-extensional reasoning typically depend on learnt 
expectations (e.g., people involved in political activism will be concerned about social 
justice), whereas problems that evoke extensional reasoning involve arbitrary data (i.e. 
probabilities or frequencies of outcomes) that are novel to the problem solver.   
 
3.1.4 Chapter plan 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to review relevant research on representational effects on 
solution procedure formulation in PPS tasks (aka. extensional reasoning about 
probability). In section 3.2, we will consider theoretical frameworks within which PPS 
has been conceptualised. The main aim of this section is to provide the reader with an 
initial conceptual outline to interpret subsequent issues on PPS addressed in the chapter. 
In section 3.3, research will be reviewed on accessibility effects of PPS tasks mainly 
identifying effects of solution procedure formulation. The main aim of this section is to 
understand the variety and scope of accessibility effects in PPS as well as the validity of 
specific theoretical interpretations. In section 3.4, we will consider empirical research 
and assumptions about prior knowledge, cognitive strategies and information 
characterisations of novice PPS. The information will be required to constrain 
interpretations of performance effects and the development of task analysis and process 
models. In section 3.5, we will summarise the research considering limitation on existing 
research, constraints on information processing account of PPS and theoretical 
implications regarding the fundamental research question being addressed in this thesis. 
 
3.2 Theoretical approaches to PPS 
 
The following section outlines some of the main theories and accounts of PPS and 
subtypes (i.e. conditional reasoning) in the research literature. Doing this at the outset 
will afford appreciation of the theoretical context behind different research themes and 
issues that will be separately addressed in subsequent sections of this chapter. The section 
will consider the following theories: ecological rationality approach, mental models 
theory, nested set theories, dual processing theories and accounts that focus on particular 
aspects of PPS such as strategies. The section will end by comparing and contrasting 
these different approaches. 
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3.2.1 Ecological rationality & natural sampling 
 
The Ecological Rationality theory argues that PPS, particularly problems involving 
conditional probabilities, depend on the recruitment of adaptively evolved cognitive 
algorithms that compute probabilities from natural sampling. The term natural sampling 
is used to refer to sequential acquisition of outcome experiences overtime. In support of 
natural sampling, the authors consider research consistent with the proposal that human 
and animal minds have evolved mechanisms to learn and behave according to the 
statistical structure of outcomes in their environment. To contextualise this idea 
Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995) provide an example of a fictitious scenario of a doctor 
who, over time, would witness patients with different symptoms, some of whom turn out 
to have some disease rather than another. According to the authors, such observations 
alone would allow the doctor to make subsequent estimations about the conditional 
probability of a patient having some previously observed disease given some symptom. 
The critical claim they focus on is that such estimations are based on exposure to 
frequencies of observed cases. The cognitive algorithms that have purportedly evolved 
for estimating probabilities based on natural sampled cases are proposed to have a 
specific input format, namely frequencies of observed cases.   
 
Explanations about input format are used to make predictions about people's ability to 
make Bayesian probability estimations as a function of the way the problem is presented. 
In other words, the authors appeal to an accessibility hypothesis to support their theory.  
According to their account, performance should be facilitated in conditional probability 
problems to the extent that the data of the problem matches the format of the natural 
sampling algorithm. What they call frequency formats, which include whole number 
specification of possible cases, should facilitate performance relative to probability, 
which are normalised fractions. Part of their argument is also motivated by the 
independent explanatory claim that probability formats are more computationally 
complex than frequency formats because, according to their analyses, the latter requires 
less operations, attention to fewer units of information (e.g., base rates can be ignored), 
and permits the posterior distribution to be computed from frequencies per se. 
 
Proponents of this view have acquired empirical evidence that frequency formats better 
facilitate reasoning than probability formats in conditional probability tasks. There are 
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varieties of particular interpretations of natural sampling accounts. For example, Barbey 
and Sloman (2007) distinguish between three related accounts. Some researchers have 
proposed the existence of specialised evolutionary adapted modules for computing 
probabilities based on natural sampling (Cosmides & Tooby 1996). In response to 
criticisms, proponents more recently adapted the interpretation of frequency formats of 
natural sampling arguing that natural sampling algorithms are tuned to the parsing of 
whole objects and events (e.g., Brase, 2009). 
 
There are a number of problems with this account. Those criticisms dealing problem 
presentation predictions of the theory will be addressed in the next section. The other 
main problems with this account are conceptual. As noted by Johnson-laird et al. (1999), 
it is difficult, if not impossible, to test evolutionary theories. However, the biggest 
problem is that the idea that individuals apply an evolutionary adapted Bayesian 
cognitive algorithm to solve word problems has little plausibility. Such cognitive 
algorithms are viewed as if they were part of the cognitive architecture like those 
implicated in lower level visual processes. This is a counter intuitive characterisation for 
a task that clearly requires high-level deliberative planning, reasoning and evaluation to 
arrive at a solution. Indeed, such tasks require participants to figure out what the problem 
is and how to solve it, and it is these processes that play a significant role in performance 
differences (others may be errors in carrying out a plan).  At least some of the reasoning 
behind carrying out steps of the task appear to be available to conscious awareness as 
has been reported in studies involving verbal protocol analysis (e.g., Shimojo & 
Ichkawa, 1989; Fox & Levav, 2004; etc.) implying that they are unlikely to be the results 
of evolved cognitive algorithms. Note that participants in their experiment spend on 
average approximately 5 minutes to solve each problem (reportedly 15 problems in first 
session taking on average 73 minutes), which is consistent with the idea that they were 
figuring out how to solve the problem, that is, formulating a solution procedure. 
 
3.2.2 Mental models theory 
 
The Mental Models theory (e.g., Johnson-Laird, et al., 1999) is aimed specifically at 
naïve extensional reasoning about probability. Mental model theory was originally 
developed to explain research in deductive reasoning and language comprehension. In 
short, the theory proposes that individuals, who are naive to formal probability, solve 
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problems by constructing mental models. The authors define mental models as a 
“representation of a possibility that has a structure and a content that captures what is 
common to the different ways in which the possibility might occur” (p. 66, Johnson-Laird, 
et al., 1999).  A central property of mental models that distinguish them from other kinds 
of representations is that they represent only true possibilities. An example of the mental 
models that should be constructed for the disjunctive statement such as ‘There is a circle 
or there is a triangle, but not both’ would be |circle| |triangle| where each closed bracket 
represents a model (Johnson-laird et al. actually use an array notation in which rows are 
models). The construction of mental models is a typical rather than an absolute 
prediction. According to the theory, an individual may also, under certain circumstances, 
construct fully explicit models which represent what is false through negation. Fully 
explicit models for the statement would be |circle ¬triangle||¬circle triangle|. 
 
The theory attempts to explain performance on a range of different types of probability 
problems varying in terms of the logical connective used to describe the query and 
premises.  Emphasis in the theory is given to the deductive nature of the task and the 
requirements to construct models from the premises. A key characterisation of the theory 
is that predictions of constructed models correspond to different partitions of 
possibilities. The theory is described by a set of principles which are, with one exception 
(i.e. the truth principle), specific to PPS rather than general mental models theory. A 
central and intrinsic principle of the theory is the truth principle, which states that 
participants will tend to construct mental models of true possibilities rather than fully 
explicit models. The other principles stated by the theory are basically procedural 
specifications for dealing with features of probability problems namely assumptions of 
equiprobability (equiprobability principle), how probabilities are quantified 
(proportionality principle), how and when to deal with unequal possibilities (numerical 
representation), and how conditional probabilities are determined (subset principle).   
 
The central component of mental models theory is its account of the extensional 
representation that people use. However, this account makes few commitments about the 
nature of internal representations employed in PPS. Such proposals abstract over the 
different ways that participants may internally model problem situations. These include 
the particular dimensions of a problem they represent, how representing referents are 
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conceptualised, and if they use abstract ERs what kind of structure is being represented 
and what kinds of constraints are being exploited from it. 
 
Another point worth noting is that many of the principles of the theory have no relation 
to mental models theory per se, and there is no new explanatory information gained from 
their integration. For example, the equiprobability principle, in short, states that 
individuals will assume equiprobability unless given information to the contrary. 
Probability is a case in which the authors attempt to glean some coherence between 
mental models theory and the principle when they claim “equiprobability applies to 
mental models and mental models represents only what is true within true possibilities” 
(p. 69, Johnson-Laird, et al., 1999).  But there is nothing in mental models theory which 
constrains or shows any explanatory connection for the assumption of equiprobability.  
It is wise to note that the term mental models has multiple and sometimes unspecific 
meanings in cognitive science literature, which should not be confused with the 
particular theory of PPS reported by Johnson-Laird, et al. (1999).  It is uncontroversial 
that PPS depends on models (internal or external) of relevant outcomes irrespective of 
any commitment to this particular theory. 
 
3.2.3 Nested-set accounts 
 
The nested-set account was proposed by a number of authors in direct response to the 
natural sampling accounts of frequency formats (e.g., Mellers & McGraw, 1999; Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1983; Yamagishi, 2003; Sloman, et al., 2003; Girotto & Gonzales, 2001). 
The nested-set account proposes that normative performance on extensional reasoning 
about probability depends on the representing the set structure of the problem situation. 
As such, the account instead explains the effect of frequency format in terms of providing 
more effective cues to access the set structure of prior and posterior outcomes. In other 
words, performance is facilitated to the extent that subset relations are accessible or can 
be formulated from the representation of the problems. In addition to the numerical 
representation used in the word problem description, the account has also been used to 
make predictions about the facilitative effects of diagrams in PPS (e.g., Yamagishi, 2003; 
Sloman, et al., 2003; Brase, 2009). Although the account has been predominately used 
to explain performance on conditional probability problems, it has also been proposed 
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to predict facilitation for a range of different problems and not just conditional 
probability problems (Barbey & Sloman, 2007). 
 
The nested set account has a close affiliation with the mental models theory of PPS 
because both assume that such tasks require extensional representations of relevant 
outcomes and operations to determine subset relations. Indeed, mental models theory 
has also been classified as an exemplar of nested accounts (e.g., Sloman, et al., 2003; 
Barbey & Sloman, 2007).  A weakness of nested accounts is that no clear information 
processing explanations of how subset structure facilitates performance has been 
provided. Indeed, reports of such accounts are typically devoid of any kinds of process 
description of how individuals go about solving probability problems. 
 
Another criticism, concerns the vagueness about what constitutes an extensional 
representation of sets. For example, Sloman, et al. (2003) take the Venn diagram 
representation as a canonical representation of sets, but such representations are 
essentially spatial containment analogies rather than literal models of sets as spatially 
discernible collections. This has arguably lead to confused predictions about what 
graphical representations and combinations of semantic information best represent sets 
and best facilitate performance (e.g., Brase, 2009). 
 
Proponents of nested set accounts may be focusing too narrowly by considering only the 
accessibility of set structure in explaining performance in extensional reasoning tasks. 
This is because set structure is not the only kind of extensional information critical to 
PPS (e.g., proportional relations). One may argue that such accounts of facilitation would 
be more appropriately cast in terms of the accessibility of relevant relational structure of 
the problem situation more generally than set relations per se. 
 
3.2.4 Dual processing accounts 
 
Barbey and Sloman (2007) proposed a dual processing account of reasoning about 
probabilities with a focus on explaining the so-called based rate neglect phenomena.  
Their account is a specific version of a dual processing theory of reasoning for which 
there are others. The account distinguished between an associative and rule-based 
reasoning system (sometimes called type 1 and 2 systems). According to Barbey and 
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Sloman (2007) a “primitive associative judgement system” (type 1) makes responses 
based on principles of similarity/memory retrieval. The rule based system (type 2), on 
the other hand, is involved in representing referents and computing necessary set 
operations from the representation (i.e. extensional reasoning). The rule-based system 
depends on working memory resources and operations that are deliberative and effortful. 
 
According to the theory, base rate neglect results from the use of the associative system, 
whereas performance facilitation occurs when the rule based system correctly employs 
rules. The dual processing account subsumes other accounts that distinguish between a 
form of extensional reasoning about probability that requires the representation of 
referents/instances of a category such as mental models theory and the nested-set 
accounts of conditional PPS.  Like the natural sampling account, Barbey and Sloman 
(2007) allude to the issue of specificity of a representation to processing operations.  The 
authors assume that relevant rules apply to representations in which the set structure is 
“transparent for problem solving” (p. 244, Barbey & Sloman, 2007) (i.e. the nested set 
hypothesis/theory). 
 
3.2.5 Other accounts of PPS 
 
There are other accounts that are not committed to general abstract theories, but specific 
models of aspects of PPS.  For example, researchers have attempted to specify abstract 
process stage models of PPS taking inspiration from earlier information processing 
accounts of mathematical word problems (e.g., Zahner & Corter, 2010). Other accounts 
have focused more specifically on models of strategies/solution procedures in 
conditional probability problems (e.g., Fox & Levav, 2004). 
 
3.2.6 Summary 
 
The review identifies similarities and differences between theoretical accounts. Nested 
set, mental models and dual processing theories also assume that users need to form 
extensional representations of the problem situation. However, representation has a 
central role in all account of PPS. Specifically, the manipulation of the accessibility of 
external represented information has been the common leverage for making theoretical 
claims about PPS. Mental models commit to minimal predictions about solution 
procedures, whereas natural sampling simply assume the use of what they construe as 
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Bayesian algorithms, given appropriate conditions. Aside from solution procedures few 
commitments are made about the nature of information processing in PPS tasks. It is an 
interesting point that, with the exception of nested-set accounts, these theories are grand 
theories of reasoning more generally and are not tied to the domain of PPS per se. 
Motivations to determine one general theoretical account rather than another arguably 
obscures the value of more specific information about the nature PPS and explanations 
of PPS performance. Theoretical commitments about PPS are perhaps weak because of 
this. 
 
3.3 Accessibility effects of external representations 
 
The following section discusses research on accessibility effects of ERs on performance, 
particularly the formulation of solution procedures, in PPS tasks. Much of the research 
on ER accessibility effects has focused on errors in conditional probability problems, 
with a particular emphasis on the determination of competing nested set and natural 
sampling accounts. This chapter will discuss accessibility effects from different sources 
of ERs, including the text presentation/representation of the problem, diagrammatic 
representation of the problem situation, and concrete physical manipulations of problem 
scenario artefacts. The section will outline a number of reported ER accessibility effects 
in PPS including, in the following order: hypothesised effects of the quantification 
format/ERs in text presentations, the representation of set structure in diagrams, the 
representation of token/instance structure in diagrams, textual presentation effects on 
partitioning of possibilities, and concrete physical manipulations of partition edits. In the 
final part of the section, these research findings will be synthesised and evaluated 
allowing alternative considerations to be surmised.      
 
3.3.1 Probability calculus 
 
Much of the research on accessibility effects in PPS task has been limited to conditional 
reasoning about probability. In these tasks, the Bayesian calculus for computing 
conditional probabilities has been taken as the normative way of determining a solution. 
The simplest form of Bayes theorem is shown by the formula below (Figure 3.2). The 
variables in the formula are values of propositions. In the equation, the conditional 
probability that a hypothesis H holds given evidence E is conventionally called the 
posterior probability written as P(H|E). The posterior probability can be calculated from 
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the probability of both hypotheses P(H) and evidence P(E) occurring alone normally 
called prior or marginal probabilities and the probability of the evidence given the 
hypothesis P(E|H), normally called the likelihood. Bayesian calculus specifies the 
quantification of possibilities at a level of abstraction higher than specific counts. To get 
values to plug into a Bayesian formula, one needs to do determine a normalised 
probability for each term.  These normalised values contain less information than counts 
of outcomes/possibilities; for example, they do not carry information about base rates 
(e.g., Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995). It is not an intuitive formula to understand because 
of this abstraction. Determining conditional probabilities does not require the use of 
Bayesian calculus.   
 
Figure 3.2.  Bayesian calculus in its simplest form. 
 
 
3.3.2 Accessibility effects of frequency presentation from text 
 
Perhaps one of the most widely addressed and most controversial issues in the PPS 
research literature is the contentious issue of why so called frequency format 
presentations facilitate normative Bayesian performance solutions in determining 
conditional probabilities. The research programme proposed by Gigerenzer and 
colleagues was, in part, motivated by disputed arguments concerning the generality of 
Tversky and Kahneman’s (1983) claim that people untrained on the probability calculus 
were prone to make unconservative probability judgements and that such findings 
apparently depart from the view of humans as a normative Bayesian reasoners. 
Gigerenzer and colleagues had instead proposed that performance of such participants 
could be significantly improved if the format of the problem data was presented in a way 
that the mind had naturally evolved to deal with, that is, if presented in a frequency rather 
than probability format. Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995) reported a series of experiments 
that aimed to test and investigate this hypothesis. 
 
According to Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995), frequency formats are presentations of 
data about the problem situation that specify counts of sets of outcomes. In contrast, 
probability formats are problem presentations where the relevant data about sets of 
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outcomes are given as normalised probabilities using decimals, percentages or fractions. 
Table 3.1 shows an information equivalent conditional probability problem, taken from 
Gigerenzer and Hoffrage’s (1995) study, presented using frequency (b and d) or 
probability formats (a and c). 
 
Menu/ 
Format 
Problem description 
Standard/ 
Probability 
 
    (a) 
The probability of breast cancer is 1% for women at age forty who participate in 
routine screening. If a woman has breast cancer, the probability is 80% that she will 
get a positive mammography. If a woman does not have breast cancer, the 
probability is 9.6% that she will also get a positive mammography. A woman in this 
age group had a positive mammography in a routine screening. What is the 
probability that she actually has breast cancer? ___% 
Standard/ 
Frequency 
 
    (b) 
10 out of every 1,000 women at age forty who participate in routine screening have 
breast cancer. 8 of every 10 women with breast cancer will get a positive 
mammography. 95 out of every 990 women without breast cancer will also get a 
positive mammography. Here is a new representative sample of women at age forty 
who got a positive mammography in routine screening. How many of these women 
do you expect to actually have breast cancer? ___ out of ___ 
Short/ 
Probability 
 
    (c) 
The probability that a woman at age forty will get a positive mammography in 
routine screening is 10.3%. The probability of breast cancer and a positive 
mammography is 0.8% for a woman at age forty who participates in routine 
screening. A woman in this age group had a positive mammography in a routine 
screening. What is the probability that she actually has breast cancer? ___% 
Short/ 
Frequency 
 
    (d) 
103 out of every 1,000 women at age forty get a positive mammography in routine 
screening.8 out of every 1,000 women at age forty who participate in routine 
screening have breast cancer and a positive mammography. Here is a new 
representative sample of women at age forty who got a positive mammography in 
routine screening. How many of these women do you expect to actually have breast 
cancer? ___ out of ___ 
 
Table 3.1.  An example of crossed versions of format and menu for the mammography 
problem in Gigerenzer & Hoffrage’s (1995) study (p. 688). 
 
The researchers tested predictions made by the proposals in a set of experiments 
involving word problems such as that shown in Table 3.1. The experiments involved a 
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design in which frequency (Table 3.1b and Table 3.1d) and probability formats of word 
problems (Table 3.1a and Table 3.1c) were crossed with presentations that either 
specified the base rate information (Table 3.1a and Table 3.1b) or omitted it (Table 3.1c 
and Table 3.1d).  Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995) call the latter presentation differences 
short and long menus, respectively. According to their rationale, the information 
presentations involving frequency format and short menus should facilitate producing a 
normative solution because they more closely match the input format of the mind's 
natural sampling algorithms.  In a series of experiments involving multiple problems, 
the authors observed that that the same problem information presented in frequency 
formats was substantially more likely to facilitate correct normative solutions than when 
presented in a probability format, presentations which short menus provided greater 
facilitation than presentations with long menus in the probability format. The menu 
manipulation was also found to have little effect on facilitation in both short and standard 
versions of the frequency format condition (frequency/short = 50%; frequency/standard 
= 46%; probability/short = 28%; probability/standard = 16%).   According to the authors, 
incorrect responses were arrived at by several different algorithms that were all classified 
as non-Bayesian.    
 
This study and others since have been taken to support natural sampling account of 
human probability estimations (e.g., Brase, 2009). A number of researchers have been 
critical of the natural sampling explanation. For example, Johnson-Laird, et al. (1999) 
claim that “the mere use of frequencies does not constitute what they call a natural 
sample“ (p. 81), in which they seem to be pointing out what are arguably incoherent 
differences between making probability calculations from word problems and making 
probabilistic judgements based on natural sampling. Other researchers have 
demonstrated that frequency presentations can also be normalised and be as difficult for 
people to solve as percentages/decimals – disputing that frequency format, at least in the 
general sense, is not the critical factor in performance facilitation (e.g., Johnson Laird, 
et al., 1999; Girotto & Gonzalez, 2001).   
 
Several researchers have proposed an alternative explanation of the observed advantages 
of frequency formats, they claim instead that frequency formats facilitate performance 
in the relevant task because they help participants visualise the set structure between 
prior and posterior outcomes (Girotto & Gonzalez, 2001; Johnson-Laird, et al., 1999; 
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Mellers & McGraw, 1999; Sloman, et al., 2003; Yamagishi, 2003).  The reasoning behind 
the explanation is summarised by Sloman, et al. (2003), who state that (a) descriptions 
of frequencies elicit an internal representation of instances of a category (i.e. tokens or 
individuals) rather than properties of a category; (b) set structure can be revealed by the 
representation of instances; and (c) nested set relations are “cognitively transparent for 
problem solving” when the set structure is revealed (p. 298).   
 
Hoffrage, Gigerenzer, Krauss and Martignon (2002) had claimed that critics of the 
natural sampling account had misinterpreted the meaning of frequency format and its 
relation to natural sampling claiming that their initial proposal meant “natural“ frequency 
formats that have the structure of naturally sampled frequencies and are therefore said to 
carry base rate information (p. 348). Hoffrage, et al. (2002) argue that nested sets are just 
a property of natural frequency formats that alone are not sufficient to account for the 
critical facilitation effects (p. 349), whereas others have argued the contrary (e.g., 
Johnson-Laird, et al., 1999; Girotto & Gonzalez, 2001; Sloman, et al., 2003; Yamagishi, 
2003).  It is interesting at this point to note that, of all the commentary regarding and the 
controversy between these issues, there is no explicit task/representational analysis or 
model of any of the proposed accounts. 
 
There have been a numbers of studies which aimed at challenging and testing the 
alternative nested set hypothesis. Many of these studies have used diagrammatic 
representations in presentations of the problem. Whilst being informative about the 
relevant theoretical accounts of naïve probability from which they are motivated, the 
research also has important explanatory implication in research on diagrammatic 
reasoning, in particular, on hypothesised advantages of diagrams conferred on 
interpreting solution procedures.   
 
3.3.3 Accessibility effects of set structure in diagrams 
 
Other researchers have used diagrammatic representations conveying the set structure to 
investigate and evaluate the nested set hypothesis. Yamagishi (2003) compared 
performance on conditional probability problems using the manufacturing problem 
scenarios described in Figure 3.3.  In two of the experiments (1 & 2), a 2 X 2 design was 
used in which word problem conditions that had either frequency or probability formats 
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were crossed with problems in which a roulette diagram (shown in Figure 3.3b) was 
either present or absent. Groups of participants were assigned to one of each of the 
crossed combinations. The condition with the diagram present was hypothesised to make 
the critical set relations more accessible. In both experiments, Yamagishi found that, 
when the diagram was absent, the frequency condition elicited more correct responses 
than the probability condition. However, in conditions where the diagram was present 
there was no statistically significant differences in performance between frequency and 
probability word problem conditions. The correct response rates in either diagram 
condition was significantly greater than the frequency word problem without a diagram. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3. The frequency format instruction (top), roulette wheel diagram (middle), 
and the network diagrams (bottom) used in the study of Yamagishi (2003). 
A factory manufactures 1200 artificial gemstones daily. Among the 1200, 300 gemstones are blurred, 
300 are cracked, and 600 contain neither. An inspection machine removes all cracked gemstones and 
retains all clear gemstones. However the machine removes half of the blurred gemstones. How many 
gemstones pass the inspection and how many are blurred? 
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In a third experiment, Yamagishi (2003) replicated the crossed design of the previous 
experiments, but substituted the no diagram conditions with conditions involving a tree-
diagram that was judged to make the critical subset relations less accessible (Figure 
3.3c). The alternative diagram conditions allowed graded comparisons of the effects of 
the accessibility of nested set information on facilitating correct responses. Yamagishi 
found that correct performance rates were consistently better over both instruction 
format conditions for participants who received the roulette diagram than those who 
received the tree diagram. Moreover, the presence of either diagram substantially 
improved performance compared to conditions without a diagram as observed 
experiments 1 and 2. A significant difference was found between participants who 
received alternative instruction format conditions with the tree diagram, but not for with 
the roulette diagram. The former finding replicates the results of experiments 1 and 2. 
 
In all of the experiments, frequency formats of the word problems had substantially less 
effect on performance than the presence of a diagram that expressed the critical set 
relations. The results were argued to support the claim that the accessibility of critical 
nested sets were a more significant factor in determining correct performance than 
frequency presentation; and they were consistent with the proposal that the effect of 
frequency presentations facilitates performance because they make the relevant nested 
sets easier to visualise. According to Yamagishi (2003), as the roulette diagram used in 
the study did not present information in terms of frequencies coupled with the 
observation that the effects of the diagrams on performance was substantially greater 
than the effect of frequency instruction; the possibility that the set structure of the 
diagram facilitated frequency interpretation of the problem was ruled out. Yamagishi 
(2003) explained the performance facilitation resulting from the presence of the 
diagrams arguing that graphical representations such as those used in the study “take 
advantage of peoples’ automatic visual computations in grasping the relationship 
between prior and posterior probabilities” (p. 105).   
 
Similar accessibility effects of set structure in diagrams have been observed elsewhere. 
For example, Sloman, et al. (2003) reported experiments which manipulated the text 
presentation of the problem and the existence of an Euler circle diagram depicting the 
critical subset relations. Their results lead them to propose that the presence of a diagram 
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facilitated performance only if the nested sets were not already accessible in the word 
problem. The authors took the findings as support of the nested set hypothesis.   
 
3.3.4 Accessibility of whole object representation in diagrams 
 
One version of the natural sampling account of frequency format proposes that natural 
sampling mechanisms are adapted to parse whole object representations (e.g., Brase, 
2009). According to this view, the more that the problem data matches this natural 
sampling format of whole objects, the greater performance rates should be facilitated. In 
a series of experiments, Brase (2009) tested a version of a conditional probability 
problem in which participants were assigned to one of four ER conditions. In a control 
condition, the problem was presented without the aid of a graphical representation. 
Otherwise, the problem was presented with either an unfilled Venn diagram (Figure 
3.4a); a Venn diagram filled with dots (Figure 3.4b) and a diagram involving a rectangle 
matrix of spatial grouped icons (Figure 3.4c) in which the number of icons matched the 
frequency given in the problem statement. The rationale and predictions given by Brase 
for the experimental designs are as follows. If the nested account was correct then all 
representations should facilitate performance. However, if the natural sampling account 
holds then the presence of “individuated entities” (e.g., Icon condition) should facilitate 
correct solutions because the entities are supposed to elicit a frequency interpretation. 
According to Brase, in the case of the filled Venn diagram condition, if the natural 
sampling account is correct then there should be some facilitation compared to the empty 
Venn diagram, but not as much as the Icon condition.  If the nested-set account holds, 
Brase predicted that there should be no difference in performance between Venn diagram 
filled and empty conditions.   
 
In line with Brase’s (2009) predictions of the natural sampling account, it was found that 
(a) the icon representation group performed better than the Venn group; (b) the filled 
Venn group performed slightly better than the empty Venn group; and (c) there was no 
significant difference between empty Venn and no diagram group. Brase also reported 
another two experiments designed to rule out alternative interpretations. Of particular 
interest is the third experiment, which replicated the initial experiment, except the icon 
diagram was modified so that icons from different sets were randomly spaced rather than 
spatial grouped, and dots in the filled Venn condition were modified such that their 
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frequency corresponded to the values given in the word problem. In this study Brase 
found the ungrouped icon diagram facilitated performance equally as well as the grouped 
icon diagram, whereas there was no difference between the Venn diagrams.  The 
facilitation of the Icon diagram condition on correct performance was consistently 
observed in all three experiments. Brase (2009) interpreted the results as supporting the 
ecological rationality interpretation claiming that “representation that better 
approximate natural sampling frequencies tend to elicit better Bayesian reasoning” (p. 
380).   
 
 
Figure 3.4. Different diagram conditions used in experiment 1 of Brase’s (2009) study 
(a) unfilled Venn diagram (top), (b) filled Venn diagram (middle), and (c) Icon diagram 
(bottom). 
 
Brase’s (2009) findings are interesting and are difficult to reconcile with the findings of 
Yamagishi (2003) and Sloman, et al. (2003). There are a couple of criticisms worth 
noting. Firstly, the icon diagram not only represents a token referential model of possible 
outcome tokens (i.e. icons in Brase’s terminology), but also uses a scheme that clearly 
expresses both nested set and magnitude relations between sets of outcomes.  The 
magnitude relations are a side effect of using a 2-d grid of icons in the icon diagram 
condition. Indeed, the choice of a matrix organisation is an appropriate one because it 
highlights these relations, although, according to Brase, the choice was taken to de-
emphasise subset grouping (p.  379). The implication is that the additional magnitude is 
a possible reason for the facilitation of the representation.  Note that the roulette diagram 
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There is a box in which there is at least a red marble or else there is a green marble and there is a blue 
marble.   
Given the preceding assertion what is the probability of the following situation? 
In the box there is a red marble and a blue marble. 
in Yamagishi's study also clearly expressed magnitude relations; hence, it may be the 
expression of this information that plays a facilitator role.   
 
There may be more global properties of the icon diagram that could play an explanatory 
role in facilitating performance, namely, how semantically accessible the diagram is as 
whole. The integrated semantics of the icon diagram combine in making the 
representation more intuitive to understand, perhaps because of its greater specificity or 
concreteness. The Venn diagrams are clearly more abstract in this respect.   
 
3.3.5 Accessibility effects of event partition from text 
 
Another issue relating to the accessibility of problem presentation concerns the 
explicitness of the partitions of alternative possibilities. Various presentation factors have 
been shown to influence the partition of the problem.  Experiments demonstrating such 
effect have been approached from different theoretical perspectives.  For example, 
Johnson-Laird, et al. (1999) reported an experiment which aimed to test the truth 
principle of the mental models theory of PPS. Recall that the truth principle states that 
mental models represent true possibilities. The authors hypothesised that the principle 
should predict biased solutions in the interpretation of certain problem presentations. 
They tested participants on a set of problems designed to elicit the bias and also a set of 
control problems. Biased problems predicted probability estimations that were different 
for mental model and fully explicit model interpretations, whereas control problems 
predicted the same solution for both mental model and fully explicit model 
interpretation.   
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5. An example of a biased problem in which proposed solutions that follows 
from a mental model interpretation differs to a fully explicit model interpretation. 
 
An example of a biased problem provided by the authors (p. 74, Johnson-Laird, et al., 
1999) is shown in Figure 3.5. According to the authors, the mental model theory predicts 
that participants should construct two models for the problem: |red| and |green blue| 
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which would predict a probability of 0% because no model is consistent with the queried 
state of affairs. However, when correctly interpreted as fully explicit models there are 
four models for the problem namely |red green ~blue|, |red ~green blue|, |red ~green 
~blue|,|~red green blue|. Assuming equiprobability, the explicit models would predict an 
unbiased estimate of 25%. The authors tested participants on 18 problems; half involving 
biased and half involving control problems. The problems involved different connectives 
in premises and questions, which were balanced across experimental conditions. 
Approximately two thirds of responses in both conditions were consistent with the 
predicted responses above chance level (p. 75, Johnson-Laird, et al., 1999).  According 
to the authors, participants’ solutions fit the predictions of mental model theory, namely, 
that naïve participants will tend to reason from partitions that are consistent with mental 
models rather than fully explicit models. A number of subsequent experiments, which 
investigated the accessibility of the partition of problem data, have also been reported 
(Girotto & Gonzalez, 2001; Fox and Levav, 2004). 
 
3.3.6 Accessibility effects of the edit partition from physical manipulations 
 
Fox and Levav (2004) reported an experiment providing evidence that the accessibility 
of edit information can influence the partitioning of the possibilities in conditional 
probability problems.  The authors investigated reasoning with an adapted version of the 
infamous Monte Hall Problem.  In one experiment, participants were told they would be 
dealt a set of five cards face down, two to the participant and three to the dealer. The 
participants were also told that that they would be awarded a dollar if at the end of the 
game they had a hand with the ace. The experimenter then told the participants that “I’m 
going to look at my hand, then indicate two cards that are not an ace. After that I will 
ask you if you want to trade your cards for my cards” (p. 629, Fox and Levav, 2004). In 
one condition, the target cards are indicated by pointing to them, in the other condition 
the two cards are identified by physically turning them over. After identifying the cards, 
the experimenter asks the participant what the probability is that the ace was in the 
experimenter’s hand rather than the participant’s hand. 
 
For either condition, the probability does not change because knowing that two out of 
the three cards is an ace does not provide any further information. Hence the probability 
of the dealers hand remains 3/5 rather than 1/3 and the participant should switch hands. 
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The authors predicted that turning over the cards will make the incorrect edit partition 
more concrete and accessible than the pointing to condition, which would require 
mentally transforming the partition with five outcomes. Fox and Levav (2004) found 
that significantly more participants in the card turning over condition incorrectly 
reported a third than in the card pointing condition (66% vs. 48%). The card pointing 
condition also resulted in three times as many correct responses of 3/5 than the card 
turning over condition (26% vs. 8%).  If the effect is merely to do with concreteness, 
these findings add to the suggestion that issues of accessibility in conditional reasoning 
problems may be more complicated than the either nested-set or frequency accessibility. 
 
3.3.7 Summary 
 
The section has reviewed a number of studies that have shown accessibility effects of 
ERs, linguistic descriptions and other communicated information in the domain of PPS.   
These accessibility effects appear to influence what information people deem as relevant 
to solving the problems and what solution procedures they formulate and end up 
executing. In this review, we have taken ERs broadly to include text descriptions of the 
word problem, numerical ERs of the problem data embedded within words problems, as 
well as accompanying diagrams or graphics of the problem situation. Accessibility of 
information in ERs have been found to influence the determination of different subtasks 
in formulated solution procedures, including conceptualisation of what constitute 
possible outcomes in the partition of the problem and whether the partition should be 
edited. 
 
3.4 Constraints on models of PPS 
 
The aim of the following section is to outline empirical research and analysis that provide 
constraints on models of novice PPS. The aim of this activity is to understand and 
establish constraints on how novice participants actually go about solving PPS tasks, 
which will be used to inform the development of cognitive models reported in this 
research. It is an interesting fact that there has been so much debate and confusion 
concerning accounts of PPS, which has driven significant amounts of empirical research.  
Despite this, there have been no detailed process models of PPS put forward. Indeed, 
characterisation of novice PPS are arguably vague. Needless to say, many confusions 
and overly narrow considerations that have prevailed in the research field may be more 
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readily dispelled with specific modelling methodologies. The other purpose of this 
section is to identify limitations on existing models of PPS. The section will discuss 
evidence for the prior knowledge and solution procedures or strategies used by 
participants novice to PPS tasks, the dependence of representation in PPS, information 
processing accounts of errors, and what factors determine processing in PPS tasks.   
 
3.4.1 Prior knowledge and assumptions in novice PPS 
 
A crucial intuition in PPS is the interpretation of probability as a ratio, which has been 
taken as central to some accounts of solution procedures in naive extensional reasoning 
about probability. For example, the mental models theory proposes the proportionality 
principle, which states that individuals take the probability of an event to depend on the 
proportion of models in which the target event occurs (Johnson-Laird, et al., 1999). The 
partition-edit-count model of conditional probability assumes that individuals take the 
probability to be a ratio of interchangeable events partitioned from the sample space (Fox 
& Levav, 2004). Both of these accounts report empirical research that is consistent with 
this intuitive assumption. The intuition appears to be present in childhood. For example, 
Piaget and Inhelder (1975) reported that children develop an understanding of 
probability as a proportion between favourable and total cases by the age of 10 or 11. 
Falk & Wilkening (1998) found evidence for this in children as young as nine. Girotto 
and Gonzalez (2008) observed that, from the age of five years old, children appear to be 
able to use posterior information to make decisions in uncertain conditions and 
judgements about random outcomes. In a latter assessment of research on children 
intuitions about probability, the authors claim that “children, like adults, base their 
decisions and judgements under uncertainty on an extensional evaluation of 
possibilities, considering and comparing the various ways in which an outcome may or 
may not occur” (p. 338-339, Girotto & Gonzales, 2008).  Whilst understanding how to 
numerically quantify a probability involving equiprobable alternatives as ratio or 
fraction is likely to be learnt through instruction, the extensional assessment of 
probability as proportion of possibilities (perhaps in analogical sense) may not need an 
explicit instructional basis. Children may develop an intuitive theory through everyday 
interaction in the same way that they develop intuitive theories of quantities, collections, 
physical causality, etc. 
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There is a box in which there is a black marble, or a red marble, or both. 
Given the preceding assertion, according to you, what is the probability of the following situation? 
In the box there is a black marble with or without another marble. 
Probability: % 
Another intuitive assumption about probability is equiprobability. Empirical evidence 
that participants assume equiprobability comes from several sources. For example, 
Shimojo & Ichikawa (1989) reported that some participants who solved the three 
prisoner problem exhibited what the authors termed as the number-of-cases intuition. 
The intuition corresponds to a method for determining the probability of an outcome 
from a set of possibilities by dividing one by the number of alternative outcomes. The 
three prisoners problem does not provide definite prior probabilities of alternative 
outcomes. The intuition, which was derived through interviewing participants, is 
proposed to play a role in misleading participants’ interpretation on how to solve the 
three-prisoner problem. Further evidence for assumed equiprobability comes from an 
experiment reported by Johnson-Laird, et al. (1999). Recall that the assumption of 
equiprobability is a principle of mental models theory of naive extensional reasoning. 
The researchers tested the hypothesis that participants would assume equiprobability 
using variations of a marble-box problem, in which a model of alternatives was given as 
an inclusive disjunction (as show below), but the form of the question differed between 
problems. The different question forms used in their experiment can be formally stated 
as P(A); P(A and B); P(A and not-B); P (not-A and not-B). The problems allow one to 
predict equiprobability from the solutions given. For example, the equiprobable answer 
for the problem in Figure 3.6 is 67%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6. Example of a problem used by Johnson-Laird, et al. (1999) to investigate 
equiprobability assumptions. 
 
The authors found that participants did not question the omission of outcome 
probabilities and solutions given for problems involving different question forms tended 
to match those predicted from assuming equiprobability. The observation that 
participants did not question equiprobability does not mean they did not entertain this 
issue. Conventions in assumptions of equiprobability with random probability devices 
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such as dice and roulette wheels in education and culture may allow participants to justify 
the assumptions of equiprobability with little concern. 
 
3.4.2 Task and external representation in PPS 
 
External representations have been considered critical to PPS learning and problem 
solving. Conventions in teaching probability typically involve guidelines for the 
conditional use of representations. For example, Cheng (2011) derived representation 
procedures for different PPS task based on a survey of the educational literature. 
According to his analysis, different representations are normally instructed with different 
kinds of problem conditions. 
 
Although, there have been a number of studies testing the controlled effects of different 
ERs and information presentation in PPS, there have been few studies which examined 
the independent selection and use of ERs in PPS tasks. In two of experiments, Corter 
and Zhaner (2007) and Zhaner and Corter (2010) examined these factors using a range 
of different probability problems. In one study Corter and Zahner tested graduate 
students on a set of eight probability problems. The students had received initial teaching 
in probability on an introductory statistics course, which had included the use of various 
ERs. The problems that were tested comprised of four types: combinations, sequential, 
permutations and conditional probability problems. The authors found that students used 
a variety of representations for different problems. These forms of ERs were classified 
and the prevalence of their use in problem was computed.  The classification and 
prevalence reported were spatial reorganisation of given information (96%), pictures 
(85%), novel schematic representations (65%), trees (84%), outcomes listings (39%), 
contingency tables (8%) and Venn diagrams (4%). 
 
Corter and Zahner (2007) claimed to find regularities in the use of ERs, for example: 
pictures with sequential, combination and permutation problems, trees with conditional 
problems, re-organisations with conditional and combination problems, and novel 
schematics with permutation problems. Although these specific findings are likely to be 
dependent on many task factors (e.g., problem type, user knowledge, etc.), they suggest 
participants do depend on different ERs to solve the task and that ER selection is task 
dependent. Participants in the study sometimes used multiple ERs for a problem, 
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apparently showing signs of changing ERs and this varied for different problems. The 
authors found that the use of ERs was differentially related to performance in complex 
ways. In some cases, the use of ERs was found to be negatively related to correct 
performance, whereas in others, they were found to be positively related. 
 
3.4.3 Novice strategies and solution procedures in PPS 
 
In the following subsection we consider research and accounts of solution methods and 
strategies employed by novice participants in PPS tasks. Characterisations of solution 
procedures have been proposed at different levels of specificity. At the most abstract 
level, some researchers have focused on the general phases of PPS over broad classes of 
problems. Zhaner and Corter (2010) propose a stage model of PPS involving (a) text 
comprehension, (b) problem representation, (c) strategy formulation and selection, (d) 
strategy execution, and (e) solution checking, which occurs only sometimes. The authors 
conducted a study involving 34 participants solving 18 problems of different types (i.e. 
Joint Events, Conditional Probability, Independent Events, Combinations, Fundamental 
Principle of Combinatorics, and Permutations) in which verbal protocols of participants 
were used to estimate the order and interleaving of processing phases. The authors report 
time estimations based on the number of utterances. According to their findings, 
participants spent over half of the PPS time on problem representation (56%), and only 
5% on text comprehension, whereas the remaining time was approximately equally 
divided on strategy formulation (19%) and execution (20%). The authors also report that 
participants tended to follow the order just specified with some back and forth 
transitions, mainly between problem representation and strategy formulation in iterated 
solution attempts. 
 
Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995) suggested three ‘cognitive algorithms’ by which people 
may arrive at normative Bayesian solutions to conditional probability problems. These 
include: (a) algorithms that accord with specification of Bayesian formula, (b) 
algorithms that accord with a simplification of the Bayesian formula (shortcut 
algorithms), and (c) algorithms that involve diagrammatic or pictorial representations, 
but that accord with a Bayesian specification of the formula (pictorial algorithms). 
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The authors describe a shortcut algorithm which involves incorrectly omitting and 
relating the quantification of sets of outcomes. Such algorithms may apparently be 
selected under conditions in which the problem data would provide a similar result if it 
were done using Bayesian calculus. For example, the so called rare event shortcut (p. 
690, Gigerenzer and Hoffrage, 1995), which was derived from participants’ protocols, 
involves taking the complement of P(E & ~H)/P(E & H) as the solution if P(E & ~H) is 
less than P(E & H). An example of a pictorial algorithm observed from an experimental 
participant is also described. The algorithm involves the use of a beam diagram in which 
portions of the beam correspond to the scaled quantities of sets specified in the sample 
space. The cognitive algorithm they describe involves segmenting (cutting out in the 
example) base rate then hit rate and false alarm portions of the beam then conjoining 
them in such a way that they correspond to the formula P(E&H)/P(E&H) + P(E&~H). 
In addition to Bayesian algorithms, the authors also report the use of non-Bayesian 
algorithms which they sub-classify as joint occurrence, Fisherian, and likelihood 
subtraction. Joint occurrence was reported to be the most common non-Bayesian 
algorithm, which involves taking the solution as the P(H & E) or P(H)P(E|H) and, thus, 
neglecting the false alarm rate. 
 
Although Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995) classify scratchings and resulting solution as 
belonging to several categories of solution procedures, which are specified as 
mathematical statements, there is little detail or explanation in their accounts. The 
authors choose to classify solutions in terms of Bayesian or non-Bayesian methods, but 
this classification is questionable because one can arrive at a normative solution as given 
by the Bayesian calculus through methods that are not Bayesian, but are correct in the 
normative solution sense as stated by others (e.g., Johnson-Laird, et al., 1999). The 
classification may be appropriately described as solution procedures that generate 
Bayesian equivalent solutions or not.    
 
Another theoretical approach that makes specific claims about the nature of solution 
procedures is the mental models theory. The theory’s commitments about solution 
procedures are mainly specified in terms of its principles. Based on these principles and 
other assumptions solution procedure commitments can be expressed by the following 
rules: 
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 If a premise is given then construct the set of mental models of the premises in 
which each model represents what is true in a true possibility (truth principle). 
 If certain rare circumstances hold, construct fully explicit models which represent 
what is false in a true possibility. 
 If no information is given about the probability of alternatives in the premise then 
assume by default that each model is an equiprobable alternative (equiprobability 
principle). 
 If numeral probabilities are given in the premise then tag models with the relevant 
values (numerical principle). 
 If equiprobability is assumed then the probability of an event is calculated by the 
ratio of the proportion of models in which they occur. 
 If the problem is conditional and equiprobability is assumed then the conditional 
probability P(H|E) is taken to be the proportion of H that is the subset of E relative 
to E (subset principle). 
 If the problem is conditional and frequencies are given for alternatives in the 
premise then calculate the conditional probability P(H|E) as the proportion of H 
that is the subset of E relative to E (subset principle). 
 
A similar characterisation of solution procedures has been proposed by Fox and Levav’s 
(2004). These authors explicitly present a strategic account of extensional reasoning 
about conditional probabilities, which they call partition-edit-count. Simply put, the 
solution procedure model proposes that (see p. 637, Fox and Levav, 2004): 
    
 The sample space is subjectively partitioned into a set of elementary possibilities. 
The term subjective is used to highlight that the partitioning is sensitive to various 
factors such as the presentation of the problem. 
 Any possibilities that can be eliminated based on conditional information are 
edited out. 
 The possibilities that remain are counted. 
 The probability is then determined by taking “the ratio of the number of focal 
events to the total number of events.”   
 
The procedural account is argued to be supported by a series of experiments conducted 
by the authors that manipulated the accessibility of partition and edit information in the 
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problem description, which systematically influences predicted partition and editing 
procedures derived from solutions and informal protocol analysis. 
 
Accounts of solution procedures, such as mental models and partition-edit and count, are 
abstract about the specificity of people's action knowledge for PPS tasks. For example, 
is the subset principle of mental models as readily applied to all cases of set structure in 
conditional problems? If not, behavioural predictions are not only over general, but the 
knowledge possessed by individuals does not correspond to the level of abstraction 
implied by the theory.       
 
3.4.4 Types of errors 
 
Whilst abstract features of solution procedures have been proposed in particular 
cognitive theories of PPS, these accounts are largely uncommitted to information 
processing properties of solution procedure formulation and implementation. As the 
different phases of problem solving are implemented in a resource bounded cognitive 
system, how different requirements of task (e.g., problem comprehension, formulation, 
planning and execution of solution procedures) are co-ordinated and implemented in 
terms of particular cognitive and perceptual motor events is a critical part of explanations 
of task performance. As discussed, performance differences as a function of task 
conditions (i.e. ER, descriptive framing) may be determined by a number or combination 
of information processing issues. 
 
Research relevant to these kinds of questions was reported by O’Connell (1999), who 
described the results of a study investigating the nature of errors made by novice 
participants in PPS tasks. The author used an initial classification of types of errors using 
a larger sample (N = 180) of students solving 93 problems of different types. At the most 
general level errors were classified as belonging to one of four categories: (a) text 
comprehension/misunderstanding errors; (b) procedural errors that result from the 
“faulty applications of formulas or rules”; (c) conceptual errors that result from 
“difficulties with probability concepts”, and (d) arithmetic errors that result from 
mistakes in calculations. The authors identified 110 errors and classified the errors into 
types of 8 text comprehension, 10 procedural, 11 conceptual and 1 arithmetic. Of these, 
the most common errors made by participants were procedural (44.7%), followed by text 
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comprehension (22.7%), conceptual (19.1%) and arithmetic (9.0), and the remaining 
were unclassified. These finding reveal that there are different reasons for generating an 
incorrect solution other than solution procedure formulation (conceptual errors in their 
terminology) and that one needs to be mindful about distinguishing between different 
causes of solutions. The high frequency of procedural and arithmetic errors (and possibly 
text comprehension) suggest that the coordination and monitoring of the results of 
cognitive processes in a resource bound cognitive architecture is also a significant factor 
in explaining PPS performance.    
 
3.4.5 Summary 
 
Few clear details have been discerned about what knowledge is employed in novice PPS, 
how the knowledge is realised in the cognitive system of the problem solver and how 
people use the knowledge to compose and implement solution procedures.  Abstract 
theoretical commitments typically correspond to common sense knowledge or known 
normative instructions about how probability word problems should be solved (although 
this is partly due to their intuitive status). In order to understand PPS and specify 
cognitive models, many more details about it need to be determined. A critical point 
worth noting is that theories do not address how novice participants formulate solution 
procedures in PPS tasks, but instead only address what solution procedures participants 
are predicted to execute. Solution procedure formulation is a particularly salient feature 
of the tasks given that the experimental problems are typically unfamiliar, conceptually 
challenging and time consuming for individuals to solve. 
 
 
3.5 ER accessibility and solution procedure formulation in PPS 
 
The chapter has outlined cognitive research on accessibility effects of external problem 
information in PPS. Accessibility effects in PPS tasks arise from different information 
sources including text descriptions, numerical ERs, diagrams and concrete physical 
manipulations of problem outcomes. Alternative theoretical accounts have been 
proposed to explain PPS or subcategories of PPS, such as conditional probability. All 
accounts make predictions about how the accessibility of certain classes of problem 
information facilitate correct performance, but differ in the scope and specific classes of 
information considered relevant.   
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3.5.1 Project relevant research limitations 
 
A number of limitations of current theories and accounts can be identified. These 
limitations are opportunities to be addressed by the thesis. 
 
 Theoretical accounts of PPS make few commitments about the nature of people’s 
knowledge, how the knowledge is represented and organised, how they actually 
solve tasks, and what information processing constraints govern their cognitive 
behaviour.   
 Conceptual problems in theoretical accounts of PPS have concerned central 
empirical issues of what classes of information influence PPS performance and 
how to classify solution procedures. The confusions are arguably a result of a 
lack of systematic analysis of the cognitive task and representation combined 
with impoverished empirical information about the actual process of PPS.       
 Whilst accessibility effects are central prediction of PPS accounts, proposals 
about how external information interfaces with the internal processes responsible 
for observed performance facilitation are absent. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
accessibility of information in ERs may occur for a number and combination of 
reasons.     
 Research on accessibility effects does not distinguish between incorrect solutions 
that result from the formulation of solution procedures from those that result from 
the execution of solution procedures. Results in such studies typically suggest an 
effect of solution procedure formulation, but those that result from execution per 
se are not distinguished. This prevalence of different kinds of formulation and 
execution errors is supported by O’Connell’s (1999) study. 
 Research conducted to address accessibility effects of representation in PPS have 
generally proceeded by examining the solutions generated by participants rather 
than the ‘process’ by which participants generate and apply the solution 
procedures. 
 Theoretical accounts, whilst making some abstract commitments about predicted 
solution procedures in PPS, do not specify why people chose to use them.  
Solution procedures in PPS have a logical explanatory structure. For example, 
part of the solution procedure for determining conditional probabilities can be 
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justified by determining the possibilities that could occur within sets relating to 
prior posterior outcomes. 
 Theoretical accounts do not address what is arguably the most central 
characterisation of PPS performance in accessibility experiments, namely, how 
people figure out and evaluate how to go about solving a problem. Instead, 
theories merely identify abstraction of solution procedures that are purported to 
be used. 
 Empirical research on accessibility effects of PPS has been largely focussed on a 
narrow subclass of probability word problems (i.e. conditional probabilities) and 
the extent to which performance matches irrelevant Bayesian solution 
procedures. 
 Empirical research in PPS, particularly concerning accessibility effects on 
performance, has been largely driven by attempts to test and confirm abstract 
domain independent theories or theoretical approaches rather than develop 
specific models.     
 
3.5.2 Project relevant constraints 
 
The research review has also provided the following information that can be used to 
inform cognitive models of PPS and the study of accessibility effects. 
 
 Accessibility of problem information can influence performance through several 
different mediums, including the framing of content of text description, 
numerical ERs, diagrams, and concrete physical manipulation of problem 
elements. 
 Accessibility of problem information has been demonstrated to influence 
different components of solution procedure formulation, including how to 
partition the problem and determining whether to rule out possibilities. 
 Accessibility effects through diagrams have been observed for different classes 
of problem information including set structure, frequency structure, and possibly 
relations of proportionality.   
 Novice participants possess an intuitive schema/s for understanding probability 
as a proportion of equiprobable alternatives (Johnson-Laird, et al., 1999).  The 
schema may have a non-instructional basis (e.g., Girotto & Gonzalez, 2008). 
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 PPS involves several problem solving phases including comprehension, 
representation, solution procedure formulation and execution. Meta-cognitively 
demanding activities such as solution procedure formulation and problem 
representation constitute significant portions of problem solving episodes and 
may involve iterated attempts (e.g., Zhaner & Corter 2010). 
 Evidence suggests that solution errors in PPS result from a combination of 
factors, including the correct comprehension, formulation, and execution of 
solution procedures (e.g., O’Connell, 1999). 
    
3.5.3 Proposals 
 
Analysis of the PPS research coupled with research on diagrammatic reasoning and other 
considerations support the following tentative proposals of relevance to the empirical 
and analytical enquiry developed in this thesis. 
 
 PPS is not (normally) a monolithic cognitive task, but involves integrating naive 
theories and action schemas about sets, proportions, chance/possibility, belief 
and perspective taking together with more specific elementary knowledge of 
procedures used to calculate probability and solve mathematical word problems 
that are learnt in school. Solving the kinds of PPS tasks used in experiments is 
not simply a case of initiating or selecting a stored cognitive algorithm. The 
conceptual integration and co-ordination of these cognitive theories/schemas are 
a major meta-cognitive burden to the problem solver. Realistic accounts of non-
routine PPS performance should be sensitive to these factors.    
 Research demonstrating that participants have default assumptions about 
probability and solution procedures suggests that certain errors may result from 
failing to recognise their misapplication. Such proposals implicate an import role 
for meta-cognitive skills used to monitor and interrupt cognitive activities in the 
light of inconsistencies in PPS tasks.   
 At the most abstract level, information accessibility is capable of influencing 
performance in three kinds of problem solving phases: formulation, evaluation 
and implementation of a solution procedure. Distinguishing effect in different 
phases is a critical step for understanding information accessibility in PPS.   
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 Errors in the execution of a plan may result in it being side-tracked, delayed and 
ultimately resulting in generation of an incorrect solution. Errors may include a 
failure to carry out necessary problem solving steps, mistakenly executing an 
unplanned step or retrieving incorrect information about the problem situation.  
Such errors will include what O’Connell (1999) classified as procedural and 
arithmetic errors. 
 Solution procedure formulation and evaluation is facilitated by opportunities 
conferred by diagrams to hypothesise and evaluate explanations of solution 
procedures. As described in Chapter 2, such advantages depend on the presence 
and accessibility of properties of auto-consistency. 
 The accessibility of information may affect solution procedure execution by 
cueing meta-cognitive processes that interrupt actions and direct attention to 
inconsistent problem information and actions plans. Such accessibility may arise 
through combinations of cognitive mechanism, task requirements and 
representation properties.      
 Accessibility effects in PPS should be understood in the resource bounded 
cognitive architecture in which they occur. It is proposed that limited processing 
resources interact in the generation of accessibility effects. For example, freeing 
up cognitive resources may allow the scheduling of meta-cognitive processing or 
attention (not just visual) to problem critical information in an ER. 
 Accessibility effects should not only determine the correctness of the solution, 
but also the particular problem solving trajectory and determined processing 
timings in a problem solving episode. Detailed measures of the ‘process’ of PPS 
are central to specific accounts. 
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Chapter 4: Problems and Tasks 
 
The first aim of the chapter is to discuss the content and presentation of the problems 
used in the research, including the methodological constraints and rationale for choosing 
the problems. The second aim is to outline empirical and analytically based predictions 
of how the problems are solved, including: the nature of the task and underlying 
constraints of the task environment, the information and knowledge required for solving 
the task, and in what ways cognitive strategies may differ. The problems are used, with 
minor variations, in both experiments reported in subsequent chapters (Chapter 5 and 
Chapter 6), and the specific computational models are discussed in the remaining 
chapters. This section, therefore, describes core assumptions that underpin the 
experimental and modelling methodology discussed in the remainder of the thesis.    
 
This chapter will be divided into four sections. In section 4.1 the abstract structure and 
content of the probability problems will be outlined, including the chosen probability 
scenario, the nature of the problem instruction and the informational structure of 
alternative probability problem situations. This will be followed by section 4.2, outlining 
a specification, analysis and empirical justifications on the way the problems were 
presented to address the research questions, including the chosen format of the problem 
instructions and representation of the problem situation. In section 4.3, the meaning of 
problems, implied interpretation and the assumed knowledge possessed by naïve 
probability problem solving (PPS) participants shall be outlined. In section 4.4, the 
nature of task shall be outlined, including a consideration of solution procedure (SP) 
errors. 
 
4.1 Probability problems 
 
4.1.1 Problem scenario 
 
The problem scenario of the probability problem employed in the PPS experiments refers 
to their particular story context. Commonly employed classes of PPS problem scenarios 
include medical diagnosis, games and randomisation artefacts. Performance on PPS 
tasks are likely to be influenced by the complexity and familiarity of the problem 
scenario. As discussed in Chapter 3, the problem scenario employed in many PPS studies 
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are often complicated and may be unfamiliar to naïve PPS participants. In such cases, 
participants need to make all kinds of unpractised inferences specific to the problem 
scenario in addition to the abstract structure of the probability problem. The potential 
implication is that observed performance, particularly negative performance that is taken 
as a measure of participants’ ability to reason normatively about probabilities, may 
depend erroneously on the familiarity of the problem scenario rather the abstract 
probability problem structure.     
 
A single problem scenario was chosen for all problem instances employed in the 
research. The chosen problem scenario required estimating the probability of spinning a 
multi-sided letter spinner. The main reason for choosing a randomisation artefact was 
that it was assumed to be familiar to all the naive PPS participants in the study. 
Randomisation artefacts are commonly employed in games and education based 
probability problems and people are likely to have developed schemas for thinking about 
them.  Randomisation artefacts also appear to be intuitive to understand.  The prevalence 
and history of randomisation artefacts in different cultures is presumably partly due to 
the ‘relatively’ uncomplicated way that they afford understanding and extensional 
reasoning about chance and probability. This perhaps has something to do with them 
being both concrete instruments for implementing chance effects and at the same time 
(3D diagrammatic) external representations of chance in a manner that systematically 
integrates both perspectives of user functions. In summary, the choice of a single, 
familiar and intuitive problem scenario will reduce the potential confounding cognitive 
burden of using unfamiliar problem scenarios. It will also help to meet constraints on 
determining a tractable methodology for empirical analysis and cognitive modelling 
outlined in the introduction by, for example, reducing the time taken, complexity and 
heterogeneity of strategies in solving the PPS problems.       
 
An important constraint in the design of the experiments is that participants should solve 
the problem using the data structure of problem situation embedded in the representation. 
Hence, the choice of the letter spinner subclass of the randomization artefact, rather than 
a more familiar randomization artefact such as die, eliminates the possibility of using 
prior knowledge of the data structure of the problem situation (e.g., the number and 
identity of the sides of a die) and possible solution instances (e.g., the probability of an 
unbiased throw is one in six) to solve a problem. As the letter spinner is essentially 
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analogical to common randomisation artefacts like die, it is assumed that participants 
will have no problem in generalising their declarative knowledge and skills of more 
familiar instances. In keeping with this constraint concerning the use of prior knowledge, 
the model/data of the spinner also needs to be different for each problem instance so that 
knowledge of the problem situation and specific solution instances memorised in 
previous trials of the experiment cannot be applied in subsequent trials. Different models 
should therefore vary in terms of the number and identity of letter sides of the spinner.   
 
4.1.2 Problems instructions 
 
The term problem instruction as used in the PPS literature refers to a part of the word 
problem that can be distinguished from the graphical representation of the problem 
situation. Problem instructions involve an abstract specification of the actions and goals 
to be achieved and are normally expressed using natural language. In the studies 
reviewed, they also normally involve some specification of the data of the problem 
situation, which can also be represented diagrammatically. The distinction between 
instruction and representation of the problem situation depends on a combination of 
types of format (linguistic vs. diagrammatic) and content (intentional actions/goals vs. 
extensional problem situation/data structure), although this is not clear cut.   
 
Heterogeneous problem instructions. Unlike the vast majority of existing PPS research 
that focussed on conditional probability problems (see Chapter 3), this research aimed 
to address more heterogeneous problem instructions, which required derivation of the 
structure of set and probability relations from the data of the represented problem 
situation for different problem solving goals. The motivation for this aim is based on the 
hypothesis that accessibility effects of representations in PPS are general to a broad range 
of inferences about the structure of the problem situation, as they also appear to be in 
non PPS domains. This is in contrast to the almost exclusive concern with conditional 
probabilities problems reported in the research literature. This hypothesis is also 
consistent with a model of the use of generic problem solving skills and cognitive 
resources in PPS as proposed in Chapter 3 rather than specialised processing system 
accounts of PPS tasks as proposed by authors such as Gigerenzer and colleagues (e.g., 
Gigerenzer et al. 1995). 
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A further motivation for employing heterogeneous problem instruction types concerns 
the potential for determining a more specific understanding of the information 
processing requirements of PPS tasks and accessibility effects. A cognitive model is 
arguably more prone to gloss over internal information conditions used by the cognitive 
system to select actions when the possible courses of actions to be modelled are limited. 
Different models of a task can generate the same processing steps with different 
specification of internal representations/information conditions. Internal information 
conditions specified in cognitive models (i.e. operator specificity) can be either over or 
under specific and it is difficult for a modeller to specify with some accuracy what 
information is being used without considering different contexts for which related 
knowledge may be recruited. Indeed, extending the tasks/problems of a process model 
may often require making more specific distinctions about the internal information 
conditions in order for the model to reproduce appropriate behaviour over the alternative 
problem conditions. Generally speaking, it is assumed that the more problems that need 
to be modelled the more constraints are likely to become available about the functional 
nature of modelled knowledge (i.e. its processing role in different problems). These 
constraints therefore can arguably help the modeller gain a more specific and systematic 
understanding the relationship between knowledge and information processing and 
improve the potential validity of a process model.     
 
Partitioning goals and data. A further aim of the design of the problem instructions was 
to minimise the amount of information about the problem situation in the problem 
instruction so that the problem instruction is more exclusively a specification of the 
goals, whereas that the representation/diagram is more exclusively a specification of 
problem situation needed to solve the problem. Hence, unlike previous PPS studies, the 
problem instruction should not contain sufficient information to solve the problem alone 
and participants should need to use the representation of the problem situation for this 
class of information. An important advantage of this scheme is that the task is more 
controlled with respect to limiting variation between participants in their chosen degree 
of reliance on information presented in either the verbal instruction or the graphically 
represented problem situation. It also ensures that the main locus of accessibility effects 
of information about the problem situation reside in the graphical representation of the 
problem situation, which is of course the central focus of investigation. 
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Scaled-down problems. A last general issue for the problem instructions is to satisfy 
constraints on methodological tractability. Solving probability problems similar to those 
reported in the research literature is conceptually demanding and may engage 
participants for long periods. For example, Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995) report the 
total time spent by participants in solving their set of problems, which works out as 
equivalent to spending approximately 5 minutes on average per problem. Researchers 
often reported that even relatively simple problem solving tasks initiate a wide range of 
cognitive and perceptual-motor strategies in participants. The problem instructions thus 
need to be sufficiently demanding to evoke some degree of reflection and the need for a 
solution procedure formulation (SPF), but not too demanding so as to evoke overly long 
solving times and highly heterogeneous problem solving strategies. Minimizing the 
amount of strategic variation is a necessary requirement to allow some degree of 
structure to be obtained from detailed protocol analysis and permit the development of 
pragmatically tractable process models. The problems also need to be made feasible for 
people to solve on a display without having to make external notes because this controls 
the representational strategies and makes the use of eye-movement protocol analysis 
more feasible. 
 
Problem instruction design. The design of the problem instructions were formulated to 
satisfy the stated research goals and methodological constraints. All of the problem 
instructions used in the research involved estimating the probability of an outcome of a 
single trial. There are five types of problem instructions: simple, queried disjunction, 
queried conjunction, conditional and unequal probabilities. These types can be analysed 
in terms of three instruction dimensions: 
 
 Whether the prior probabilities of possible outcomes in the trial are equal or not. 
 Whether conditional information about the category of the trial outcome is to be 
assumed or not. 
 The number of attributes and types of operators used to specify the category of 
the queried outcome. 
Table 4.1 shows the three dimensions of variation of problem instruction and the set of 
possible classes of values for the problems used in the research. A key feature of the 
scheme is that alternative problems are differentiated by the value of a single instruction 
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dimension. The scheme has the methodological advantage that the interpretation of 
participants resulting solutions (i.e. a probability ratio) can be more clearly attributed to 
particular types of solution procedure (SP) because the space of incorrect SPs for each 
problem is minimised. 
 
SPF framing of instruction design. The ‘simple’ problem instruction can be viewed as 
a kind of baseline problem because its values arguably constitute the most culturally 
prevalent type of instruction (i.e. equiprobable, non-conditional problems involving a 
single category query) whose solution procedure is predicted to be generally familiar to 
naive PPS participants. One may view the simple instruction dimension values (cell 
values of Table 4.1 without shading) as corresponding to practised problem attributes of 
the PPS schema of naïve PPS participants. For the non-simple instruction dimension 
values (shaded cell values of Table 4.1), we would expect that corresponding problem 
attributes are not practised.   
 
 Instruction dimension 
Problem type Priors? Stated outcome? Queried outcome? 
Simple Equal chances  
No unique 
category 
 
 
Single category 
Unequal 
probabilities 
Division of unequal 
chances 
Conditional 
Equal chances 
 
Single unique 
category 
Queried 
conjunction 
No unique 
category 
 
Conjunction 
category 
Queried 
disjunction 
Disjunction of 
categories 
 
Table 4.1. Types of problem instructions used in the research as defined by the values 
of their instruction dimensions. 
 
4.1.3 Problem data 
 
The data of the probability problems may vary in terms of the specific variables of the 
problem situation namely the number of outcome possibilities, categories of outcomes 
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and their probabilities. Values of the problem data determine higher-order set and 
probability relations. These higher-order relations are potential experimental 
manipulations which influence the difficulty of problem solving because they vary in 
terms of the requirements of information processing (e.g., processing steps, required 
working memory resources and executive/process scheduling control) and because of 
their differential familiarity, which determine whether SPF is required.   
 
Design specifics of the problem data related to an instruction type are different in 
experiments 1 and 2; hence, these will be discussed in those respective chapters. There 
are, however, some methodologically motivated generalities about the data structure of 
the problem situation with regard to both experiments that are worth mentioning at this 
point. The required arithmetic complexity of a probability problem which depends on 
routine procedures and required cognitive resources of SP execution can be distinguished 
from the interpretive demands of SPF. Whilst the former may influence the latter, 
experimental designs aimed at minimising effects of arithmetic complexity should more 
clearly reveal the details of representational influences of SPF in task performance. 
Recall in Chapter 2 that this is one of a number of confounds that could arguably 
contribute to the proposed difficulty of problems reported in a number of influential PPS 
studies that were attributed to information format rather than the data.   
 
In addition (as stated) problems should be solvable online without external workings in 
order to make performance on the task more tractable to analyse and model. As a result, 
three properties of the problem data should be constrained. Firstly, a sample (or 
frequency) frame is desirable for the problem data such that outcomes are given in terms 
of sample tokens rather than relative probability values of category occurrences. 
Secondly, the number of sample outcomes to be dealt with should be kept relatively 
minimal. Thirdly, for problems involving unequal probabilities the simplest case should 
be preferable i.e. a simple division of two unequal sets with the relative proportion being 
2:1. 
 
 
 
 
  
101 
4.2 Problem format 
 
All problem presentations involved a text based specification of the problem instructions 
and a corresponding PS-diagram (probability space diagram) representing the data 
structure of the problem situation.   
 
4.2.1 Problem instruction format 
 
In order to simplify the instruction encoding component of the task, allow participants 
to easily access text frame values on repeated occasions without having to search though 
elaborate text, and to increase the accuracy of identification and interpretation of 
participant’s eye-movements, the problem instructions in the experiments were 
formatted using a generic text frame. The text frame scheme also has the advantage of 
not requiring a complex model of text processing to model participants' performance.  
The text frame in both experiments comprise of three fixed frame slots with different 
values for each problem. The specific frame used in experiment 2 is shown below. The 
first (top) line specifies whether the outcomes should be considered equal or not using 
the frame slot “Probabilities are |        | letters:” with values could be equal (i.e. “equal 
for all”) or unequal (e.g. “double for red”) depending on the trials instruction type. The 
second line specifies if and what conditional information is known using the frame slot 
“The spinner falls on a |       |” with values that could be unconditional (i.e. “letter”) or 
conditional (e.g., “consonant letter”).  The third line states the question using the frame 
slot “What is the probability the letter is:” and values, which could be a single letter 
category (e.g., “G”), a single letter property (e.g., blue), a conjunction of letter properties 
(e.g., “red and small”) or a disjunction of letter properties (e.g., “large or blue or both”). 
Table 4.2 shows the text frame with values of a simple problem instruction used in the 
second experiment. The first experiment involves an almost identical text frame with 
small differences to the wording. 
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Instruction 
statement type 
Frame entry Instruction value 
type 
Frame value 
Priors statement Probabilities are  |     ?    |  letters 
Equal 
probabilities 
equal for all 
Unequal 
probabilities 
e.g. double for red 
Outcome statement The spinner falls on a  |    ?     | 
Non conditional letter 
Conditional e.g. red letter 
Query statement 
What is the probability the letter 
is |     ?    | ? 
Simple e.g. large 
Conjunction e.g. blue & small 
Disjunction e.g. red or large or both 
 
Table 4.2. Text frame entries, values used to specify problem instructions. 
 
4.2.2 Problem situation format 
 
Experimentally manipulated variations in the format of PS-diagrams were chosen to 
represent the problem situation. PS-diagrams were chosen as a diagrammatic format for 
the research for three main reasons. PS-diagrams are representational systems 
specifically designed to support learning probability and in certain contexts are 
considered to improve on the use of traditional heterogeneous systems for such purposes 
(Cheng, 2011). Firstly, compared to traditional forms of representation used in 
probability, PS-diagrams provide a more comprehensive scheme that represents set 
relations using both referential identity and containment relations, and represents 
probability relations using geometrical configurations. For single trial problems, the 
information represented spatially includes the same information as in icon diagram 
representations of single trial probability situations such as those used in the study of 
Brase (2009) and the roulette diagram of Yamagishi's (2003) study. Recall that in both 
studies the corresponding diagrams facilitated the best PPS performance. With regard to 
comparisons of the icon diagram, the PS-diagram improves by representing the 
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probability of individual outcomes by the relative size of outcome units. Note that a 
single trial PS-diagram can be viewed as an extended icon diagram when used to 
represent an outcome sample (frequency frame) rather than the probability of outcome 
categories. With regards to the roulette diagram, the PS-diagram improves on 
information richness by representing both referential identity of outcomes (i.e. frequency 
frame) and their probability.    
 
The information in PS-diagrams is argued to be accessible (or semantically transparent) 
for novice users. This claim is supported by a combination of representational analysis 
and empirical research findings on the use of the diagram. Specifically, in a longitudinal 
learning study Cheng (2011) found improved performance with participants trained on 
PS-diagrams compared to participants trained on a conventionally assigned assortment 
of traditional ERs (e.g., Venn, network diagrams and contingency tables) or algebraic 
notations. The results of Brase (2009) and Yamigishi (2003) also support the accessibility 
because the strongest diagrams in their study involve representing spatial (set) and 
geometrical (probability) schemes that are subsumed in the PS-diagram. 
 
A second reason for choosing PS-diagrams, is that the semantic richness of the format 
allows the scheme to be degraded in a more systematic way to assess the presence and 
accessibility of represented information than conducted in previous studies using 
conventional or ad hoc ERs. Thirdly the choice of using PS-diagrams rather than ad hoc 
ERs with similar levels of required information integration, is because PS-diagrams are 
capable of modelling much more complex problems than investigated in this research, 
which would allow extensions of research to complex problems to exploit existing 
research developments with PS-diagrams (e.g., a process model of solving simpler 
problems using PS-diagrams could be extended to solve more complex problems rather 
than starting again from scratch using a completely different ER). In addition, it is 
notable that PS-diagrams are a purposely designed ER for learning probability in 
education such that studies involving them could potentially have greater applied 
significance. 
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Figure 4.1. Cheng’s (2011) sample of a PS-diagram, (p. 482). 
 
Format and semantics. A canonical PS-diagram is shown in Figure 4.1. An important 
characteristic of PS-diagrams is that they represent within a unitary system many of the 
critical relations and constraints (or axioms) of the domain. It simultaneously allows 
meaning to be derived from alternative perspectives and levels of abstraction that are 
normally only partially available through traditional representational systems. As this 
research only employed single trial probability problems, the following description of 
the PS-diagrams will be limited (for a more complete description see Cheng (2011)). 
 
In the complete system, probability problems are modelled in a two dimensional space 
in which trials are represented across the vertical dimension and outcome instances or 
classes within a particular trial are represented across the horizontal dimension. For our 
purposes, only a single trial diagram will need to be described. Each segment in a trial 
represents one of the collectively exhaustive set of outcomes. The data structures of the 
problems used in the experiment involve a sample framing of outcomes although the 
system is capable of representing a non-sample framing. The total width of the conjoined 
outcome segments represents the total probability of exhaustive possibilities in the model 
and is called the probability space. The probability of any outcome is represented by the 
relative width of the representing outcome segment relative to the probability space. In 
modelling a problem situation, it is conventional to selectively arrange outcomes 
segments into neighbouring groups to spatially model abstract set relations between 
outcomes such as intersection, union, disjointedness. The scheme also includes marking 
lines below the probability space which mark out sets of interest to the problem. The 
containment relations between the marking lines also provide an additional abstract and 
perhaps more salient expression of set relations in a similar way to Venn and Euler 
diagrams. 
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Figure 4.2. Format of PS-diagram used in experiment 2 with weighted outcomes and 
an overlapping data structure. 
 
Structural constraints The diagram provides a relatively accessible consistency proof 
of the problem situation. The consistency proof results from laws of probability and set 
membership that are represented by spatial and geometrical relations in the diagram. A 
complete specification of the laws modelled by the system can be found in Cheng (2011). 
Constraints on probability are revealed by a number of representational properties such 
as that it is not possible to construct a complete representation where outcome partitions 
do not sum to unity, which is an example of self-consistency. Another example of self-
consistency is that the relative probability proportion is consistent irrespective of the 
derived proportion (e.g., proportion of large to the whole, large and red to large, etc.). 
Specifying the probability of an outcome determines the probability of remaining 
outcomes, which is an example of a free-ride. Constraints on set relations are revealed 
by self-consistency of expressions; for example, if A is a subset of B and B is a subset of 
C it is not possible to represent situations where A is not a subset of C. Similarly, in 
specifying the first two abstractions, the relation between A and C follows, which is an 
example of a free ride. As modelling in PS-diagrams proceeds by specifying the 
probability and category of outcomes, all set relations that result are free-rides. 
 
Accessibility of relations and constraints. As argued, the presence of constraints does 
not determine their accessibility. This is influenced by whether the user is in possession 
of a theory/schema of the spatial scheme embedding the constraints. Quantitative 
probability is represented in traditional ERs such as tree diagrams and contingency tables 
using numerical symbols, often expressed in terms of relative probabilities rather than 
sample frequencies. There is good reason to hypothesise that the accessibility of the 
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quantitative structural constraints of probability may also be critical to SPF in probability 
problems. As discussed earlier, evidence for this claim derives from the studies of Brase 
(2009) and Yamagishi (2003), who both used representations that encoded the relative 
proportion of probability, although they attributed performance facilitation exclusively 
to the accessibility of either set structure of the icon format (i.e. a token reference 
representation of a sample frame). In the PS-diagram, probability relations are embedded 
within part-whole configurations between any nested set of outcomes derived in the 
diagram. The particular part-whole configuration which underpin probability constraints 
is arguably intuitive because it taps in to geometrical knowledge of a class of related 
schemes for interpreting proportional structure that apply to everyday interactions with 
a range of physical objects and artefacts.   
 
Set relations are represented in traditional PPS ERs such as Venn and tree diagrams. As 
discussed, the apprehension of nested sets is argued to be a critical factor in determining 
performance in extensional reasoning about conditional probabilities. In the PS-diagram, 
a range of set relations can be derived between outcomes by either relations of referential 
identity or containment relations between groups or marker lines. Set relations 
represented in the diagram (e.g., proper subset, disjoint, overlap, intersection, 
complement, union) are required to compute the possible reference of individuals in sets 
in accord with instruction criteria such as conjunction, disjunction and conditional. The 
way set relations are modelled via relations of referential identity and relations of 
containment are assumed to be intuitive in the sense that participants would be expected 
to have well practised schemas for interpreting and reasoning about sets within these 
spatial domains. 
 
4.3 Concepts and knowledge 
 
4.3.1 Meaning of probability problems 
 
Explicating key assumptions about the meaning of the classes of probability word 
problems used in the experiments, including intentional (conceptual) and extensional 
(models) aspects, is viewed as a preliminary methodological requirement for the 
characterisation of observed measures of interpretation in the experimental tasks and in 
implementing knowledge for cognitive models of participants' performance. This is 
particularly critical because of the conceptually difficult nature of probability.  
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Probability word problems typically require the quantification of possible states of 
affairs. Whilst solution procedures may not always be based on reasoning from initial 
principles (assumed constraints) of the problems, the proposed SPF requirements of the 
experimental problems are assumed to depend on the recruitment of such principles. 
Reasoning from first principles in probability word problems implicates abstract 
reasoning about category identity, the differentiation of alternative hypothetical models, 
the co-coordination of meta-cognitive or self-relating intentions towards models, and 
assumptions about past/future and definite/indefinite state of affairs. Even in the 
relatively simple experimental problems the required abstractions and subtle distinctions 
in conceptualisations of problem information is complex when analysed. 
 
Category abstraction and set structure. In the research problems, querying the 
probability is a request to determine the quantification of the possibility of a category of 
outcome occurring in a hypothetical model of a trial. Only an outcome category is being 
queried rather than the referential identity of a particular outcome individual. The 
particular category of the outcome is a minimal specification rather than unique 
specification of the outcome category such that any alternative with the minimal 
description is considered a possibility irrespective of other categories it may have. 
Categorical queries of probability are a convention in probability word problems. In the 
experimental problems these conditions enforce that solutions require determining the 
referential identity of the queried category, which in turn implicates the domain of sets 
because set relations are functions required to determine the referential identity from a 
category description. Note that it is only because probability word problems 
conventionally query categories rather than referents that the derivation of set relations 
are critical to solving such problems. 
 
Interpretation of models. According to Johnson-Laird et al. (1999), each 
alternative/possibility in extensional reasoning about probability is represented as a 
distinct mental model. Whilst there is reason to be sceptical about, at least, the generality 
of this claim (see Chapter 3), it is assumed that the experimental problems require 
differentiating models/states of affairs of outcome categories for implementing particular 
subtasks. The use of the term model here is understood in terms of what it represents (i.e. 
a distinct state of affairs) rather than how it is represented (e.g., a specific representing 
format in the mind). 
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4.3.2 Prior PPS knowledge 
 
Theoretical accounts of PPS typically do not factor in what specific knowledge naïve 
PPS participants do and do not posses about the PPS domain. Johnson-Laird, et al., 
(1999) specify a set of principles of extensional reasoning of probability, but does not 
commit to an interpretation of how these principles are manifest in cognitive processes.  
Fox and Levav (2004) propose what appears to be an account of reasoning about 
conditional probabilities, which roughly corresponds to a hypothesised SP for 
conditional PPS. Whilst the solution procedure provides constraints on the interpretation 
of procedural knowledge, little can be gleaned about the underlying declarative 
knowledge and prior assumption possessed by naive PPS participants. 
 
The experimental problems have been designed based on the assumption that 
participants have learnt through previous experience how to solve a stereotypical class 
of probability problems which involve: 
 
 a sample (or frequency) framing of outcomes 
 outcomes are equiprobable 
 the probability of single trial is queried 
 no conditional information is given 
 the queried outcome category is identified by a single attribute 
 
These problem features are common of probability problems involving random artefact 
scenarios such as dice, roulette. The type of problem described is equivalent to the 
experimental baseline problem instruction specified in section 4.1.2. This stereotypical 
PPS schema is proposed to implicate the following interdependent default assumptions 
that may not be explicitly considered by participants unless the problem instruction 
specifies conditions perceived to be unusual. These assumptions are important in 
interpretation of PPS performance and in their initiation in cognitive models. 
 
• Sample referents as outcome surrogates.  Outcomes are a particular kind of an 
event construal, namely the resulting state of a trial event. However, under this 
assumption, at least with certain kinds of problems, “distinct” possible outcomes are 
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taken to correspond to the distinct referential identity of sample objects in the problem 
situation (e.g., side of a die, cards of a pack, balls in a bag). This default assumption may 
play a part in so called frequency format effects because naïve PPS participants are more 
able to apprehend a solution procedure when it is presented in a frame consistent with 
this assumption (e.g. Brase 2009).          
• Outcomes have equal probability. This assumption corresponds with Johnson-
Laird, et al.’s (1999) equiprobability principle - namely that participants assume that 
possible outcomes in certain stereotypical word problems are to be taken as equiprobable 
as a matter of course. Recall that in Johnson-Laird, et al.’s study participants were 
observed to assume equiprobability without question in problems despite the absence of 
any information about the likelihood of possible outcomes. Whilst probabilities are 
explicitly stated in the experimental problems, the assumption is important because it is 
proposed to be a central condition for the initiation of equiprobable quantification 
procedures. 
•  Probability is a proportion of sample referents. This is the assumption that the 
numerical values of a probability ratio are the count of sample outcome referents. In 
other words, quantification of probability is derived from the number of outcome 
referents rather their likelihood. This assumption which concerns the quantification 
subtask is dependent on the last two assumptions, but is additionally required to solve 
the problem. 
 
4.4 Task and strategy 
 
The aim of the section is to characterise the nature of the experimental task, identify key 
task requirements, constraints, critical diagrammatic information that may be relevant to 
solving the problem and possible sources of SP errors for each problem type discussed 
below.    
 
4.4.1 General task structure 
 
Cheng (2011) distinguished between modelling, interpretation and calculation phases of 
PPS with PS-diagrams. Zhaner and Corter (2010) propose a stage model of PPS 
involving (a) text comprehension, (b) problem representation, (c) strategy formulation 
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and selection, (d) strategy execution, and (e) solution checking, which occurs only 
sometimes. Analysis of the experimental problems conform roughly to both Cheng and 
Zhaner and Corter proposals with the exclusion of the modelling phase because the 
diagrammatic models are pre-specified. 
 
At the most general level of the experimental problems, two phases of problem solving 
can be roughly distinguished: possibility determination and probability quantification, 
with the former generally preceding the latter. Both include interpretive and 
procedural/SP execution components. Possibility interpretation depends on the 
representation of set relations because set relations need to be computed to determine the 
referential identity of possible individuals in models of the categorical specified problem 
instruction. The relevant SPF components of the disjunction, conjunction and 
conditional problem types are therefore primarily concerned with formulating an 
interpretation of possibility. Quantification of possibility, on the other hand, depends on 
the representation of probability. The biased probability problem type is intended to 
address SPF in the phase of possibility quantification.   
 
At a more specific level, the task of solving each of the different experimental problems 
can be broken down into several general subtasks including comprehending the 
instruction frame, identifying corresponding sets of referred categories, using the 
diagram to determine logically possible models of the problem instruction, quantifying 
the probabilities, and reporting the answer. The analysis excludes checking behaviour 
which may occur for different subtasks. With the exception of the reporting subtask, each 
subtask is performed in the service of a subgoal to acquire a particular class of 
information. Interdependent constraints exist between information requirements of 
subtasks; for example, possible outcomes of interest must be identified before being 
quantified. Due to the information compositional nature of the task, alternative SPs can 
be differentiated at the subtask level so that each subtask can be viewed as a SP 
component. 
 
4.4.2 Task requirements 
 
Table 4.3 shows the instruction type and corresponding SPs for the different kinds of 
problems. The SP for each instruction type is general in the sense that it applies to all 
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types of data structures, which have different relations between referent sets of interest. 
Each SP corresponds to a solution to a sub-problem that can be read-off directly from 
the PS-diagram. Table 4.3 shows visualisations of the solution read-offs applied to three 
data structures involving the different types of set relations, overlap, proper subset and 
disjoint. Note that information in the diagram can be used to determine correct solutions 
in less direct ways that rely more heavily on internal cognitive algorithms. 
 
 
 
Table 4.3.  SP component for instruction type and data structure for the problems. 
Images depict solution read-offs in a PS-Diagram for each data structure. The simplest 
expression of the SP using spatial/geometrical operators are shown on the left. 
 
Conditional problem instruction. The solution to the conditional sub-problems are 
referential and require limiting targets set to C. The general referential solution that can 
be read-off for the sub-problem is the intersection A and C relative to C (i.e. A∩C|C). 
On conditional/disjoint and conditional/subset problems the procedure of limiting A to 
C is required. On conditional/overlap and conditional/subset problems the procedure of 
U to C is required. 
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Queried disjunction instruction The solution to the disjunction sub-problems are 
referential and require determining the referents in alternative models of the queried 
category. The general solution that can be read-off is the union of the target sets. In 
disjunction/subset and disjunction/overlap, participants are required to take the union in 
each model. However, in the disjunction/disjoint problems either the union or the 
conjoined sets (which can be summed) will provide the correct solution because there is 
no intersection between A and B. 
 
Queried conjunction instruction.  The solution to the conjunction sub-problems is 
referential and requires determining the set of referents that have both categories A&B 
specified in the conjunction statement for numerator quantification. Hence, the 
referential solution that can be read off is AUB. In conjunction/subset and 
conjunction/overlap the set AUB need to be quantified. In the disjunction/disjoint there 
are no members of AUB so the probability is zero.    
 
Biased outcomes.  The solution to the corresponding sub-problem is quantitative and 
involves deriving the proportion of members in the queried category A relative to U.  
There are two procedures available: (1) taking a normalised frequency of A to U (i.e. 
|A|/|U|), or (2) reading off the geometrical fraction of A to U (i.e. ||A|/U||). For all biased 
problems determining the denominator value requires normalising two different sets in 
U. In the biased/subset and biased/disjoint only one set needs to be normalised in A. In 
the biased/overlap problem two sets need to be normalised for A.      
 
4.4.3 Solution procedure formulation 
 
The different problems should require SPF with respect to sub-problems associated with 
the problem specific instructions. In Chapter 2, we hypothesised that the constraint 
related properties and the accessible representation of structural constraints possible in 
diagrams may facilitate SPF by supporting abduction and evaluations of candidate SPs.  
SPs can be viewed as functions that are partially coded into structural constraints of 
diagrams as illustrated in Chapter 2 (e.g., a lined up array of object representing quantity 
by size can encode an addition function). Under this view, the representing scheme 
modelling the structurally coded function may be advantageously exploited by users in 
  
113 
explaining an SP correspondence of the represented function. Mapping between the 
arguments (input) and solution (output) information simultaneously represented by a 
diagram are related by acts of derivative meaning relating these states (i.e. a visual 
demonstration/proof of consistency). The representing structure is judged as explanatory 
by virtue of its consistency. Consistency is a property of diagrams that analogically 
model representing structural constraints. A function (i.e. SP) that can be derived in a 
diagram can explained through its structural constraints if those constraints are judged 
to be consistent – that is, if the users treats the representations as a consistency proof of 
the relevant function. 
 
It is hypothesised that explanations will be actively sought by users to justify SPs in 
unfamiliar problem contexts. The representing scheme carrying the structural constraints 
can therefore influence the formulation of SP hypotheses if that scheme is sufficiently 
accessible and its consistency can be judged. If users are able to derive an SP consistent 
function analogy in the diagram this could facilitate the construction of a candidate SP 
and its evaluation by allowing the diagram to be a test bed for an SP hypothesis.   
 
The results or solutions of SPF for the problem instructions are the intersection of A & 
B for the conjunction problem, the union of A and B for the disjunction problem, the 
subset of A in B relative to B for the conditional problem, and the weighted sum of 
outcomes in the unequal probabilities problem. The input data used to compute these 
functions are the sets in the diagram referred to in the experimental instructions. Possible 
derived sets are partitions of the represented state of affairs, which may corresponds to 
|A & ~ B| ,|B & ~A|, |A & B| depending on the data structure.  Meaning derivations that 
relate the input and solution in the scheme used to explain why a general or a data 
specific sub-case of an SP holds. For the conditional probability problem, it is the 
derivation of possibility constraints from set structure of derived referents in the queried 
and assumed outcome categories. For the disjunction problem, it is the derivation of 
shared referential identity between derived models of referents in the categories of the 
disjunction statement. For the unequal outcomes, it is the derivation of a uniform scheme 
for adding outcome probabilities and deriving their relative proportion. Functions 
corresponding to SPs of different problem instructions have different degrees of 
structural encoding in the PS-diagram. For example, SPF for the unequal probabilities 
problem appears to be most strongly supported in the PS-diagram – partly because a 
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number of constraints of the arithmetic functions for probability quantification are 
structurally coded in the PS-diagram scheme. 
 
4.4.4 Solution procedure errors   
 
In Chapter 3 we reviewed research which indicated that SP errors can result for a number 
of different reasons including SPF. For example, O'Connell (1999) observed errors that 
were classified as belonging to one of four categories: (a) text comprehension/ 
misunderstanding errors ; (b) procedural errors result from the “faulty applications of 
formulas or rules”; (c) conceptual errors that result from “difficulties with probability 
concepts”; and (d) arithmetic errors result from mistakes in calculations. Given our 
particular framing and terminology SP errors are considered to result in instruction 
comprehension, SPF and SP execution. 
 
 SPF errors occur in the mapping of the instruction interpretation to a solution procedure 
plan. SPF errors result from a failure to critical consider logical constraints between 
instruction interpretations and hypothesised solution procedures. As discussed, the 
diagram may be used to guide SPF by revealing constraints on the mapping between the 
instruction and the SP. The formulation errors may be likened to what O’Connell (1999) 
calls conceptual errors. 
 Misinterpretation of problem instruction errors may occur when the user incorrectly 
interprets the intended meaning of the problem instruction. Misinterpretation errors may 
come from a failure to integrate the meaning of statements (e.g., conditional and query), 
confuse values of referred categories as well as misunderstanding the intended meaning 
of individual expressions (e.g., what models are being queried by a disjunction). As full 
instruction interpretation does not need to be immediately formed upon reading the 
corresponding text (participants may encode the lexical information required for 
determining a postponed interpretation), the distinction between problem instruction 
interpretation errors and SPF errors is somewhat vague. Such cases, whilst exploiting 
constraint on interpretation, may result in errors in the absence of checking procedures 
because this class of strategies implicate initial superficial encoding of instructions. 
 SP execution errors occur in carrying out of a solution procedure. Even if a solution 
procedure plan is correctly formulated errors can also be made in executing that solution 
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procedure. There are a range of errors that could result. For example, procedures 
implicated by a previously formulated plan may not be carried out, inappropriate 
procedures may be incorrectly implemented that were inconsistent with an initial plan, 
and participants may also incorrectly retrieve or select categories (set identities) and 
instances (e.g. mathematical facts), which result in errors. SP execution errors therefore 
include what O’Connell (1999) call procedural and arithmetic (which may also be 
procedural). 
As the main goals of the research concern SPF, we will focus on outlining the main 
predicted SPF errors associated the different problem instructions and leave execution 
and text interpretation errors, which implicated more numerous and varied possibilities.  
For conditional problems, predicted errors in SPF include (a) failing to limit A to  A∩C 
and (b) failing to limit C to U because of an absence in interpreting the conditional nature 
of the problem instruction and/or implications of the set structure between A, C and U. 
For conjunction and disjunction problems, predicted SPF errors include problems in 
translating the referential criteria for possibilities of the queried categories from the 
queried statement. For biased problems, predicted incorrect SPF errors include failing to 
normalise or correctly normalise the frequency possibilities from sets A and/or U to 
determine the proportion. 
 
4.5 Summary & conclusion 
 
The chapter has outlined the design of the experiment problems and the main motivation 
for choices of the problem types and choice of the format. The problems designed were 
less complicated than those used in previous studies, but helped to overcome a number 
of methodological problems associated with interpretation problems identified in 
experimental designs used in previous studies (e.g., unfamiliar problem scenario, 
linguistic and arithmetic complexity, presentation and representation confounds, etc.) 
and in making the particular research methods to be used in this research more tractable 
for the use of fine grained protocol analysis and computational  process modelling. The 
chapter has also specified assumptions about the nature of the task including a 
characterisation of the conceptual distinctions central to the problems, an overview of 
the structure of the task, the task requirements for each SPF critical part of the problems, 
how the diagram is predicted to support SPF for different problems, the predicted errors 
in SPF, and assumption about prior knowledge of participants. The details unpack a 
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number of assumptions to be addressed and, where appropriate, built on in the research. 
The analysis of the problems and tasks also reveal the methodological feasibility of these 
components of the experimental framework for addressing the main research aims, that 
is, understanding the process of diagrammatic accessibility effects on SPF formulation. 
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Chapter 5: Pilot Experiment 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The main aim of the pilot study was to test whether the types of problems and 
presentation format were feasible for the research goals.  That is, whether the problems 
were sufficiently challenging to require solution procedure formulation (SPF), but at the 
same time simple enough to permit methodologically tractable protocol analysis and 
cognitive modelling. A second aim of the experiment was to test a manipulation of the 
accessibility of represented information in determining the form of a solution procedure 
for the different types of problems. A third aim was to test an experimental design 
required to separate these effects of SPF from effects on the execution of a solution 
procedure. The last main issue was to test out and assess the interpretability and 
informativeness of using eye-movement and verbal protocol analysis for the particular 
experimental task.  The detailed rationale for the design of this pilot and main experiment 
are described in Chapter 4. 
 
5.2 Method 
 
5.2.1 Participants 
 
The study involved eleven participants who were either postgraduate (n = 9), 
undergraduate (n = 1) or a research fellow (n = 1) at the Department of Informatics at 
the University of Sussex. Six participants were male and five were female with a median 
age of 27 years.    
 
5.2.2 Problems 
 
The experiment involved a class of three simple practice problems and three of each of 
the four types of experimental problems: disjunction, conjunction, conditional and 
biased problems, as described in Chapter 4. The three instances of each problem type 
always involved a different data set. All problems involved a spinner scenario and 
referred categories in the problem instruction were either letter types, colour or 
consonant/vowel status of letters. The problem instructions were presented within a 
frame scheme as described in Chapter 4, which includes invariant text entries for the 
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priors statement (i.e. Probabilities are:____), outcome statement (i.e. Spinner falls on: 
_______), and query statement (i.e. What is the probability of:_______). The instruction 
frame values and spinner data models used for each problem and trial type are shown 
Table 5.1 and an example of a trial display is shown in Figure 5.1. 
 
Problem type Trial type Priors Outcome Query Model 
Disjunction  
formulation 
 
equal 
 
unknown 
blue or 
vowel 
|F|Q|O|E|K| 
 
 
transfer - 
 
equal 
 
unknown 
consonant or 
red 
|U|E|G|N|K|U| 
 
 
transfer + 
 
equal 
 
unknown 
consonant or 
blue 
|U|W|X|E|O| 
 
Conjunction  
formulation 
 
equal 
 
unknown 
consonant 
and blue 
|U|P|G|T|O|E| 
 
 
transfer - 
 
equal 
 
unknown 
vowel and 
blue 
|Z|C|A|U|E|O|J|N| 
 
 
transfer + 
 
equal 
 
unknown 
consonant 
and red 
|E|A|K|L|M|N|O| 
 
Conditional  
formulation 
 
equal 
 
blue 
 
E 
|A|B|C|D|E|F|G| 
 
 
transfer - 
 
equal 
 
consonant 
 
G 
|O|K|G|H|E| 
 
 
transfer + 
 
equal 
 
red 
 
A 
|F|U|V|A|X|Z| 
 
Biased  
formulation 
 
double red 
 
unknown 
 
Z 
|E|Z| K | Q |F|O| 
 
 
transfer - 
double 
consonant 
 
unknown 
 
D 
|A| D | Q |J |E| 
 
 
transfer + 
 
double blue 
 
unknown 
 
T 
|U|T| M | E |S| 
 
 
Table 5.1. Instruction frame values and spinner model for each problem and trial type 
in the pilot experiment. The columns contain values of the prior statement, outcome 
statement and the models in the diagram. 
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Figure 5.1. Example of a trial display used in the pilot experiment. 
 
5.2.3 Design 
 
The experiment involved a manipulation of representational accessibility. The   
manipulation involved testing the presence or absence of representational features on 
solution formulation. The features manipulated depended on the problem type. For 
conjunction, disjunction and conditional problems, where the sub-problem involves 
determining possibilities from the set structure of referred categories, the features that 
were either present or omitted were the marker-lines that expressed the set structure of 
referred categories. For the biased problems, which involve a quantitative sub-problem, 
the feature that was either present or omitted was the representation of probability, which 
is coded geometrically by the relative width of PS-units (probability space units). The 
marker-lines should facilitate interpretation because they highlight the set structure of 
the target sets of three problem types through a 1-D form of spatial containment. The 
geometrical representation of probability should facilitate solution procedure 
interpretation in the biased problem because it expresses relative probability of outcomes 
in a part-whole structure. It was hypothesised that the feature present condition would 
facilitate interpretation of the correct solution procedure for each of the problem types 
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such that performance time would be less and a correct solution would be greater for the 
feature present group members.   
 
The experimental manipulations also have effects on strategic possibilities used for the 
execution of some subtasks. For example, the marker lines allow sets to be identified 
and related without considering the categories of individual letters of PS-units. The 
geometrical representation of probability allows the geometrical proportion to be read-
off without identifying the probability of individual PS-units and computing the 
denominator/ numerator from these details. In an attempt to separate the effect of the 
experimental manipulation on interpreting a solution procedure from the effects of just 
executing one, additional trials involving each of the same type of problems were also 
included in the experiment. 
 
Specifically, the problems were presented in blocks containing three trials of each 
problem type. The first trial of each block is called a formulation trial because it is the 
trial where participants are predicted to initially derive a solution procedure. The second 
and third trials are called transfer trials because they are trials where participants are 
expected to transfer the solution procedure formulated in the formulation trial. The 
transfer trials can be viewed as a type of control or baseline trial. The performance 
difference between formulation and transfer trials is predicted to represent a difference 
between the requirement to formulate and execute a solution procedure (formulation 
trial) or just execute a recalled procedure (transfer trial). Performance differences include 
trial time, solution correctness and potential interpretation processes indicated via eye-
movement and verbal protocols. All participants were required to complete two transfer 
trials on each problem type: one with the target feature present (transfer +) and one with 
the target feature absent (transfer -). The rationale for having the participants complete 
one of each transfer trial is that it allows between group differences in just executing a 
solution procedure to be compared under both representational conditions. Note that all 
trial instances involve different data, so no problem instance is the same.  The structure 
of the experimental design is shown in Table 5.2. 
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 Groups 
Problem Type Block 
Formulation Transfer - Transfer + 
Feature Present + - + 
Feature Absent - - + 
 
Table 5.2. Illustration of the design of a problem type block used in pilot experiment. 
Cell values indicated whether the trial had the target feature present (i.e. +) or absent 
(i.e. -). 
 
To explore the effects of different performance measures, two groups of participants 
conducted the task under different instruction/measurement conditions. Six participants 
performed the task on a head-mounted Eyelink eye-tracker without making verbal 
protocols. This group were instructed to solve the problems as quickly as possible and 
provide a solution as soon as they were sure of it. A second group of five participants 
performed the experiment on a Tobii head-free eye-tracker and were instructed to 
provide ongoing verbal protocols, but unlike the first group no time constraints were 
instructed for task performance as this constraint could interfere with the production of 
think-aloud protocols. The former condition would potentially provide a more sensitive 
measure of problem solving time, whereas the latter should potentially provide a more 
sensitive measure of interpretation strategy. Note that measure conditions were crossed 
with the experimental representation condition. 
 
5.2.4 Procedure 
 
Participants were given elaborate written experimental instructions, which indicated how 
to interpret the instruction frame for each problem type.  The experimenter then checked 
that participants understood the task by asking them to provide a solution to a printed 
example in the experiment instruction. Participants first completed a block of practice 
trials then completed four blocks of experimental trials for each problem type. Blocks of 
problem types were performed in the following order: conjunction, disjunction, 
conditional and biased. Problem type trials were performed in blocks of consecutive 
trials to maximise transfer. A fixed order of problem type blocks was used, so possible 
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transfer/practice effects between problem types would be the same for the small group 
of participants used in the experiment as an exhaustive counter balanced design was not 
compatible with the sample size.         
 
5.3 Results 
 
Details of the pilot experiment will only be outlined broadly due to space and relevance 
constraints. The section will focus on performance in the formulation trials, specifically 
the nature of solution procedure errors, and the allocation of visual attention and effects 
of the measurement and representation conditions. As protocols were generally sparse 
for the five participants instructed to give them; analysis of them will be omitted.      
 
A generic template was used to segment diagram elements into interest areas. 
Specifically, each PS-unit, set-marker/label pairing, statement entry and value 
corresponded to a unique interest area as shown in Figure 5.2. A template for processing 
the eye-fixation data was developed in Excel that took a model of the content of the 
presentation and assigned codes identifying attributes of fixated objects. 
 
Figure 5.2 Interest area template used for eye-movement analysis in the pilot 
experiment 
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Initial inspection of scan paths revealed a difficulty in their interpretation because of the 
number of eye-movements in a trial. To support interpretation, an alternative 
visualisation of eye-movements was developed in a purpose specific software 
application. The alternative visualisation represents the position of eye-movements only 
on the horizontal axes, but represents the type of objects by the colour of the eye-
movement icon. Hence, white icons are fixations to PS-units, green icons marker lines 
and the different shades of burgundy correspond to different statements in the problem 
instruction. The vertical axes encodes the time, order and duration of eye-fixations. A 
snapshot of the visualisation software is illustrated in Figure 5.3B and the scan path for 
a subject on the conditional formulation trial is shown in Figure 5.3A. The interest area 
segments of the corresponding problem display has colour coded blocks at the top of the 
scan path visualisation. Following the scan path from the start at the top one can observe 
that the first eye-movement is to the PS-unit D, then the two brief fixations left at PS-
unit B,  then fixations to the priors text entry and then the priors text values, and so on. 
At a higher-level, one can make observations like: (a) there is a first pass encoding of 
the problem instruction at the beginning of the trial lasting about 3 seconds; (b) the 
participants re-encoded text value on three occasions after first pass text encoding; (c) 
most of the fixations in the diagram are on the PS-unit with the letter E and, to a less 
extent, PS-units involving blue letters, both of which are the referred categories; and (d) 
there is a scan of the diagram starting at about 3.5 seconds and, again, at  about 9 seconds 
that probably represents counting and so on.        
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Figure 5.3. (A) A close up example of a scan path of on the conditional problem (left), 
and (B) a screen shot of the software developed to visualise the scan paths (right). 
 
5.3.1 Solution Procedures 
 
On average, participants gave correct solutions on 66 % of formulation trials and 70% 
of transfer trials. The graph in Figure 5.4 shows relative differences in correct solution 
probability between the two representation groups on formulation and transfer trials. The 
percentage of correct solutions was greater for the feature present than the feature absent 
group on formulation trials (80% vs. 50%) and transfer trials (75% vs. 65%), but this 
difference was pronounced on the formulation trials, where the representation conditions 
are different. The difference between feature absent and feature present groups in terms 
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of the frequency of correct response for each participant on formulation trials was 
statistically significant (t(9) = 2.6, P < 0.05). 
 
 
Figure 5.4 Solution probability as a function of representation group and trial type. 
 
Table 5.3 shows the number of participants who gave a correct solution in each group 
for each problem and trial type. The participants who gave incorrect solutions are shown 
in parentheses. This data suggests, in general, that participants tended to use the same 
solution procedure across transfer trials. One can observe from the table that some 
participants repeatedly produce an incorrect solution. Indeed, 73% of the errors made by 
participants on the formulation trial were repeated on one or both of the transfer trials.  
Note that although there is repetition of errors for a problem by particular participants, 
different participants produce errors on different problems. Only one participant (S3) 
produced correct solutions to all problems. Details of solution errors are described below. 
 
Correct and incorrect performance on each problem type is summarised below. Table 5.3 
shows the frequency of participants who provided correct solutions. 
 On the conditional formulation problem one participant in the feature absent 
group gave a solution consistent with incorrectly deriving the denominator from 
|U| rather than |C|, which implies failing to determine the conditional trial 
possibilities. Note that two additional participants (S8, S11) made this error on 
subsequent transfer trials. 
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Problem Representation Formulation Transfer - Transfer + 
Disjunction Present 
(N=6) 
5 
(S6) 
5 
(S6) 
5 
(S6) 
Absent 
(N=5) 
2 
(S9, S10, S11) 
3 
(S10, S11) 
2 
(S10, S11, S7) 
Conjunction Present 
(N=6) 
2 
(S1, S2, S5, S6) 
3 
(S1, S2, S6) 
3 
(S1, S2, S6) 
Absent 
(N=5) 
2 
(S8, S9, S11) 
4 
(S9) 
4 
 (S9) 
Conditional Present 
(N=6) 
6 5 
(S4) 
5 
(S4) 
Absent 
(N=5) 
4 
(S11) 
3 
(S11, S8) 
4 
(S11) 
Biased Present 
(N=6) 
6 4 
(S1, S6) 
6 
Absent 
(N=5) 
2 
(S7, S8, S10) 
2 
(S7, S8, S10) 
4 
(S7) 
 
Table 5.3: Frequency of correct solutions for each problem, trial and representation 
conditions. The list in parenthesis identifies the participants whose solution was 
incorrect. 
. 
 On the disjunction problem, one participant in the feature present group gave an 
incorrect answer compared to three participants in the feature absent group. S6 
of the feature present group reported a probability consistent with |A|/|B|. Of the 
feature absent group, incorrect solutions were consistent with taking the 
numerator from |A| + |B| (S9), whatever set out of |A| or |B| is the largest (S10) 
and |A∩B| (S11). Note that these solution procedure errors were made 
consistently across transfer trials for S6, S10 and S11.   
 For the conjunction problem, four (S1, S2, S5, S6) of the feature present and 
three of the feature absent group (S8, S9, S11) gave incorrect solutions. Incorrect 
answers were all consistent with participants taking the numerator from |AUB| 
rather than |A∩B|, except for S6, who reported a probability consistent with 
|A|/|B|. Four participants (S1, S2, S6, S9) continued to make the same error on 
transfer trials. 
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 For the biased problem, three of the feature absent group answered incorrectly. 
S7's solution was consistent with taking the denominator from |D|2. S8 and S10 
gave denominators that were close, but incorrect values to |U| suggesting they 
may have resulted from arithmetic or counting errors. Note, however, that on 
transfer trials the solutions of S8 and S10 are consistent with failing to normalise 
either |U| or |A|.  In addition, some participants (S1, S6) also made this class of 
error in a transfer trial after providing a correct normalised solution in the 
formulation trial. 
 
5.3.2 Problem solving time 
 
As would be expected, the verbalisation group (M = 26) tended to take longer in seconds 
to solve the formulation problems than the non-verbalisation group (M = 16) and the 
difference was statistically significant (t(42) = 3.655, p < 0.001) and the trend was 
consistent across transfer trials. The problem solving time in seconds for formulation 
trials tended to be less for the feature present group (M = 18) compared to the feature 
absent (M = 23) group, but the effect was not statistically significant (t(28.1) =1.6, p > 
0.05), indeed this trend also reversed in transfer trials. When pooled together, the average 
problem solving times for the whole sample are highly similar for the formulation (M = 
21), transfer-absent (M = 21) and transfer-present trials (M = 20). The average 
differences in problem solving time in seconds between problem types was shortest for 
the conditional (M = 16), similar for the conjunction (M = 20), disjunction (M = 20), and 
longest for the biased problem (M = 26). 
   
5.3.3 External attention 
 
For the formulation trials, overall participants spent on average 10 seconds attending to 
diagram elements compared to 7 seconds attending to instruction text and only about 1 
second attending marker lines and/or the accompanying labels in cases where present 
(i.e. feature present trials). On average, only 1 second of time was spent attending to the 
blank areas surrounding the text and diagram suggesting that presentation information 
was in near constant use throughout the trial. Figure 5.5 shows the average relative 
                                                 
2The notation |X| means the normalised cardinality of set X, see Chapter 6. 
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allocation of attention to classes of interest areas as measured by accumulated fixation 
durations for the different combinations of representation and measure conditions.   
 
 
Figure 5.5. Average attention time spent on different classes of information element for 
the different problems, representation and measure groups. 
 
Whilst participants tended to read the instruction before interpreting the diagram, 
participants appeared to refer back and forth between diagram and text in the course of 
solving the problems. On average, on a formulation trial, the number of switches of 
attention between PS-units and instruction text was 9, between PS-units and set markers 
2, and between set markers and instruction text less than 1. 
 
5.4 Discussion 
 
The frequency of solution procedure errors made by participants suggest that the 
problems were sufficiently challenging, but the time taken to solve the problems suggest 
they are sufficiently tractable for the methodological goals of detailed process analysis 
and modelling. The analysis of solutions indicate a range of problem specific errors, 
some of which occurred for multiple participants suggesting potential regularities for the 
classes of problem. These results therefore suggest potentially interesting problems and 
errors worthy of further empirical investigation and analysis. Visual attention on 
presentation elements appears to be constant during the problem solving episode and 
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frequent co-referencing of information between the diagram and text instruction indicate 
continual dependence of externally presented information in the service of limiting 
working memory requirements. Participants were able to use the diagrams and problem 
instructions and solve these problems online without making further notes. Collectively 
these results suggest that the generic problems types and the type of presentation format 
are adequate for addressing the main research goals.       
 
The presence of marker lines were employed as an independent variable to distinguish 
conditions of the accessibility of set structure. However, for the formulation group, 
attention time to marker lines and co-referencing of marker lines were proportionally 
infrequent in comparison to PS-units. If marker lines were employed by participants to 
determine the reference of sets and set relations then one would arguably expect more 
attention and co-referencing than was observed. Attention to marker-lines may be 
influenced by their salience and connectedness to the array of PS-units, therefore 
changes to their connectedness may better support their consideration. 
 
One of the main limitations with the design of the problems concern differences in 
accessibility of referred categories used in the experiment, i.e. colour, consonant/vowel 
status and letter form, which are not systematically controlled across formulation and 
transfer trials. The marked differences in accessibility were realised by modelling the 
process of set identification in the task using ACT-R (subsequent to the data collection), 
revealing that consonant/vowel status of letters needs to be retrieved from declarative 
memory, whereas colour and letter form comparisons require no such retrieval (at least 
in ACT-R) because colour is a visual property available in the visual buffer of attended 
visual objects that can be matched against the buffered search criteria held in a goal or 
imaginal buffer. In addition, grouping of objects into sets requires qualitatively different 
strategies as colour grouping can be performed in parallel by pre-attentive processes. 
Consonant/vowel status grouping, on the other hand, requires serial testing and 
aggregating of referred letters. The analysis suggest that modifications to the design of 
subsequent experiments must include either systematic control or balancing of the 
accessibility of referred categories.   
 
In terms of solution procedure errors one of the most unexpected results was the 
frequency of errors on conjunction problems that were consistent with applying the 
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union of A and B, which is the correct procedure for the disjunction problem. The results 
suggest that participants may have incorrectly transferred the solution procedure from 
the disjunction problems to the conjunction problems, as the later trial block immediately 
followed the former. A key similarity between the two problem types (other than both 
involving queries of two categories related by an operator) is that interpreting the 
disjunction query correctly (instruction interpretation) when followed logically implies 
interpreting all members of both A and B as the queried possibilities i.e. AUB (solution 
interpretation). Therefore, this incorrect generalisation may have arisen from a confusion 
between instruction interpretation and the corresponding referential solution 
interpretation between the two problems. The incorrect generalisation may also be 
influenced by the verbally economical format of the problem instruction frame, which 
could be improved to make the instruction more clear.     
 
The data suggest that measurement conditions that include both verbal protocols and 
eye-movements are the best alternative for understanding facilitation effects of the 
representational format. This is because inspection of eye-movement using the graphical 
representation developed indicates that strategies and visual-spatial procedures are 
difficult to interpret from the data. The eye-movements provide useful constraints on 
interpreting the problem solving process, but this interpretation can be made more 
specific with verbal protocols. 
 
Conclusion The initial pilot experiment provides an indication of the time scales of 
problem solving, the type and frequency of errors and the order and distribution of 
attention to presented information. The experiment has also provided information about 
the empirical feasibility of the problems, the problem presentation and alternative 
measurement conditions.  The study has also indicated some potential limitations on the 
design of the initial pilot study including the lack of verbal protocols that could be due 
to the verbalisation instructions; possible errors that could be due to the economical 
nature of the instruction frame; and differing cognitive properties of the outcome sets 
(i.e. letters) that could differentially influence the accessibility of a set as well as the 
cognitive work involved in deriving a solution across problem instances.       
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Chapter 6: Main Experiment 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The main experiment was designed to gather eye-movement and verbal protocol data of 
the step by step process by which participants solved experimental problems with the 
problem and presentational dimensions described in Chapter 4. The study is an extension 
of the initial pilot and was motivated by the pilot study to adopt an experimental design 
compatible with a more in-depth analysis of the strategies and solution interpretation 
process. The results of the pilot study suggested that the class of problems were feasible 
for participants to solve in reasonable time without the need to make external notes or 
sketches. However, the time spent on reflecting about some of the problems by some 
participants coupled with the frequency and nature of solution procedure errors suggest 
that the problems chosen provided an appropriate balance between methodological 
requirements and research aims.   
 
Representational role. The central, and first aim of the experiment was to investigate 
the role of the diagram in determining how to solve the problems under different problem 
instructions. Unlike the pilot study, the experimental design does not manipulate an 
independent variable of representation format. The absence of a representation 
manipulation was motivated by the assumption that it is possible to identify aspects of 
the use of the diagrammatic representation on the process of facilitating problem 
identification and solution conceptualisation from details of the protocols. However, 
such an approach does not provide comparative information about the degree of 
facilitation for solving the experimental problems for alternative representations. 
Research reviewed in Chapter 2 identified a number of studies in which enhanced 
facilitation on correct performance was observed with diagrams in comparison to text 
and alternative diagrammatic formats differing in the accessibility of goal relevant 
information. As such comparative effects have been robustly demonstrated, the aim of 
experiment 2 was to gather data exclusively about the process by which diagrammatic 
facilitation in probability problem solving (PPS) occurs.   
 
It was predicted that the structural constraints and accessibility of the diagrammatic 
format, namely the iconic (or token referential) representation of possibilities, the 
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containment representation of set structure, and the geometrical representation of 
probability, will be exploited by participants in two ways. Firstly, it is hypothesised that 
participants will employ read-off solution procedures to sub-problems afforded by the 
representation schemes in the PS-diagram (probability space diagram) as described in 
Chapter 4. The solution read-off procedures should be preferred over more abstract 
cognitively demanding solution strategies. The read-off solutions will be evidenced by 
verbal protocols indicating the identity of quantified and related sets in conjunction with 
the values of the solutions given. Secondly, it is hypothesised that the same structural 
constraints of the PS-diagram format will be exploited by participants in determining the 
form of the solution procedure to particular sub-problems. This will be evidenced by 
protocols that identify that a solution is directly read-off from the diagram in conjunction 
with protocols indicating that the solution interpretation was not known or planned in 
advance.     
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1 The set relation between members of the two referred categories of a 
problem were manipulated so that it was either disjoint, a proper subset or overlapping 
relation. Letters are referred category members i.e. A = first category of the query, B = 
second category of the query, C = category of the conditional outcome, D = category 
with double probability).   
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Set structure. A second aim of the experiment was to investigate the effects of the nature 
of the set structure of the problem data on performance. The instruction of each 
experimental problem type refers to two categories. To examine variation in set structure, 
the set relation between members of the two referred categories of a problem were 
manipulated so that it was either disjoint, a proper subset or overlapping relation.  Hence, 
for the conjunction and disjunction problems the manipulated set structures were 
between A and B, for the conditional problems between A and C, and the biased problems 
between A and D as shown in Figure 6.1.   
 
Recall that different types of set structures for the same type of problem instruction not 
only pose different cognitive requirements on solution procedure execution (e.g., 
cognitive steps, use of cognitive resources), but also impose different solution procedure 
requirements as specified in Table 4.3 (Chapter 4). As well as a general solution 
procedure for each problem type, there are also correct solution procedures for different 
data structures of a problem type. Take, for example, the conditional problem instances 
where the set structure is varied between the sets A and C. Note the general solution form 
for all problems is |A∩C|/|C|. However, applying the form |A|/|C| will provide the correct 
solution for the conditional/subset problem, but not for the conditional/overlap problem 
because the derivation of |A∩C| is not a requirement. For the disjoint problem, applying 
the form |A∩C|/|U| will result in the correct solution because the value of |A∩C| alone is 
sufficient to determine the correct value of zero probability. 
 
It is hypothesised that the data structure of the problem will differentially influence the 
interpretation of the form of the solution procedure. It is also hypothesised that the 
diagram will support the derivation of a general solution procedure form over different 
data structure cases. Evidence for particular solution procedures applied by participants 
will be derived from participants' protocols, namely the verbalised identity of set 
relations and quantified sets.           
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6.2 Method 
 
6.2.1 Participants 
 
Eight participants were all educated to graduate level or above and either in postgraduate 
study (n = 6), working in post-doctoral research (n = 1) or in non-academic employment 
(n = 1). Five participants were male and three were female with a median age of 31. 
Participants completed questions about their mathematics education. Based on their 
reports, all had studied GSCE maths or equivalent, six had studied A-level maths or 
equivalent, five had studied intermediate statistics, and two had studied Bayesian theory. 
All participants were offered payment for their participation. 
 
6.2.2 Problems 
 
The experiments involved the same types of problem instructions and problems scenario 
(i.e. spinner trial) described in Chapter 4. There were three practice trials and twelve 
experimental trials. The twelve experimental trials comprised of the four types of 
problem instructions (conjunction, disjunction, conditional and biased) crossed with the 
three types of set structure (overlap, subset, disjoint). Each experimental trial therefore 
differed in terms of an instruction type or set structure of problem critical set. The spinner 
problem scenario always involved a spinner with letter sides, and referred categories in 
the instruction were always the visual properties colour (red or blue) and size (large or 
small) of the letters that are sufficiently similar in accessibility.   
 
 
6.2.3 Presentation 
 
The problem instructions were presented in a generic frame format using the same class 
of three statement types: probability, conditionality and query. The instruction frame 
used in experiment 2 and the types of frame values are shown in Table 6.1 (see appendix 
2).   
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Statement 
type 
Problem dimension Frame statement 
Priors Equiprobable Probabilities are (equal for all) letters 
¬Equiprobable Probabilities are (double for D) letters 
Outcome ¬Conditional The spinner falls on a (letter) 
Conditional The spinner falls on a (C letter) 
Query Single category 
query 
What is the probability the letter is (A)? 
Conjunction query What is the probability the letter is (A and B)? 
Disjunction query What is the probability the letter is (A or B or 
both)? 
 
Table 6.1. Types of frame statements slots and values (in brackets) used in experiment 
2. 
 
Figure 6.2. An example presentation for the conditional/overlap problem. 
 
  
136 
 
 
 
6.2.4 Procedure 
 
All participants were given experimental instructions before completing the experiment 
(see appendix 1). The instructions contained an example of a simple problem and 
elaborate explanations of how to interpret the frame meanings. Participants performed 
the experiment on a Tobii T120 eye-tracker that recorded their eye-movements as well 
as audio-video recording of their speech and facial expressions. Participants completed 
the trials in three blocks consisting of three practice trials in block 1, six test trials in 
block 2 and six test trials in block 3. Eye-movements were calibrated before each block 
commenced. Each block started with an instruction screen and was followed by a set of 
problem displays each separated by break display. Participants clicked the mouse to 
move between displays. Participants were instructed to report the answer as soon as they 
were sure of it and then click on the button to commence the next trial. All subjects were 
instructed to provide on-going verbal protocols. The trials were presented in randomised 
order. Two randomisation trial orders were created so that half the subjects did one order 
and half of the subjects did the other.   
 
6.3 Results 
 
6.3.1 Data classification 
 
The problem displays were segmented into interest areas as in the pilot experiment. A 
scheme was also developed for representing verbal protocols to provide a uniform, 
concise and explicit vocabulary for the purpose of supporting quantitative analysis of 
protocols and the economical documentation of sequences of problem solving steps.  An 
initial review of the content of participants verbal protocols indicate that they could be 
divided into: 
 Information encoded from the diagram and text such as frequencies, set relations, 
proportions and instruction statement. 
 Higher-order projected inferences based on information in (1) involving 
propositions about possibility, proportion and normalisation. 
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 Meta-relations indicating how propositions of (1) and/or (2) are used in the 
service of reasoning and problem solving via relations of implication, exception, 
interruption and explanation. 
 
The main categories of encoded and projected propositions are documented in Table 6.3. 
Statements in (1) and (2) are encoded in a kind of predicate argument form and using set 
notation symbols. Arguments are either types of text statements or referred sets in the 
diagram. Text statements and text values are written as types such as prior, outcome or 
query. Sets are identified by variable letters (e.g., A) that indicate their problem role (e.g., 
member of the first category of the query) rather than problem specific category values 
such as the colour blue. Arguments of sets can be combinations of categories and related 
with operators such as conjunction (&) and negation (~). Quantitative operators are also 
used including the frequency of a set (e.g., |A|), the geometrical quantity (e.g., ||A||) and 
normalised frequency (e.g., |A|). Hence, if a participant says “there are two red and 
large” and red is the queried category and large is the double category and there are 
actually two then the statement would be translated as |A&D| = 2. The arguments used 
are listed in Table 6.2. 
  
 
 
 
Variable 
Type 
Meaning 
query the query statement 
outcome the outcome statement 
priors the priors statement 
A first category of the query 
B second category of the query 
C   category of the conditional outcome 
D category with double probability   
 
Table 6.2: Argument vocabulary translating protocols. 
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Category Code rule Examples Coding examples 
Encode Reading aloud a statement or 
statement value on first occasion. 
 “probabilities are equal for all 
letters” 
encode (priors = equal) 
Re-encode Verbalising a statement or 
statement value on a subsequent 
occasion accessed via reading 
and/or memory retrieval. 
“its a blue letter” 
 
“it falls on a letter” 
re-encode (outcome = C) 
 
re-encode (outcome = U) 
Counting/ 
Counting 
normalised 
Counting aloud using a regular or 
normalisation strategy e.g., count-
remainder or count-double. 
 
“there's 1, 2, 3, 4, ,5 ,6 
letters” 
 
“that's 2, 3, 4 letters” 
counting: |U|= 6 
 
 
count-remainder: |A|= 4 
Frequency/ 
Frequency 
normalised 
Verbalising the 
frequency/normalised frequency 
of a set. 
“There are three blue letters” 
“I have double for large 
letters so its like having 8 
letters” 
|A| = 3 
 
|U| = 8 
Set Verbalising a set relations or set 
reference. 
“All the reds are large” 
“there aren't any small blue 
letters” 
“some of the blue are big” 
“blue” 
subset (A,~B) 
empty (A, C) 
overlap (A, B) 
set(A) 
Possibility Verbalising projected possibility 
values of a set. 
 
“its only falls on four” 
“we have seven possible 
letters” 
“it can't be small and red” 
limited-trial-possibilities (C) 
trial-possibilities (U) 
 
impossible-query (A&B) 
Denominator/ 
Numerator 
Verbalising a numerator or 
denominator role assignment. 
“its out of five” denominator = |U| = 5 
Arithmetic 
operations 
Verbalising arithmetic operations 
such as addition, subtraction and 
multiplication. 
“one of six plus two of six “ 
“one half times two of six” 
|A|/|U| + |B|/|U| 
||AUB/|U|| * |B|/|U| 
Frequency 
probability/ 
Geometrical 
probability 
Verbalising a probability 
proportion in which the result and 
intermediate steps indicate the 
proportion was derived from 
component frequencies or the 
geometrical structure of the PS-
diagram. 
“Its 2 out of 6 for blue” 
“ah its a half anyway” 
P(A) = |A|/|U| = 2/6 
P(A) = ||A|/|U|| = 1/2 
 
Table 6.3. Coding used for classifying verbalised derivation operations. 
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Meta-relations were identified via conjunctions and other intervening terms of phrases 
that relate to concurrent propositions such as so, but, if, because, hold on, etc. The 
translation of the terms identifies the argument structure expressed by verbal protocols.  
Note that meta-relations are composed and coded as constituent roles. The types of meta-
relations are documented below in Table 6.4.  
 
Category Code rule Example Code 
Conditional Where a given/conclusion is 
indicated in a statement by given 
terms such as “if”, “well”, “as” 
“since” and/or a conclusion 
terms such as “so.” 
“one of them is small so the 
probability is one third” 
GIVEN 
|A∩C| =1 
CONCLUSION 
P(A) = |A∩C|/|C| 
=1/3 
Exception Where an exception to a default 
interpretation is indicated by 
terms such as “but.” 
“I have six letters but I have 
double for large letters” 
NORMALLY 
denominator = |U| 
= 6 
BUT 
re-encode (priors = 
D or ~D) 
Interruption Where a result of some 
interpretation or calculation is 
abruptly interrupted indicated by 
phrases such as “no”, “wait”, 
“hold on.” 
“One in..... no no, the spinner 
falls on a large letter” 
INTERRUPTED 
P(A) = ||A/|U|| = 
1/2 
CONSIDERED 
re-encode 
(outcome = C) 
Explain Where some choice or 
interpretation is explained or 
justified by one or more facts 
using terms such as “because.” . 
“its out of five cos |because| it 
falls on a letter” 
 
EXPLAIN: 
denominator = |U| 
= 5 
BECAUSE 
re-encode 
(outcome =U) 
 
Table 6.4.  Meta-relation classification used in protocol analysis. 
 
The translation to the notation allows the verbal protocols to be presented in a way that 
reveals what acquired and projected information was verbalised, its order, and how the 
information was used, therefore providing some indication of the argument structure that 
participants constructed in the course of solving the problem.   
 
6.3.2 Problem solving time 
 
The solving time on a problem was measured by the duration from the first to the last 
fixation of the trial. The median time to solve a problem was approximately 28 seconds. 
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The longest time spent solving a problem was 150 seconds and the shortest time took 10 
seconds. The median solving time was approximately double or more for trials involving 
disjunction (M = 49) and biased (M = 37) problem instructions than on trials involving 
conjunction (M = 20) and conditional (M = 22) problem instructions. Table 6.5 presents 
descriptive statistics of the problem solving times for each problem. One can observe 
that the greatest dispersion in problems solving times, as measured by the inter-quartile 
range, is for the biased/subset and disjunction/overlap problem. 
 
Instruction Data 
structure 
Median Inter-quartile 
Range 
Minimum Maximum 
Biased 
  
  
Overlap 34 10 25 101 
Disjoint 38 14 20 150 
Subset 58 49 27 144 
Conditional 
  
  
Overlap 22 5 15 28 
Disjoint 17 5 12 29 
Subset 24 5 13 70 
Conjunction 
  
  
Overlap 22 11 16 38 
Disjoint 18 9 12 58 
Subset 19 14 10 45 
Disjunction 
  
Overlap 49 37 20 125 
Disjoint 31 19 18 51 
Subset 61 12 25 97 
 
Table 6.5. Descriptive statistics of the problem solving time for each problem. 
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Figure 6.3. Problem solving time for each participant, for each problem. Each line 
represents a participant. Problems are not presented in the order in which they were 
solved. 
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Figure 6.3 shows the problem solving time for each participant on each problem. One 
can observe that there are several outlier solving times in the data for disjunction and 
biased problems for the participants S1, S2 and S6. These deviant solving times result 
from the particular participants reaching an impasse and taking some time to determine 
a solution procedure. 
 
6.3.3 Task scheduling and cognitive strategies 
 
General scheduling order. At an abstract level, the scheduling of subtasks tended to 
follow a specific order as evidenced by protocols. Participants tended to: 
1. Initially read the problem statements from top to bottom aloud. 
2. Identify members of referred categories and their set structure (i.e., A, B, 
C, D). 
3. Enumerate the trial possibilities (U if the outcome was unconditional, or 
C if conditional).   
4. Enumerate the possibilities of the queried outcome. 
5. Report an answer. 
6. Check the answer.   
 
Depending on the problem, the protocols also indicated intermediate steps including 
statement re-encoding, re-identifying sets, determining intermediate frequencies and 
probabilities, as well as engaging in acts reflection and reasoning.  Details of subtask 
scheduling are described below. 
 
Initial instruction comprehension. The instructions were consistently read aloud in full 
from top to bottom by six of the eight participants before interpreting the data in the 
diagram (i.e. first pass instruction comprehension).  The two exceptions to this first pass 
instruction comprehension behaviour were S5 and S2. S5 tended to interleave acts of 
reading statements of the instruction and identifying sets of referred categories in the 
diagram. S2 showed a tendency to just read out the statement values and skip reading 
the frame text.   
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Enumeration. Participants appeared to use a combination of serial counting and 
subitizing to determine the cardinality of sets. Serial counting was indicated by the 
consecutive verbalisation of count states (i.e. one, two, three, four, etc.) and occurred 
most commonly when enumerating U. Subitizing was indicated by reporting the 
frequency of a set in the absence of verbalising count states. This tended to occur for 
small subsets (i.e. 2 or 3) of PS-units (problem space units) when indicated by a referring 
category in the text (i.e. A, B, C, D).  For biased probability problems, participants 
appeared to use either one of two strategies to quantify outcomes according to a 
normalisation scheme. The remainder-strategy involved taking the count of double PS-
units, multiplying the sets by 2 then counting the remainder from the resulting value. 
The double-count strategy involved counting a PS-unit once or twice depending on 
whether it had double probability (i.e. twice) or not (i.e. once). The double-count strategy 
was the most common strategy for biased probability problems.   
 
Search, set structure derivation and co-reference. Participants' performance on 
conditional and conjunction disjoint problems indicate that they are likely to initially 
identify the set structure of referred categories before proceeding with any form of 
quantification. Visual re-identification of sets and set structure occurs at different stages 
depending on the problem. Over different problems there are different patterns of 
diagram scanning and cross referencing between referred categories in text statements, 
corresponding members in the diagram and marker-lines (see the next section for 
quantitative details) reflecting task requirement and difficulties associated with a 
problem. 
 
Proportions. Protocols indicate that participants commonly derived frequency based 
proportions. Geometrical proportions were only employed on a small number of trials 
and tended to occur in problems where the solution proportion involved a half. This is 
arguably because of the increased visual-spatial fidelity of a ½ proportion can be more 
readily recognised and its accuracy assessed with greater confidence. Verbalising a 
geometrical proportion requires translating a visual spatial representation to a numerical 
representation. Verbalising a geometrical proportion only when fidelity constraints are 
satisfied suggests that the cognitive system must encode the proportion to check if these 
constraints are satisfied first. This suggests geometrical proportions may be encoded at 
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some level as a matter of course, but only selected for numerical translation and 
verbalisation when an accuracy trade-off is satisfied.   
 
Checking and monitoring. Participant's protocols typically revealed periods between 
verbalising an initial solution and then clicking the mouse to move on to the next trial. 
Within this period, many trials involve verbal protocols that indicate checking/ 
confirming the initial solution by, for example, repeating the answer after a pause or 
using confirmation indicating terms such as “yes”. Inspection of protocols suggest what 
is checked varies and may involve check of frequencies, categories as well as solution 
interpretations.  
 
6.3.4 External attention 
 
The fixations made to classes of interest areas were tabulated in order to derive a measure 
of the relative amount of attention spent by each participant on each problem. For 
simplification, the analysis considers fixation of five classes of interest areas: the PS-
unit area of the diagram, the set markers, the probability statement, the conditional 
statement and the query statement. As shown in Figure 6.4, the relative time spent on a 
type of statement depends on whether a referring category was present. So, for example, 
the average fixation time on the probability statement was 8.5 seconds in biased 
problems, but only 2.7 seconds in others, the average time on the conditional statement 
was 4.9 seconds in conditional problems, but 3.2 in others. The average total fixation 
time for the query statement is greatest for the disjunction problems (M = 17.4 seconds), 
which is substantially greater than the conjunction problems (M = 6.6 seconds) even 
though they express the same number of category values. These results confirm the 
earlier proposal that some of the attention to the query statement in the disjunction 
problem is driven by instruction interpretation requirements for solution procedure 
formulation rather than just rehearsing, re-accessing or checking category values. The 
amount of attention to PS-units for the difficult problems appeared to far exceed the 
requirements to identify and enumerate the target set to determine the probability 
proportion. The amount of attention is consistent with participants reflecting on how to 
solve the problem rather than employing a practised solution procedure. Note that the 
mean amount of fixation time for a problem on the blank-space surrounding the diagram 
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and text is approximately 2 seconds, suggesting that the information in the problem 
presentation was almost constantly in use.   
 
Analysis of attention shifts between different features of the problem presentation where 
derived from consecutive fixations. The purpose of the analysis was to provide some 
quantification of attentional strategies for the problems and differences between different 
problems instructions and types of data structure. Note that such changes in fixations are 
a conservative estimation of attention shift because it is possible to attend to a different 
element E without making an eye-movement if E is in close enough proximity. This point 
is relevant to interpretation of eye-movement on PS-units because eye-movement 
replays have shown that participants count the total set of PS-units without necessarily 
making eye-movement to all the units, particularly the end ones. 
 
Figure 6.4. The relative fixation time on different interest areas for each experimental 
problem average across participants. 
 
Diagram scanning. In order to assess the amount of scanning or eye-movement visits 
made to PS-units of the diagram, the frequency of fixations to PS-units from any of the 
different token interest areas (including different token PS-units) were tabulated for each 
participant. Participants on average made 45 eye-movement visits to PS-units in solving 
an experimental problem, but there appeared to be substantial differences in this 
frequency between types of problems. The mean number of fixation visits to PS-units 
ranged from 18 for the conditional/disjoint to 97 for the biased/subset problem. As there 
are between seven and nine PS-units in a diagram and only some PS-units are critical to 
the problem, the frequencies indicate again the high frequency of attention shifts to 
different PS-units in the course of problem solving. Figure 6.5 shows the average 
  
145 
frequency for each problem. As can be seen, the largest number are for biased and 
disjunction problems, which is consistent with the problem solving times of these 
problems. 
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Figure 6.5: Frequency of saccades made to PS-units of the diagram for each of the 
twelve experimental problems averaged over participants. 
 
The average number of times either or both markers were fixated by participants whilst 
solving a problem was 5.3. On average, markers on the biased/disjoint problem received 
the lowest number of fixations (M = 3.8), whereas markers on the disjunction/subset 
problem received the highest number of marker fixations (M = 9.3). Attention shifts to 
the markers were not that frequent, probably because determining this configuration 
information requires a couple of attention steps.   
 
Diagram and text integration. To get a measure of the frequency of interrelating text 
and diagram elements, the saccades between text and diagram interest areas (i.e. text -> 
diagram or diagram -> text) were derived. The mean number of fixation switches made 
by participant between text and diagram elements over all problems was 15.3. This 
indicates again that, in general, attention shifting and interrelating of text and diagrams 
elements were frequent in the task because there are only three statements and only two 
statements contain category information. Although participants tended to exhibit a 
relatively contained first pass of comprehending the full set of text instructions, the act 
of referring back to the text was common in the process of problem interpretation and 
solution procedure execution using the diagram. The graph below (Figure 6.6) shows 
that the highest frequencies of this tended to occur with the biased and disjunction 
problems. Note that each type of problem instruction has two category values to encode, 
so differences between problems in terms of switching between text and diagram are 
  
146 
likely to be the result of more than the need to rehearse or re-access a category value.  
Rather, these differences between problems may also be influenced by the requirement 
to re-address the interpretation of the problems instructions. 
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Figure 6.6: Frequency of saccades between text and diagram elements for each of the 
twelve experimental problems averaged over participants. 
 
6.3.5 Problem interpretations 
 
The section focuses on the process of problem interpretation. As protocols revealed that 
the conditional, biased and disjunction problems with subset and overlapping set 
structure were the trials that elicited the most reflection and appeared to be the most 
challenging to participants, the section will focus on performance on these problems. 
 
Disjunction. For the disjunction/disjoint problem calculating |A| + |B| will provide the 
correct numerator and calculating |A|/|U| + |B|/|U| will provide the correct answer. The 
difference between the two is superficial because |A|/|U| + |B|/|U| will simply require 
adding the numerators as the denominator is a constant. Indications of either suggest the 
interpretation or framing of an addition procedure. As can be seen in Table 6.6, on the 
disjoint problem, one group of participants (S2, S3, S6, S8) provided protocols consistent 
with adding probabilities of each set because they either verbalised the frequencies for 
each model (S3), the probabilities of each model (S2, S6) or explicitly verbalised adding 
them together (S2, S8). Only S4 and S5 provided no verbalisations of component 
models, which is consistent with taking the union of the possibilities of the alternative 
models.  An exception is S7, who incorrectly answered with component probabilities for 
each model – presumably due to an instruction misinterpretation. 
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Subject Disjoint Overlap Subset 
S1 N/A |AUB|/|U| N/A |AUB|/|U| N/A |AUB|/|U| 
S2 |U|, |A|/|U|, 
|B|/|U|, 
|A∩B|/|U| 
|A|/|U|+|B|/
|U||+ 
|A∩B|/|U 
|U|, |A|, 
|A|/|U|+ 
|B|/|U|+|A∩B|/
|U|..... 
A|/|U| * 
|B|/|U …......
... 
|U|, 
|A|/|U|+|B|/|U
|, |U| 
|AUB|/|U| 
S3 |U|, |A|, |B| |A|+|B|/|U| |U|, |A|, |B|, 
|A∩B| 
|AUB|/|U|  |AUB|/|U| 
S4  |AUB|/|U| |U| |AUB|/|U| |A|/|U|, 
|B|/|U|, 
|A∩B|/|U| 
|A∩B|/|U| 
S5  |AUB|/|U| 
|A|, |B|, |A∩B| 
||AUB|/|U||  |AUB|/|U| 
S6 |A|/|U|, 
|B|/|U|, 
|A∩B|/|U| 
||A|/|U|+|B|
/|U||+ 
|A∩B|/|U 
|A|/|U|, |B|/|U|, 
|A∩B|/|U|, |A|, 
|B∩~A|, 
|B∩A|, |AUB|, 
|A∩B|/|U|, 
|A∩B|/|U| 
|A|/|U| , 
|B|/|U| 
|A∩B|/|U| 
S7  |A|/|U|, 
|B|/|U|, 
|A∩B|/|U| 
|A|/|U|, |B|/|U|, 
|A∩B|/|U| 
|A|/|U|, 
|B|/|U|, 
|A∩B|/|U| 
|A|/|U|, 
|B|/|U|, 
|A∩B|/|U| 
|A|/|U|, 
|B|/|U|, 
|A∩B|/|U| 
S8 |U|, |A|/|U| 
+ |B|/|U|+ 
|A∩B|/|U| 
|A|/|U|+|B|/
|U||+ 
|A∩B|/|U 
|A|/|U| + 
|B|/|U|, 
|A∩B|/|U| 
||AUB|/|U|| |A|/|U|, 
|B|/|U|, 
|A∩B|/|U| 
A|/|U|, 
|B|/|U|, 
|A∩B|/|U| 
 
Table 6.6. Quantitative derivations on the disjunction problems. S1's derivations are 
not included due to problems with the audibility of his/her verbalisations. The left 
column represents verbalised quantitative derivations in order excluding the final 
solution. The right column represents derivation consistent with final solution given. 
Shaded cells are incorrect solutions. 
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For the disjunction/overlap and disjunction/subset problems, calculating |A| + |B| will 
not provide the correct numerator and calculating |A|/|U| + |B|/|U| will not provide the 
correct answer. Instead only |AUB| will provide the correct numerator on these problems 
For the disjunction/overlap problem (S2, S3, S5, S6, S8) and/or for the disjunction/subset 
problem (S2, S4, S6) six participants provided protocols consistent with employing an 
initial adding procedure, but none of them gave the result as a final solution. Participants 
S4 (disjunction/subset) and S6 (disjunction/subset and disjunction/overlap) proceeded to 
give incorrect solutions consistent with taking the numerator from |A∩B|. S2's verbal 
protocols indicated that he/she generated an incorrect solution by multiplying the 
probabilities from each model (see figures 6.7 and 6.8). The remaining trials of this group 
of six participants are consistent with them taking |AUB| as the numerator or the 
probability from the geometrical proportion of ||AUB||/||U|| as their solution. Participants 
whose protocols were not consistent with the use of an initial addition procedure include 
subjects S3, S5 (disjunction/subset) and S4 (disjunction/overlap), who only provided 
correct union solutions as indicated in the solution paths of figures 6.9 and 6.10. Other 
participants, S7 (subset and overlap) and S8 (subset) gave component probabilities as 
solutions on problems. 
 
Whilst applying the incorrect addition procedure on these problems, verbal protocols of 
some participants indicate that they noticed the procedure yielded a high (i.e. 
disjunction/overlap) or impossible probability (i.e. disjunction/subset) resulting in 
participants applying an alternative solution procedure. For some subjects, this was 
indicated by explicit verbalisation e.g., S2, S3, S6, S8. For many other participants, this 
was indicated by a pause either following or in the middle of executing the addition 
procedure – suggesting reflection on the sub-problem. Examples of the coded solution 
paths derived from verbal protocols of participants, who abandoned the addition 
procedure, are shown in figures 6.7 and 6.8. 
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Figure 6.7. Coded protocols of S2 on the dijunction/overlap problem, who began adding probabilities for each 
model, but abandoned the procedure and gave an incorrect answer consistent with multiplying sets of possibilities.   
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Figure 6.8. Coded protocols of S4 on the disjunction/subset problem, who began adding probabilities for each 
model, but abandoned the procedure and gave an incorrect answer consistent with taking the numerator from |A∩B|. 
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Figure 6.9. Coded protocols of S3 on the disjunction/subset problem, who gave a 
correct answer consistent with interpreting the numerator from |AUB| without initially 
trying an alternative procedure. This answer is preceded by a reflective period, 
verbalising the sets and scanning the relevant set structure. 
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Figure 6.10. Coded protocol of S5 on the disjunction/subset problem, who gave a 
correct answer consistent with interpreting the numerator from |AUB| without initially 
trying an alternative procedure. This solution appears to be hypothesised by 
recognising that the queried alternatives are all members of A which is equivelent to 
the union. 
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On the disjunction/overlap and disjunction/subset problems we can assume that 
participants who answered correctly on these problems took the numerator as |AUB| 
because there does not appear to be an alternative interpretation consistent with the 
answer. The observations that some participants initially attempted an incorrect solution 
procedure together with the refection times of all participants before reporting a solution 
suggest that these participants did not plan the union solution interpretation on 
instruction comprehension, but instead appeared to derive the form of the solution with 
the use of the diagram. 
 
Eye-movement protocols indicate participants tended to make frequent switches of 
attention back and forth to the disjunction statement and the queried possibilities of those 
models in the diagram before reporting an answer (see figures 6.7 to 6.10). The average 
number of switches from the query statement to the diagram or back again was 29 for 
the disjunction/subset, 18 for the disjunction/overlap and 17 for the disjunction/disjoint. 
The pattern of eye-movements coupled with verbal repetitions of the disjunction 
statement suggests that participants were not clear about the meaning expressed by the 
disjunction or its referential interpretation. It is suggested that the repeated encoding and 
consideration of the disjunction statement and its corresponding sets reflect a bi-direction 
interpretation strategy in which participants use both sources (text and diagram) of 
information that they are uncertain about to determine a coherent interpretation of the 
solution.   
 
Conditional problem. Both the conditional/subset and conditional/overlap problems 
require participants to interpret the set C, rather than U, as the trial possibilities. The 
conditional/disjoint and conditional/overlap problems require participants to interpret 
the set A&C, rather than A, as the queried possibilities.  Table 6.7 shows the quantitative 
derivations and solutions given by participants on each problem.  As can be seen, the 
most common error made by four participants (S1, S2, S4, S7) involved incorrectly 
interpreting members of U rather than C as the possibilities on the disjunction/subset 
and/or disjunction/overlap problems. 
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Table 6.7. Verbalised quantitative derivations for the conditional problems. The left 
column represents verbalised quantitative derivations in order excluding the final 
solution. The right column represents derivation consistent with final solution given. 
Shaded cells are incorrect solutions. 
 
On the conditional/subset problem three subjects (S2, S4, S7) gave incorrect answers 
consistent with taking U as the trial possibilities. The protocols of three (S3, S5, S6) of 
the remaining five (S1, S3, S5, S6, S8), who correctly solved the conditional/subset 
problem indicate that they initially derived |U| (S3) or derived the geometrical proportion 
||A|||/|U|| (S5, S6) after the first pass reading of the instruction. This suggests that this 
subgroup (S3, S5, S6) had not initially considered the need to limit the trial possibilities 
of U to C. Subsequent eye-movement revisit to the conditional statement was preceded 
by verbalisations such as “but” (S3, S1) indicating recognition of an exception to derive 
the denominator from |U| or “no no” (S6), “ah no” (S5) indicating abrupt interruption of 
an initial solution derived from ||A|/|U||. After re-encoding the outcome statement and 
returning to the diagram these participants formed an interpretation of C as the trial 
possibilities. Examples of coded verbal protocols of two participants S3 (6.11) and S6, 
(6.12) who appear to show initial consideration of U as the possibilities for denominator 
quantification, are shown below.  
  
Subject Overlap Subset  Disjoint 
S1 N/A |A&C|/|U| N/A |A|/|C| N/A |A&C| 
S2 |U| |A&C|/|U| |U| |A|/|U|  |A&C| 
S3 |C|, |A&C| |A&C|/|C| |U|, |C|, |A&C| |A&C|/|C|  |A&C| 
S4 |A&C| |A&C|/|U| |U| |A|/|U|  |A&C| 
S5 |U|, |C| |A&C|/|C| ||A|/|U||   |A|/|C|  |A&C| 
S6 |C|, |A&C| |A&C|/|C| ||A|/|U||, |C| |A|/|C|  |A&C| 
S7  |A|/|U| |A|, |-A|   |A|/|U| |U|, |A| |A|/|U| 
S8 |C|, |A&C| |A&C|/|C| |C| |A|/|C| |C| |A&C| 
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Figure 6.11. Coded protocol of S3 on the conditional/subset problem. This participant 
answered correctly but after recognising an exception to taking the denominator from  
|U|.  
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Figure 6.12. Coded protocol of S6 on the conditional/subset problem. This participant 
answered correctly after appearing to interrupt an initial solution in which the 
denominator is taken from |U|. 
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In the conditional/disjoint problem only one participant (S7) responded incorrectly. Of 
the remaining group, five participants (S2, S3, S4, S5, S6) did not verbalise any 
quantitative derivations. This is consistent with participants immediately deriving that 
the probability is zero from recognition of the disjoint relation between sets A and C in 
the diagram before deciding on any form of quantification. Some participants showed 
surprise to initial recognition that A&C is an empty set as indicated by the tone of their 
voice. The fact that participants tended to derive the probability zero immediately after 
reading the instruction by observing A and C are disjoint suggests that they interpreted 
the form of the queried possibilities as being the set A&C from reading the instruction.   
 
On the conditional/overlap problem, only three participants (S2, S4, S7) gave incorrect 
answers because they gave answers consistent with interpreting U as the trial 
possibilities. Note that these are a subset of participants who also failed to interpret C as 
the trial possibilities on the conditional/subset problem. However, although they derived 
incorrect denominators, S2 and S4 provided numerators consistent with interpreting the  
queried possibilities as A&C on the conditional/overlap problem indicating that they 
understood the outcome information as conditional, but failed to make both of the 
required conditional inferences (see figure 6.13).  Note also that on this problem only 
one participant (S5), who answered correctly, initially derived |U| compared to four on 
the conditional/subset problem. For some participants this was not the first instance of 
the conditional problem allowing them to recognise the solution implication of the 
conditional information on first pass instruction interpretation as indicated in figure 6.14. 
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Figure 6.13. Coded protocols of S4 on the conditional/overlap problem. The 
participant provides an incorrect answer consistent with correctly taking the numerator 
from |AnC| but incorrectly taking the denominator from |U| rather than |C| .  
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Figure 6.14. Coded protocols of S6 on the conditional/overlap problem.  Following a 
previose conditional instrucution trial the participant recognises the requirement to 
limit trial possibilities upon first pass interpretation of the instruction. 
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Biased problems. The solution to the biased problem can be derived in two ways.  The 
frequency procedure requires interpreting a scale to normalise possibilities that have 
double and non-double probability then using one of several possible strategies for 
counting them. An alternative procedure is deriving the probability from the geometrical 
proportion of queried and trial possibilities. Table 6.8 shows the quantitative derivations 
verbalised by participants and resulting solutions. For all biased problems, three 
participants repeatedly gave incorrect solutions (biased/overlap: S1, S4, S6; 
biased/subset: S1, S6; biased/disjoint: S6). 
 
 Excluded possibilities. On the biased/overlap problem, S4 correctly derived the 
denominator from |U|, but incorrectly took the numerator from only |A&D|, 
which omitted |A&~D|. S1 also made the same mistake on this problem taking 
the numerator from only |A&D|, but also omitted normalisation of the 
denominator. 
 
 Normalisation omissions. For the biased/overlap problem, S6 provided the 
correct numerator value derived from |A|, but like S1 did not apply normalisation 
to the denominator. On the biased/subset, S1 also gave a solution consistent with 
making the same error. A similar mistake was also made, but corrected by S5 on 
the biased/subset problem in which S5 appeared to have initially omitted 
normalising the numerator whilst reporting a fraction involving a normalised 
denominator value as indicated by the verbalisation ”oh not two over eight, four 
over eight”. These normalisation omissions replicate errors observed in the pilot 
experiment. 
 
 Normalisation misinterpretations. On the biased/disjoint problem, S6 chose to 
derive the denominator from |U|-|D| which appears to be some way of 
normalising |D|. On the biased/subset trial, S6 derives the denominator first from 
|U|-|D| then rejects it and chooses the value of 10 for the denominator apparently 
because it is consistent with |D|*2|/|U|*2 + |~D|*2|/|U|*2. S6 thus appears to 
derives the resulting solution from |A|/|U|*2. Each of these procedures appears to 
be incorrect attempts at providing a normalised solution of |U|. 
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Subject Overlap Subset Disjoint 
S1 N/A |A&D|/|U| N/A |A|/|U| N/A |A|/|U| 
S2 |U|, |A| |A|/|U| |D|, |U| |A|/|U| |U| |A|/|U| 
S3 |U|, |U|, |A| |A|/|U| |U|, |D|, |U|, 
|D&A| 
|A|/|U| |U|,|D|, |U|, 
|A|, |A&D| 
|A|/|U| 
S4 |D|, |D|, |U|,      
|A&D|, 
|A&D| 
|A&D|/|U| |A|, |D|, |~D| |A|/|U| |D|, |D|, |U| |A|/|U| 
S5 |D|, |U| ||A|/|U|| |U|, |A|/|U| |A|/|U| |U|, |U|, |A|/|U| 
S6 ||A|/|U||, 
|?|/|?|, 
||A|/|U||,            
|A&~D|/|U|,     
|A&D|/|U| 
|A|/|U| |U|- |D|, 
|?|/|?|, |U|, 
|?|/|U|, |U|, 
|D|*2|/|U|*2|
, 
|~D|*2|/|U|*
2|,|D&A|,  
|~D&A| 
|A|/|U|*2 |U|, |U|-|D| |A|/|U|-|D| 
S7  |A|/|U|  |A|/|U| |D| |A|/|U| 
S8 |U| ||A|/|U|| |U|, |D| ||A|/|U|| |U|, |D|, |U| |A|/|U| 
Table 6.8. Verbalised quantitative derivations for the biased problems. The left column 
represents verbalised quantitative derivations in order excluding the final solution. The 
right column represents a derivation consistent with final solution given. Shaded cells 
are incorrect solutions. 
On correct solutions, as can be observed in Table 6.8, participants tended to verbalise 
normalised frequencies for |U|, |A| and sometimes |D| before providing a solution. The 
frequencies |D| and |D| were verbalised as either part of a count-remainder strategy or in 
the context of describing the condition for deriving normalised frequencies |U| or |A|.   In 
deriving a normalisation scale some participants (S3, S2, S4) on multiple problems made 
verbal protocols that suggested they interpreted large PS-units that represent double 
probability as being equivalent to two letter outcomes that have non-double probability 
as exampled in figure 6.15.  This is indicated by verbalisations such as “it’s like if I had 
eight letters in total” (S3), “double for blue means there’s six for blue ” (S2), “means we 
have six blue letters” (S4). 
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Figure 6.15. Coded protocols of S3 on the biased/overlap problem. The participant 
arrives at the correct solution by appearing to frame the double probability letters as 
equivelent to two letter outcomes. 
 
  
163 
 
Figure 6.16. Coded protocols of S5 solution procedure on the biased/overlap problem.  
The participant appears to provide the correct solution by noticing the geometrical 
proportion between target sets.  
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Figure 6.17. Coded protocols of S5 solution procedure on the biased/subset problem. 
The participant provides a correct solution by using a weighted count stratgy. 
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Three (S8, S5, S6) participants produced verbal protocols consistent with deriving 
geometrical proportions (see figure 6.16 for an example of this strategy).  For S5, 
recognising the geometrical proportion appears to have overridden using a frequency 
procedure: “It's gonna be over eight, What's the probability the letters are? so its half 
anyway” (S5, biased/overlap). For S8, he/she immediately recognised when the queried 
possibilities are identified: “the probability the letters is small? is a half, lets look at the 
diagram, naught point five” (S8, biased/subset). Another of participant’s initial solution 
(S6, biased/overlap) also seemed to be derived from the geometrical proportion, but then 
gave an incorrect solution based on a frequency derivation.   Other participants appear 
to use a weighted count strategy, an example of which is shown in figure 6.17.  
 
Conjunction problems. Conjunction problems were all answered correctly by seven of 
the eight participants in contrast to experiment 1. Only participant S7 incorrectly 
answered on the conjunction/subset problem. S7 incorrectly determined the probability 
from the frequencies of type values rather than tokens of possibilities, but gave correct 
solutions on the other two problems. 
 
Subject Overlap Subset  Disjoint 
S1 N/A |A&B|/|U| N/A |A&B|/|U| N/A |A&B|/|U| 
S2 |U| |A&B|/|U| |U| |A&B|/|U|  |A&B|/|U| 
S3 |U|, |A|, 
|B&A| 
|A&B|/|U| |U|, |A|, |B&A| |A&B|/|U|  |A&B|/|U| 
S4 |U| |A&B|/|U|  |A&B|/|U|  |A&B|/|U| 
S5 |U| |A&B|/|U| |U| |A&B|/|U|  |A&B|/|U| 
S6 |U| |A&B|/|U|  |A&B|/|U|  |A&B|/|U| 
S7 |A|/|U|, 
|B|/|U| 
|A&B|/|U| |V(A)|, 1/|V(A)|,       
|V(B)|, 1/|V(B)| 
1/|V(A)| *    
1/|V(B)| 
|A|/|U|,   
|B|/|U| 
|A&B|/|U| 
S8 |U| |A&B|/|U| |A|/|U| |A&B|/|U|  |A&B|/|U| 
Table 6.9. Verbalised quantitative derivations for the conjunction problems. The left 
column represents verbalised quantitative derivations in order excluding the final 
solution. The right column represents derivation consistent with final solution given. 
Shaded cells are incorrect solutions. |V(X)| is the number of values of the dimension of 
X e,g. |V(blue)| is 2 because there are 2 values blue and red.   
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Note that on the disjoint problem in which the probability is zero only one participant 
verbalised making a quantitative derivation before giving a solution. Like the 
conditional/disjoint problem, the fact that participants (with the exception of S7) do not 
take |U| suggests that they encode the set structure of the referred categories before 
choosing to do any form of quantification and this act is not normally verbalised. As they 
cannot know before the act whether a set is disjoint and quantification is not needed, the 
observation suggests identifying the set structure of referred categories before 
performing any quantification (i.e. |U|) may be a matter of course for participants (see 
figure 6.18 as an example). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.18. Coded protocols of S2 on the conjunction/disjoint problem who provides 
the correct answer.   
 
On the conjunction/overlap and conjunction/subset problems participants tend to derive 
|U|. In addition, only two participants appear to make quantitative derivations of either 
A or B alone before giving a solution. Note that for S3 this seems to be part of a strategy 
for determining the frequency |A∩B| because |A| is derived then |B∩A| is derived from 
the set A as indicated in the protocols of figure 6.19. These observations together with 
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the relatively shorter problem solving times and correct response rates are consistent 
with the view that participants tended to have little difficulty in interpreting the queried 
possibilities for the conjunction problem. Coded examples of performance on the 
conjunction problem are shown below.  
 
 
Figure 6.19. Coded protocols of S3 on the conjunction/subset problem who provided 
the correct answer. 
 
 
Summary. The results of the experiment reveal details about the strategies typically 
employed in solving the problems, how participants interpreted the represented 
information, and the solution procedure errors made. To recap: observed errors replicate 
some of those observed in experiment 1; the protocols suggest that some participants 
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sometimes used solution read-off procedures afforded by the diagram as described in 
Chapter 4 in contrast to known or adapted arithmetic algorithms that operate on 
probabilities; the diagrammatic scheme was sometimes used in the process of problem 
interpretation and solution procedure formulation and the diagram facilitated recognition 
of unplanned consequences of problem data. Analysis of eye-movement patterns 
replicate the continuous dependence of the problem presentation in the process of 
problems solving and the apparent in situ use of externalised information. 
 
6.4 Discussion 
 
The section discusses the implications of the experimental data. The discussion is 
divided into 5 sections. Section 1 discusses the effects of the changes to the methodology, 
section 2 discusses the patterns of solution procedures errors and what information they 
provide about representation and reasoning processes in the task. Section 3 discusses the 
interpretation processes on correct solution procedures, and section 4 describes the 
problem solving strategies that were implemented to support information acquisition for 
problem interpretation and the executions of planned solutions procedures.     
 
6.4.1 Methodology 
 
The changes to the design of the problem presentation and experimental instructions 
appeared to have the predicted effects on performance. The presence of examples in the 
verbal protocol instruction appeared to elicit greater verbalisation by participants during 
the task, but this, in turn, increased the time to perform the task. The requirement to read 
the text aloud substantially extended the time of first pass reading of the problem 
instruction. The changes to the conjunction statements resulted in a major reduction in 
solution procedure errors for conjunction problems compared to experiment 1. The 
changes to the disjunction statement resulted in some participants assuming that a 
component answer was required for each model expressed by the disjunction, which did 
not occur in the first experiment. These instruction presentation changes show how 
sensitive participants' performance is to the wording of problem instructions – even 
though such problems are clearly less conceptually challenging than those typically 
reported in experimental research. 
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6.4.2 Problem interpretations 
 
Conditional problems 
A common interpretation error in conditional problems was failing to infer the limitation 
of trial possibilities in problems where this was required (i.e. conditional/subset and 
conditional/overlap). Participants who gave a correct solution on these problems showed 
signs of initially making this omission or considering a default interpretation that implied 
this omission in the course of the trial. It cannot be the case that participants who failed 
to infer the limitation of trial possibilities did not observe that C was a subset of U and 
was a smaller set than U because these same participants used C in deriving limitations 
on queried possibilities from A∩C in conditional/disjoint and conditional/overlap 
problems. This also implies that all participants (except perhaps S7) did interpret the 
outcome statement as conditional information and that the problem for these participants 
was specifically inferring the implications of the limited trial possibilities, even though 
they showed evidence of accessing all the required information necessary to make the 
inference. 
 
The importance of the instruction in making conditional inferences is suggested by the 
pattern of errors on different conditional problems. Namely, the observation that 
participants who omitted inferring limited trial possibilities did correctly infer limited 
queried possibilities whenever it was required. A simple explanation of this pattern can 
be attributed to differences in how informative the problem instruction was on the 
former, but not the latter inference. It is proposed that when participants interpret the 
query statement, they infer that the outcome of the queried category must also have the 
category of the conditional because the meaning of the instruction designates models of 
the same outcome token. The information allows participants to infer the criteria for 
possibilities in the queried set as being those that are members of both the queried and 
conditional category, directly from the instruction. This is consistent with protocols 
indicating participants immediately responded in surprise after recognising that the sets 
in the queried and conditional category are disjoint on first inspection of the diagram; 
presumably because these participants had already formulated this expectation before 
searching for possibilities in the queried category. 
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Participants solved the conditional problems in a relatively short time and thus engaged 
in less reflection about the problem (compared to biased and disjunction problems) 
suggesting that the problems posed less of a challenge independently of whether 
participants gave correct solutions or not. Participants who gave an incorrect answer did 
not spend time deliberating about the conditional information implying that they did not 
foresee the need to question or assess the correctness of their interpretation. Making 
conditional inferences about limited possibilities is arguably an everyday cognitive 
activity. However, it is likely that the requirement for such inferences need appropriate 
conditions to be framed. Given this claim is correct, the omission errors observed in this 
experimental context may result from a problem in setting the required framing 
conditions for initiating the inference of limited possibilities. Whilst the structural 
relation between U and C may facilitate this framing the information alone is not 
sufficient in the problem context.   
 
For those participants who answered correctly, the observation that these participants 
began counting U and provided verbal reports suggesting interruption of the goal to 
derive the denominator from U suggests that they did not anticipate the requirement and 
solution implication of this information upon reading the instruction. Rather, these 
participants initially adopted a default interpretation of what counts as the trial 
possibilities (i.e. U), despite inferring the conditional dependences of C on the queried 
possibilities. The interruption occurred after verbalising |A|/|U| or |U|. This is normally 
at the juncture where participants focus on the queried possibilities that would have 
included consideration of the conditional set relation and implied possibilities between 
A and C. One possibility is that the conceptual context in conjunction with recognition 
of the subset relation between C and U may have provided the necessary cues for 
initiating consideration of the limited possibilities of U in participants who recovered 
from the omission. Another possibility is that these participants set a prospective goal to 
consider the stated outcome information when addressing the queried possibilities 
because, on reading the instruction, they had inferred its implication on queried 
possibilities (but not the trial possibilities).      
 
Disjunction problems 
The main interpretation error for the disjunction probability problems was with the 
disjunction/overlap and disjunction/subset. For these problems a number of participants 
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appeared to derive the numerator by adding the frequency of each model or by adding 
the probability of each model in the disjunction query. The procedure may result from 
an interpretation of the disjunctions as involving sets of mutually exclusive categories of 
possibilities and/or an omission in considering the implication of the set structure 
between alternative sets of possibilities on the value of the resulting numerator. Given 
the latter is true this suggests that participants' interpretation underpinning the use of the 
adding procedure is partially correct, but under-specific because it fails to consider the 
set structure between alternative sets.      
 
None of the participants produced a resulting solution consistent with this error.  Instead, 
participants interrupted and abandoned the procedure. It is clear from the verbalisations 
of some participants the interruption is based on the observation that the resulting 
probability is too high. This invites the question of what information participants use as 
a basis for making this judgement? One possibility is that they make this judgment by 
comparing the result of summing the probabilities of each model (i.e. |A|/|U| + ||B|/U| + 
|A&B|/|U|) to the relative geometrical proportion of ||AUB||/||U|| or the numerator of the 
result against some impression of the quantity of |AUB|. Another possibility is that some 
quantitative apprehension of the complement of AUB is used and judged against the 
remainder of the resulting probability. Whatever the basis of the judgement may be, the 
observations of the judgement suggest that participants must employ checking strategies 
to evaluate the results of calculations as a matter of course. 
 
Verbalisations seem to suggest that the solution was based on an initial guess. As most 
participants answered correctly, the guess is clearly not an arbitrary choice of a set, but 
based on one or more facts that constrain and/or explain the result. The information that 
the union is the correct solution follows from several observations that could have been 
made: (1) the value of AUB is less than the value of the add-probabilities procedure, 
which was the reason for rejecting it; (2) the reason why adding probabilities is higher 
that AUB is because the former does not involve repeating the count of A∩B; (3) AUB 
is also consistent with an interpretation of the query as involving no mutually exclusive 
categories. The diagram provides conditions for demonstrating the meaning and 
implications of an instruction whether given or self-generated. 
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Biased problems 
The most common error on the biased problem involved omitting the normalisation of 
the frequency of a sets used in the probability proportion. This error was also performed 
by participants in the pilot experiment. One possible reason for the omission is that 
participants just made a slip. That is, they planned or understood the requirement, but 
accidentally failed to execute it. However, the verbal protocols of S6 suggest that this 
was not the case, at least for this participant. The participant seemed to believe that the 
double probability information does not change how the denominator must be quantified, 
but only the queried possibilities. This implies that S6 did not apprehend the constraint 
that assuming double probability of some PS-Units changes the relative probability of 
non-double PS-units. 
 
The protocols provide evidence that participants appeared to use the geometrical 
representation of probability to interpret a solution to the quantification sub-problem. 
These participants interpreted double probability PS-units as being equivalent to two 
units that have half the probability. This conceptualisation has a diagrammatic 
correspondence in which double probability units can be viewed as made of two non-
double probability units because they have double the width. Participants appeared to be 
interpreting a geometrical normalisation scale that they used to adapt a frequency based 
sub-procedure for determining the probability proportion as though the problem were 
equiprobable (e.g., |A|/|U|) by taking the frequency of normalised units in A and U rather 
than actual token possibilities. The diagram also has a potential role in expressing why 
the denominator can be taken from this normalised frequency. A denominator in a 
fraction is an expression of a number of uniform unit of relative quantity to a whole. 
Counting the trial possibilities to get the denominator is equivalent to deriving a 
denominator from a relative proportion/probability of an outcome because there is an 
assumption of uniform quantity of the number of denominator units. The diagram thus 
shows this equivalence through its structural constraints. The assumption that 
participants interpreted the fraction scheme and understood the equivalence between the 
geometrical and frequency based derivation of the proportion on the biased problem is 
supported by participants who spontaneously read-off the geometrical proportion on 
these problems to provide a solution.   
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The diagram expresses frequency and probability information simultaneously, but does 
so in a format that shows constraints on the equivalence of expression from either 
perspective which can be demonstrated. Participants appear to exploit knowledge of this 
equivalence in interpreting a frequency based solution from the geometrical structure of 
the diagram using a normalisation scale, taking opportunities to derive the geometrical 
proportion to determine a probability. 
 
 
6.4.3 Errors 
 
Solution procedure errors. Experiment 2 replicates many of the types of errors reported 
in the pilot experiment, such as omitting the limitation on trial possibilities implied by 
the conditional statement and problem data, failing to normalise the frequency of either 
trial or queried possibilities in the biased problem, and interpreting the intersection rather 
than the union of models of queried possibilities in the disjunction problem. Collectively, 
the data suggests that the errors may be regularities for the types of problems and 
presentation format tested in the experiment. The incorrect solutions given are, in 
general, consistent with error in incorrectly determining the form of a solution procedure 
rather than errors in task execution. 
 
Task execution errors. These were not common but, when observed, appeared to 
involve the incorrect derivation of information from the diagram that was subsequently 
corrected. The protocols revealed several cases of incorrectly deriving set relations and 
incorrectly enumerating sets. These errors occurred even though the data was simple and 
the presentation format was arguably highly accessible. 
 
Implications of errors. The analysis reveals a mixed bag of problem solving errors that 
fall under a similar classification to those reported by O’Connell (1999). We have 
distinguished between errors that result from failing to consider implications of problem 
data, errors that result from a difficulty in interpreting the logical constraints of the 
solution, and task execution errors involving the incorrect derivation of information. The 
latter two can be classified as conceptual errors and procedural errors in O’Connell's 
framework.   
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6.4.4 Format advantages 
 
The study has aimed to identify the process of problem interpretation at a 
methodologically tractable time scale. Performance on these different problems 
highlights different roles of the diagram in determining a correct solution. Three different 
roles are identified: (1) sub-problem identification, (2) framing a solution procedure and 
(3) establishing and distinguishing the specific referential meaning or alternative 
meanings of a given or self-generated instruction. 
  
Sub-problem identification. The protocols of some participants suggest that they 
employed the diagram in the identification of sub-problem requirements. Recognition of 
the implications of structural information is observed in three problems, notably, the 
conditional, but also the disjunction and biased problems. This type of support is most 
explicit in the conditional problem in which the relevant information was the subset 
structure between C and U and its implication in interpreting a limitation of trial 
possibilities. In the disjunction/subset and disjunction/overlap, it is the implication of the 
overlapping structure between alternative sets that determines what procedure legally 
constitutes the reference and cardinality of the set of queried possibilities. On the biased 
problem, some participants made verbal protocols that expressed consideration of a 
default equiprobable assumption and engaged in redundantly counting U before deriving 
a normalised frequency. 
 
These cases described are ones where critical sub-problem features (e.g. the set structure 
of C and U) of are not initially considered before a solution or parts of a solution are 
planned. The specificity of the diagram ensures that the relevant information conditions 
(e.g., set structure) are present. In addition, the context is one where default assumptions 
about what solution procedure to apply are made by problem solvers and will be applied 
only if information condition are recognised to override such assumption.  This suggests 
that structure of probability problems is such that problem solvers can act in accordance 
with an assumption of default problem features (e.g., equiprobability, unconditional) 
unless additional information is recognised and framed as relevant. This could explain 
why diagrams can have a particular utility in probability problem solving because they 
facilitate recognition of potentially omitted sub-problem features for determining a 
solution.    
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Framing a solution procedure. Another form of cognitive support suggested by the 
experiment is the use of the form of the scheme in framing the form of the solution 
procedure. This is most clearly suggested by protocols of participants solving biased 
problem. The scheme’s geometrical representation of probability was exploited by 
participants in interpreting how the denominator could be derived from the diagram by 
seeing how non-double probability units could be used as a uniform scale unit and how 
this interpretation was a consistent or equivalent way of determining the denominator. 
The framing in question concerns the apprehension of a scheme or system. It is not only 
the feature of the representation that is encoded (e.g., the width of PS-units), but how the 
feature is part of a scheme (e.g., part-whole/geometrical fraction scheme). This is 
because one needs to apprehend why interpreting double probability units as two 
outcomes and using this normalisation rule to enumerate them provides an equivalent 
proportion of the denominator and numerator values. The scheme is an instance of 
familiar part-whole geometrical schemes, such as pie charts. The framing is tapping into 
existing prior knowledge of diagrammatic systems. As described in Chapter 2, 
diagrammatic systems can be seen as more general than conventional external 
representations (like pie charts) and can include ubiquitous types of spatial analogies or 
metaphors, such as the trajectory metaphor of time that is used in everyday thinking as 
well as conventionalised external representations. Geometrical proportions of spatial 
extent may also constitute a common informal spatial analogy/representational scheme 
for modelling proportions or fractions of non-geometrical data. 
 
Solution read-offs. Analysis of participants’ protocols suggest that participants typically 
employed the solution read-offs on problems that involved referential sub-problems as 
required by the disjunction, conjunction and conditional problems. On the biased 
problems, the solution read-off that involved deriving the probability from a geometrical 
proportion was used by a small number of participants. In disjunction problems, some 
participants employed an abstract add-probabilities procedure implying an interpretation 
of derived component possibilities. S1 also showed cases of applying abstract procedures 
on other problems and, interestingly, unlike the other participants, showed a tendency to 
make eye-movements to blank regions of the problem display consistent with his 
verbalised abstract procedures. 
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6.4.5 Strategies 
 
The experimental data provides information about the nature of subtask scheduling, the 
encoding of problem information and the argument structure employed in the problem 
solving episode.   
 
Subtask scheduling. A number of strategic regularities in the scheduling of subtasks 
were observed that were general to all and specific to some of the problems. These 
regularities suggest an underlying knowledge structure of subtask execution order that 
had been initially constructed and reused over the course of performing the experimental 
trials. Due to the small number of practice episodes in the experiment, this knowledge 
must be represented declaratively rather than being part of procedural knowledge. Initial 
task ordering choices will be based on different factors including experimental 
instructions, inferences of logical subtask dependencies, generic knowledge about word 
problems and PPS tasks as well as generic task ordering heuristics. These subtask 
scheduling regularities suggest the requirement for the cognitive model to incorporate a 
declarative representation of the task schedule. 
 
Argument structure. Verbal protocols of some participants expressed an underlying 
argument structure. Participants were not instructed to justify or explain their solutions, 
suggesting that argument verbalisations were motivated by the problem demands. The 
argument verbalisations were also commonly made in situ rather than retrospectively 
after a full plan and solution had been worked out; this suggests that the content of 
argument verbalisations tended to be a reflection of participants’ ongoing thinking and 
was a reflection of cognitive representations and processes that were functionally 
involved in task performance. Expressions of exception, implication and explanation 
indicate that participants represent the meta-cognitive role of acquired and projected 
information in higher-order meta-cognitive relations. The roles identify patterns of 
specific cognitive activities; for example, the verbalisation of an exceptions (indicated 
by terms such as “but”) identifies the consideration and rejection of a default 
interpretation that is overridden by some piece of information.  This invites questions 
about how to characterise and model such meta-cognitive states algorithmically and what 
functional role these representational states play in the reasoning process. 
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Attention allocation. Eye-movements tended to be continuously made to text and   
diagram interest areas. Eye-movements protocols reveal many repeated saccades to 
problem relevant information in the diagram and text. The frequent eye-movement 
revisits could be explained in different ways including (a) a choice strategy in which 
visual access is used as a substitute for memory retrieval and maintenance, (b) as a meta-
cognitive strategy to visually rehearse previously encoded items, (c) as a side effect of 
reconstructive episodic memory in which retrieved information activates eye-
movements associated with the encoding source, or (d) as a general search heuristic in 
problem and solution interpretation in which processing is directed at repeatedly re-
encoding target information until something comes to mind. Neither of these explanatory 
abstractions are necessarily mutually exclusive. This data provides a challenge to 
account for the eye-movement patterns and the frequency of eye-movement repetitions 
in a cognitive model that is consistent with one or more of these abstractions. 
 
6.4.6 Conclusion 
 
The second experiment provided richer verbal protocols than the first pilot experiment.  
These protocols aided identification of subtask scheduling and solution interpretation 
strategies of participants. The frequency of solution procedure errors, time taken to 
perform the task and the period of apparent reflection suggest that participants typically 
did not have practised solution procedures that could applied to all features of the 
problems. Particular solution read-offs afforded by the representational format were 
spontaneously employed by participants for a number of problems together with abstract 
arithmetic procedures that operate on proportions and frequencies. Analysis of the 
protocols provide evidence that in some cases the diagram appeared to support the 
process of problem solving by (1) facilitating unplanned consideration of data 
implications on a solution procedure, and (2) facilitating solution procedure formulation 
by providing a frame or scheme for deriving a solution interpretation and (3) allowing 
participants to demonstrate the specific meaning and implications of a solution 
interpretation. 
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Chapter 7: ACT-R Cognitive Architecture 
 
The chapter briefly outlines the ACT-R cognitive architecture used in the project. The 
models were developed in the most recent version of ACT-R, called ACT 6.0. The next 
section discusses the rationale for choosing the cognitive architecture, followed by an 
overview of ACT-R, the symbolic and sub-symbolic constraint on knowledge in ACT-R, 
and the modular structure of ACT-R.      
 
7.1 Rationale for modelling framework 
 
The ACT-R cognitive architecture was chosen because it was judged to best satisfy the 
most requirements for the research goals. A major pragmatic requirement given the 
complexity of the to-be-modelled task was that the architecture needed to be suitable to 
support analysis and experimentation with different strategies and knowledge 
representation possibilities. An abstract production system modelling approach was 
judged to be best suited to these requirements for which ACT-R is an instance. In 
addition, a cognitive architecture was also required to provide a framework for modelling 
interactions with external diagrams. ACT-R has perceptual motor modules and a well-
developed modelling framework for supporting the development of such models. 
 
In addition to the pragmatic requirements satisfied by ACT-R, this cognitive architecture 
also has a number of empirical and theoretical credentials that made its choice favourable 
over other cognitive architectures. ACT-R has long history of empirically informed 
research development and has been used to model a wide a variety of empirical 
phenomena, from reaction time tasks to complex problem solving. Many of these models 
are either publicly available or described in sufficient detail to inform the development 
of new models. Many aspects of ACT-R, in particular its theory of memory, have been 
empirically assessed on the ability to make fine grained predictions about the time course 
of processing, not just modelling accounting for qualitative aspects of behaviour data. 
The production of real time metrics is another important criteria for choosing ACT-R to 
model the target tasks because such data can be matched against the verbal and eye-
movement protocols collected in the experiments allowing temporal constraints to be 
exploited in the development and evaluation of cognitive models.   This is particular 
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important given the goals to formulate explanations of behaviour that are grounded in 
specific details of processing. 
 
7.2 Overview of architecture 
 
ACT-R is a theory of a hybrid cognitive architecture that is implemented in a 
computational modelling framework. ACT-R partitions knowledge into declarative and 
procedural types, which are modelled by chunks of attribute value pairings and 
production rules respectively. The selection of both types of knowledge are governed by 
mathematical theories of sub-symbolic processing, which determine the continuous 
activation levels of chunks in declarative memory and utility values assigned to 
production rules in procedural memory. The architecture consists of a central procedural 
module and a set of specialised processing modules that deal with cognitive, perceptual 
and motor operations. Each of these modules interacts through the contents of one or 
more of its buffers. The specialised modules perform local operations and their buffers 
hold declarative chunks that result. A central production system selects productions in a 
serial manner based on the states of modules and the contents of their buffers. Selected 
productions route information between modules in parallel which initiate modular 
operations changing the contents of their buffers. Changes to the state of buffers cause 
new productions to fire, which in turn, move the cognitive system in to a different state. 
Cognition thus unfolds through cycles of parallel interactions between modules mediated 
by the central procedural module. 
 
7.3 Symbolic and sub-symbolic knowledge 
 
ACT-R theory assumes two kinds of knowledge: declarative and procedural, each of 
which is taken to have a distinct functional role within the cognitive architecture. 
 
Declarative knowledge. According to ACT-R theory, a distinguishing property of 
declarative knowledge is that can be used for different purposes and is normally 
considered accessible to introspective processing. In ACT-R, types of knowledge 
encoded declaratively include semantic facts, episodic memories, goals or intentional 
states, knowledge of how to do things, spatial relations, perceptual states and motor 
plans. Declarative knowledge is organised into discrete knowledge structures called 
chunks. A chunk in ACT-R holds a set of references to other chunks in its slots.   
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Two kinds of values of slots may be distinguished; ones that refers to chunks 
corresponding to semantic types (e.g., the identity of a number) and one that refer to 
chunks that are episodic representations (e.g., an episodic memory trace of encoding a 
number). The difference between the two cases concerns their access. Semantic chunks 
are part of long term memory for which similarity associations (which are not chunks) 
exist (e.g., the semantic chunks for the numbers one and two will be semantically related 
in a fully specified model). This allows access to be based on similarity based retrieval 
or partial matching as it is often termed. Episodic chunks have no similarity relations 
between other chunks in declarative memory hence their content is opaque. In these 
cases, the slot reference is often construed as holding a pointer to the chunk. 
 
Slots are type defined with the type normally specifying the attribute or role of the 
referred chunk. Consider the canonical example shown in Figure 7.1, which represents 
the fact that 2 + 3 = 5. The chunk is made up of three slots; arg1, arg2 and sum. Each 
slot is bound (or said to hold) to the reference of another chunk, which corresponds to 
the value of the chunk's slot; for example, the chunks for numbers two, three and five in 
the example.   
 
 
Figure 7.1. Sub-symbolic properties for a declarative chunk adapted from Anderson 
(2007). 
 
The sub-symbolic level of chunks are characterised in term of their activation (see 
Anderson, 2007; Anderson et al., 2004). The activation level of a chunk determines, at a 
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given point in time, whether and how quickly it can be retrieved. Chunks have a base 
level activation and can receive an associative activation from other chunks in buffers. 
The activation Ai of a chunk i is calculated by the following equation: 
 
 
 
In the above equation, Bi corresponds to the base-level activation of the chunk i, Wj is 
described as the attentional weighting of those source chunks in slots of the chunk in the 
current buffer, and Sji is the strength of association between source chunks j to i. The 
associative part of the equation consists of the attentional weights Wj that are set to the 
result of 1/n where n is the number of sources of activation. The Sij are computed as: 
 
𝑆ji=S − ln(fanji) 
 
where the so called fan i is the number of chunks associated with source j. The value of 
S is a parameter that is typically set at 2.  Base level learning determines the change in 
the base level activation of a chunk as a function of its use.  This is defined by: 
 
 
 
where n is the number of presentations of chunki to declarative memory, tj is the time 
elapsed since the jth presentation of the chunki and d is a decay parameter.  The equation 
reflects the log odds that a chunk will reoccur as a function is past appearance (Anderson, 
2007). The probability that a chunk i will be retrieved, depends on whether its activation 
exceeds a threshold.  The equation that governs the probability of a chunk being retrieved 
is: 
 
 
 
The parameter T is the retrieval threshold and S is value that determines noise in the 
activation level. If the chunk is retrieved, the retrieval time is defined as: 
 
 
 
where F is a latency factor. 
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Procedural knowledge. Procedural knowledge is knowledge of how to perform a 
particular skill such as operate a keyboard, drive a car, make a cup of tea or solve a 
quadratic equation. Unlike declarative knowledge, units of procedural knowledge are 
purpose specific and unavailable to introspective processes. Procedural knowledge is 
organised into primitive units called productions. Productions in ACT-R relate a set of 
conditions about the states of the cognitive system with a set of actions that change that 
state. The information stored in the condition side of a production is a specification of 
the content of chunks held in buffers and the processing state of modules required for 
the production to fire (i.e. to be executed). The information stored in the action side 
specifies the transfer of information between buffers and processing requests made to 
modules. In ACT-R models, productions have a specific functional meaning, that is, they 
are specifications or action-selection contingencies established through a form of 
reinforcement learning. They are not to be confused with intuitive notions of rules.  There 
are several different ways in which rules can be said to be represented or emerge within 
ACT-R and productions only constitute one specific functional sense. 
 
Productions in ACT-R models are idealised knowledge structures modelled at a high 
level of abstraction. There are different levels of abstraction that productions can be 
modelled at including connectionist and computational neuroscience levels. For 
example, current neural level accounts propose that productions are stored in neural 
circuits in substructures of the basal ganglia and emerge through complex dynamic 
interactions within these circuits (Stocco & Anderson, 2008).  The critical point is that 
the choice of modelling abstraction is a matter of pragmatics rather than an exclusive 
theoretical commitment. ACT-R is typically used to model high-level and complex 
cognitive phenomena for which the role of strategy and contribution of all components 
of the cognitive system is an important explanatory feature of the model. 
 
Productions in ACT-R have constraints on what pattern matching capabilities and actions 
are possible. The conditions specified in productions need only be partial specifications 
of chunks in buffers and the processing states of modules. The contents of chunks 
specified in productions are slots that may have constants, variables or may be empty. If 
a variable is specified in a production then a condition is signalled that a chunk must be 
bound to that slot irrespective of its content, if a constant is specified then the chunk with 
a specific semantic value must be bound. An empty slot is treated as not present in the 
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chunk.  Productions in ACT-R can be seen as implementing three classes of operators 
between slot values of conditions: an AND operator (i.e. each slot value specified), an 
equivalence operator (i.e. slot values that have the same variable or constant value), and 
negation (i.e. where a variable of constant value does NOT hold). A single production 
cannot respond to a disjunction of slot values; hence the system would need to have 
different productions for each of the disjunctive possibilities.   
 
Productions' conditions can apply to queries about the processing state of modules. 
Information made available by modules include whether a chunk is present in the buffer, 
whether a buffer chunk was created by the corresponding module in response to a 
request, whether a module is busy processing information (where multiple processes are 
possible what class of process is being performed). The main reason for the processing 
state queries is to determine the availability of processing resources so that resources are 
not requested when they are used and can be used as soon as they become available. 
Actions that can be taken by productions include modifying multiple slot values of 
chunks within buffers with either constants or variables, copying complete chunks to 
buffers, clearing chunks from buffers and sending complex retrieval or perceptual 
commands to modules via partial chunk specifications. 
 
Productions can be static or dynamic. In static productions the slot type is a specified 
constant whereas in dynamic productions the slot type can also be bound to a variable. 
Consider the two productions in Figure 7.2, where the retrieved value of the sum slot of 
an addition fact in the retrieval buffer is copied to the imaginal buffer. In the static 
production the identity of the sum slot is specified in the retrieval and imaginal chunks 
of the production. This means that the production will only respond when the specific 
semantic conditions hold (i.e. the sum slot pattern across buffers). 
 
Now consider the dynamic production, which can do the same job. In the dynamic 
production the sum slot is not specified, but instead, a variable slot is specified labelled 
=result that could take on the value of the sum slot (one could also imagine the same 
production responding to the result of a multiplication or subtraction fact). For a slot to 
be a variable in a dynamic production, it must also be the value of at least one static slot 
as shown in the example (i.e. =goal> result [=result]). This production could fire for any 
case where the value of the result slot is a variable slot retrieved from declarative 
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Static production 
 
Condition 
Goal> 
  result [sum] 
Retrieval> 
  sum [=value] 
Imaginal> 
  sum [?] 
 
Action 
Imaginal> 
   sum [=value] 
Dynamic production 
 
Condition 
Goal> 
  result [=result] 
Retrieval> 
  =result [=value] 
Imaginal> 
   =result [?] 
 
Action 
Imaginal> 
   =result [=value]    
memory. On the action side, in the example, the variables for the slot =result and its 
value =value are copied to the chunk in the imaginal buffer. Note that it does not matter 
if the slot bound to the variable =result is part of the imaginal chunk as the dynamic 
production mechanism allows chunks in buffers to be extended with new slots. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.2. Static and dynamic productions that can carry out the same operation. The 
dynamic production provides a more general operation in which the retrieved value of 
some result is updated in the imaginal buffer. 
 
Productions in ACT-R also have a sub-symbolic level, which determine their selection 
probability in addition to symbolic pattern matching. The selection probability of a 
production is based on a measure of its utility to the current goal. As production utility 
is not used in the model, the mathematical details of production utility computations will 
not be discussed further. 
 
7.4 Modular structure 
 
ACT-R 6.0 has several specialised processing modules that deal with specific functions 
of central, perceptual and motor cognition (see Figure 7.2). Central cognitive modules 
include a goal module that keeps track of processing intentions, a declarative memory 
module which processes the storage and retrieval of memories, an imaginal module that 
holds and manipulates problem states, and a procedural module which selects 
productions based on the state of the cognitive system. Visual and auditory modules 
handle requests to search and process modality specific information, a manual motor 
module controls hand movements, and a speech module processes requests to generate 
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vocalisations. Modules have one or more buffers, which act as an interface to the module. 
Chunks may be created in buffers, modified and maintained over the course of 
processing. Modules can only hold and execute processes on a single chunk at time. In 
addition to the content of their buffers, modules can signal abstract information about 
their availability for processing. The core modules of the architecture have been 
empirically linked to particular brain regions, where the primary neural circuitry behind 
the modules is believed to take place. These associations have been based on a 
combination of general findings in cognitive neuroscience as well as specific studies 
which explored bold response predictions of ACT-R models in fMRI tasks. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.3. Modular architecture of ACT-R 6.0. 
  
 
Procedural module. The procedural module is involved in the learning, storage, 
selection and execution of productions. The module is proposed to be implemented in 
the basal ganglia and associated neural structures. According to the current theory, the 
striatum is involved in recognizing patterns in buffers, the palladium performs conflict 
resolution and thalamus participates in controlling the execution of productions.  
According to Anderson et al. (2004), a production rule can be considered a “specification 
of a cycle from the cortex, to the basal ganglia, and back again” (p. 1038). The 
procedural module can only execute one production at time and each production takes 
approximately 50ms to execute. 
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Goal module. The goal (or control) module contains a buffer which holds chunks that 
contains abstract control information. This information is specific to particular intentions 
carried out by the system. The content of the control buffer is determined by productions 
that make requests to construct and modify control chunks. The goal module is said to 
track the state of the cognitive system as the execution of a cognitive task unfolds. For 
example, if a request is made to retrieve information from declarative memory then the 
procedural system may update the goal buffer with a control state specifying that a 
retrieval is being made. This allows productions to respond to the result of the retrieval 
request conditionally on the goal state. Control states can thus be seen to provide the 
necessary conditions to prune the selection of concurrent productions in a goal directed 
way. 
 
Declarative module. The declarative module includes mechanisms for accessing 
declarative memories and a buffer for holding chunks that result. The module is 
associated with the functioning of the lateral prefrontal cortex. Retrieval requests are 
made to the module by productions that provide a partial specification of chunk. The 
information specified can be viewed as retrieval cues that constrain search for the 
appropriate memory. The retrieval module can execute a partial matching search so that 
chunks that are similar, but do not exactly match the retrieval constraints, have a chance 
of being retrieved. If the retrieval is successful a chunk matching the request is generated 
in the retrieval buffer. If the retrieval fails, a module state is generated which signals an 
error. The retrieval takes some interval of time in accordance with its activation 
equations.    
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Type Modules Module 
function 
Buffers Buffer 
Properties 
Knowledge 
Cognitive Procedural Action selection, 
reinforcement, 
learning 
Procedural Input, output Productions 
Goal Construct & 
modify 
intentional states 
Control State Input, 
Output, 
Maintenance, 
Modifiable 
Unspecified 
chunks 
Declarative Memory 
retrieval, 
declarative 
learning 
Retrieval Input, 
Output, 
Maintenance 
Unspecified 
chunks 
Imaginal Construct and 
modify problem 
states/images 
Imaginal Input, 
Output, 
Maintenance, 
Modifiable 
Unspecified 
chunks 
Perceptual Visual Visual search & 
attention 
processing 
 
 
Visual 
location 
Input, 
Output, 
Maintenance 
Visual-
location 
chunks 
Visual 
Object 
Input, 
Output, 
Maintenance 
Visual-
object 
chunks 
Auditory Auditory search  
& attention 
processing 
Auditory 
location 
Input, 
Output, 
Maintenance 
Auditory-
location 
chunks 
Auditory 
Object 
Input, 
Output, 
Maintenance 
Auditory-
object 
chunks 
Motor Manual Hand movements 
 
Manual Input Manual 
command 
chunks 
Speech Speech 
production 
 
Vocal Input Speech 
command 
chunk 
 
Table 7.1. A tabulation of properties of modules in ACT 6.0. 
 
 
Imaginal module. The imaginal module is part of central cognition and has a single 
buffer. Its main functions are the maintenance and manipulation of internal 
representations of states of a problem. Maintenance of chunks in the imaginal buffer are 
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normally required when the cognitive system needs to interrelate or integrate serially 
acquired information from perception and memory. One may think of the imaginal 
module as a system for processing representations of an external environment (images) 
because chunks represented in the imaginal module typically carry information about 
real or imaginary external state of affairs. It can be contrasted with the goal module that 
represents internal states about the cognitive system. Information changes to the 
imaginal buffer consume processing time. The module is proposed to be associated with 
functions computed by the posterior parietal cortex. 
 
Perceptual modules. The visual module models abstract aspects of visual attention 
processing sufficient to make rough predictions about the time to encode visual 
information in complex tasks. The module comprises of visual location and visual object 
buffers corresponding to the distinction between so called where and what processing 
streams. Productions make requests to search for objects by specifying search 
constraints. If the search proves successful a location chunk is placed in a corresponding 
location buffer. The visual location chunk holds information about the position of an 
attended location. In the case of vision, the position information is specified in a 
retinotopic frame of reference. To process the perceptual features of the located object, 
the procedural system must make a request to the module to shift attention to the location 
of the object. If the request is successful, a corresponding visual object chunk that binds 
the different perceptual features of the object together (e.g., colour, form, size, etc.) is 
placed in a visual buffer. These processes take time to execute. 
 
In ACT-R, tags called FINST (Finger Instantiations) are assigned to visual object chunks 
by default whenever a visual object is attended. The FINST mechanisms implemented 
in ACT-R is a conservative model of the original theory of spatial indexes/FINST 
developed by Pylyshyn (1994). In ACT-R the main (and limited) function of FINST is 
to allow the system to use the attended status of visual objects as a search criterion. For 
example, if the system is trying to find objects that have/have not recently been attended, 
productions can specify this constraint in the search requests sent to the visual module. 
As this mechanism resides in the visual module, central cognition cannot directly access 
the identity of FINST bindings. Central cognition can only establish that a FINST is 
assigned to an object by serially requesting a search for objects that have been recently 
attended and then attending to the result. The assignment of a FINST to a visual object 
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has a default decay parameter of a few seconds so what counts as recently attended is 
with respect to a short time window. 
 
Motor modules. The architecture also includes a module for processing speech and a 
module for processing manual motor actions. In both cases, processing requests are made 
by productions that transfer commands via chunks that specify symbolic parameters of 
a motor action. Once transferred to the module, these chunks are not maintained and no 
new chunks are created as a result of the motor process. Indeed, unlike other modules in 
ACT-R, the motor modules do not hold chunks in buffers that the procedural system can 
directly access. 
 
7.5 Conclusion 
The ACT-R cognitive architecture satisfies a number of requirements for modelling 
performance in the experiment. It has a modular organisation that embodies constraints 
on available resources and the time course of processing and maintenance, a sub-
symbolic theory of memory that constrains and predicts the time course of knowledge 
access and a framework for modelling interactions with an external display. These 
architectural constraints are supported by empirical research. 
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Chapter 8: Modelling Diagrammatic Reasoning about 
Probability 
 
8.1. Introduction 
 
The aim of the modelling research is to develop a cognitive model that simulates the 
process by which participants solved the experimental problems. This is to be achieved 
by exploring and explicating the set of possible assumptions that are required to provide 
an explanation of participants’ observed solution procedures and strategies. The purpose 
of this exploratory modelling investigation is to acquire information about the task model 
possibilities, information processing roles of the diagram in the unpractised PPS 
(probability problem solving) experimental task and its potential implications in 
understanding other PPS and problem solving tasks using diagrammatic representations. 
 
8.1.1. Chapter outline 
 
Section 8.2 describes generic modular mechanisms, representations and processes 
concerned with visual and spatial processes, with meta-cognitive processing associated 
with the goal module and with problem representation, and processing associated with 
the imaginal module and declarative inference. Section 8.3 describes the main 
probability concepts and how PPS knowledge is represented and organised. Section 8.4 
describes how basic subtasks are implemented in the model such as reading, identifying 
sets, counting and determining proportions. Section 8.5 describes models of unpractised 
problem solving which aim to address the process of how problem identification, 
solution interpretation and solution procedure formulation occurs. Section 8.6 discusses 
the findings and implications of the modelling research.        
 
8.1.2. Modelling aims 
 
The main focus of the cognitive modelling is to investigate the role of the diagram in the 
formulation of a solution procedure. The experiment identified roles of the diagrammatic 
format on solution procedure interpretation. It was argued that these types of cognitive 
support are dependent on the information properties of the diagram (e.g. specificity, 
modelled constraints, token referential, visual spatial ontology) and their accessibility. 
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The cognitive modelling research aims to address more specifically how these different 
solution procedure interpretation advantages are realised at an information processing 
level. The general modelling aims also require addressing a set of modelling sub-
problems posed by the modelling task: (1) the nature and use of PPS relevant knowledge 
possessed by participants, (2) the nature of generic representations and processes 
employed in unpractised problems solving activities, and (3) the nature of visual spatial 
processing implicated in the diagrammatic reasoning activities. 
 
Evolution of cognitive model. The model has been developed incrementally as both a 
pragmatic strategy of model development, but also in response to the increased 
understanding of requirements and limitations of modelling possibilities that naturally 
come about when engaging in such activities. One assumption applied in the 
development of the cognitive model was to develop subtask strategies and other routines 
as independent collection of knowledge with an independent control structure. There are 
several arguments supporting this theoretical assumption and modelling strategy. (1) 
Whilst this kind of approach is common in software development and engineering (e.g., 
object oriented programming) its motivation in this context also has a theoretical and 
empirical basis. Many theories of cognitive phenomena assume that cognition implicates 
a hierarchy of processing that involve combining primitives to make up complex 
processes. (2) The task being modelled implicates a number of routine subtasks and 
lower-level cognitive routines that are executed across all problems (e.g., instruction 
comprehension, object/set identification, enumeration, proportion construction). (3) As 
the task is unpractised it is required that knowledge from different domains or schemas 
be brought together in solving the task rather that assuming proceduralisation of a unitary 
strategy derived from the aggregated optimisation of different subtask domains. (4)  
Treating the routine subtasks as relatively fixed parameters was employed as prerequisite 
to developing the sequence of interpretation processes that occur between the execution 
of subtasks. Initial models of the task were practised models that included knowledge of 
goals specifying parameters of a subtask. The practised model was used to initially test 
and evaluate the subtask strategic knowledge.           
 
8.2 Generic modular processes and mechanisms 
 
The section outlines modular processing mechanisms and knowledge that are specific to 
the cognitive model and the modelling task. Four main classes of cognitive functions   
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and corresponding modules are discussed: (1) visual-object processing using the visual 
module, (2) spatial processing using the spatial module, (3) meta-cognitive processing 
using the goal module, (4) the processing of integrated problem information using the 
problem state/imaginal module. 
 
 
8.2.1. Visual object processing 
 
Visual representations. ACT-R's visual module provides an abstract model of visual 
attention. The chunk ontology of visual object representations is limited to text elements, 
lines and dialog buttons, which are not sufficient for modelling visual interactions with 
complex diagrams. The visual chunk ontology was therefore extended for modelling 
visual attention with the PS-diagram (probability space diagram) and problem display 
features used in the experiments. Table 8.1 lists the ontology.   
 
 
Display components 
 
Visual object category 
 
 
Text 
 
 
 
 Text-frame 
Text-statement 
Text-entry 
Text-value 
Text-unit 
 
 
 
Diagram 
 
 
 
  PS-space 
PS-unit-group 
PS-unit 
PS-letter 
PS-unit-boundary 
Marker-line 
 
Table 8.1. Visual object chunks in the modelling framework. 
 
 
The extended ontology is built around the assumption that visual objects in the problem 
display are individuated at different levels of granularity. This is normally the case in 
graphical cognition because represented information is typically embedded in 
hierarchically organised parts of diagram configuration. For example, the model assumes 
that the problem solver is able to distribute attention to a whole PS-diagram, subgroups 
of PS-units (problem space units), individual PS-units, letters within PS-units, and 
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vertical boundary lines that separate neighbouring PS-units. The scheme supports multi-
scale visual attention as have been previously reported in ACT-R models elsewhere (e.g., 
Anderson, 1997). The ontology of visual object types is summarised in Table 8.1.  Each 
type of location chunk corresponds to a possibility for visual attention. Visual objects 
formed by groupings are based on distinct and salient properties. In the modelling 
framework, the visicon, which is a model of the external display, contains the space of 
potential individuations at different levels of granularity. 
 
To model minimal functions of peripheral vision, additional slots were added to visual 
objects chunks. The chunks hold peripheral information only about the existence per se 
(not attribute bindings) of surrounding objects. Peripheral surround information is 
modelled minimally with a single slot that holds a ground part of a figure-ground pattern. 
The pattern indicates that there are peripheral objects to the left “?#”, right “#?”,  both 
left and right “?#?” or neither “#” modelled by the corresponding notation. The 
peripheral information is used to make scanning decisions in low level visual attention 
routines implemented in the model. Evidence that the cognitive system has access to 
knowledge of the presence/absence of visual objects in peripheral vision is supported by 
studies in reading (e.g., McConkie & Rayner 1975; Rayner 1975). In addition, the 
observation that eye-movements are rarely made to the last letters in the PS-unit array is 
consistent with the claim that participants processing systems must have initially 
detected the end of the array via peripheral vision whilst fixating on a preceding rather 
than end PS-unit (one can also verify this by inspecting any of the presented scan paths 
of participants in Chapter 6). 
 
In the model, perceptual groupings are represented by single visual object chunks. Note, 
however, that by default visual object chunks in ACT-R only represent a single value of 
an attribute at a time. In the model, when a group has multiple values of a visual attribute 
(e.g., a group of large letters containing subgroups of red and blue letters) then the 
corresponding visual-object chunk does not contain a value for that visual attribute (e.g., 
colour) indicating the value is indeterminate. In order to specify this information, the 
system must serially attend to each subgroup having the single target visual attribute. 
The constraint, however, has an upside. The information that an attribute of a chunk of 
a visual group is unspecified is used to indicate that there are subgroups with different 
values of that attribute. This is exploited by visual attention productions that implement 
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decisions about whether to scan component groupings. This modelling constraint (not 
ACT-R) is motivated by and consistent with the Boolean map theory of visual attention 
(Huang & Pashler, 2007) that claims the visual system can only process/attend to one 
single value of a visual attribute of an object at a time, but can process values of different 
attributes in parallel. 
 
8.2.2. Spatial representation and processing 
 
In addition to representation and processing requirements of the visual object processing 
module, ACT-R also requires a spatial processing capacity to adequately model the 
diagrammatic reasoning in the PPS tasks. ACT-R 6.0 has limited architectural 
commitments for modelling spatial processing. Critical spatial processing activities that 
need to be addressed include the derivation of topological relations of spatial 
containment, relations of magnitude and orientation, and capacity to identify or 
individuate spatially defined groupings such as the intersection and union of two or more 
groups. The section discusses solutions to these problems. 
 
Logan and Sadler's (1996) computational theory of spatial apprehension proposes that 
abstract conceptual spatial relations are selected with intermediate representations from 
a perceptual spatial representation that is analogous to a spatial array representation, but 
contains spatial relation information only implicitly. Gunzelmann and Lyon (2007) 
propose certain architectural features for a general model for spatial processing 
competence in ACT-R based on a survey of empirical research.  Their proposals include: 
replacing the existing imaginal module with a spatial module and several additional 
buffers including an egocentric buffer to represent visual locations in egocentric frames 
of reference; an environmental buffer to represent spatial and magnitude relations 
between visual objects in an exocentric frame of reference; and an episodic buffer to 
hold episodic representations that index chunks from the different visual spatial buffers. 
Matessa and Brockett (2007) proposed a particular implementation of a framework 
developed by Chandrasekaran et al. (2004) for diagrammatic reasoning. In summary, 
their proposals include: the existence of routines that determine spatial relations through 
search requests to the visual location system; make metric comparisons to visual objects 
in the visual buffer; and project non-veridical objects (e.g., paths) on perceived scenes 
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using a combination of visual and imaginal processing. These authors however do not 
report the empirical basis or an evaluation of the feasibility of the proposals. 
 
A spatial buffer with modular functions was added to the existing architecture to support 
the spatial processing required for reasoning with the PS-diagram in the experimental 
task. To be clear, the additions are not intended as a general model of human spatial 
processing abilities. The spatial processing additions to ACT-R are based on recent 
empirical results and theoretical claims as well as analytical consideration of the 
feasibility of the proposed scheme. The constraints implemented in the model are 
summarised below.         
 
Parallel indexing hypothesis. Computing spatially relational information between 
selected objects requires indexing the target objects (e.g., Pylyshyn, 1994, 2000). FINST 
theory proposes that the cognitive system has a capacity of about four spatial indexes 
that are used to compute spatial relations. Relations of relative position between objects 
may be computed from a representation of a set of two to five objects files (Hayworth, 
Lescroart, Biederman, 2011) as described by the neural object files theory (Xu and Chun, 
2009). Studies of visual short term memory supports an estimate of three to four slots, 
where each slot holds the bindings of a unique visual object (Luck and Vogel, 1997), 
groups of objects (Kong, Schunn and Wallstrom, 2010), or pairs of attended visual 
objects (Clevenger and Hummel, 2014).       
 
Spatial specificity hypothesis. There is a functional requirement to derive spatial 
relations from a perceived base representation of space, which is informationally 
specific. The base representation could be the absolute position of objects indexed in an 
abstract spatial array or retinotopic co-ordinate system. Such representations are 
assumed in computational theories of diagrammatic reasoning. A base perceptual spatial 
representation is proposed in Logan and Sadler's (1996) computational theory of spatial 
apprehension, which in turn provides information conditions to select abstract 
conceptual spatial relations (e.g., left-of) by an intermediate process of template 
matching. Note that such a base representation is also implicit in the ACT-R framework 
as the absolute location of visual-objects that are encoded as visual-location chunks in a 
retinotopic co-ordinate system. Hence, a spatial buffer in ACT-R holding N visual-
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location chunks can be viewed to represent a local retinotopic base representation of 
selected visual objects.   
 
Research on the organisation of visual short term memory (VSTM) suggests that objects 
in visual short term memory are coded within a global spatial configuration (Jiang, 
Ohlson and Jung, 2000). This is also consistent with evidence for a recent structural 
description account of spatial encoding in which the cognitive system explicitly 
represents a configuration of relative spatial relations between represented objects files 
(Hayworth, et al., 2011). It is also consistent with evidence and the model of visual 
spatial short term memory capacity and representation proposed by Clevenger and 
Hummel (2014) in which (about two) pairs of objects can be bound to a representation 
of all spatial relations. According to their research, the number of relations between a 
pair have no additional working memory resource cost. The authors explain this resource 
independence by proposing that the role bindings take the forms of what they call stacked 
relations, which involve combined roles between pairs of objects (e.g., left-of-near-to-
larger-than) in VSTM. All of these accounts are supported by evidence suggesting 
immediate spatial representations of perceived objects are specific/configurational and 
these spatial configurations representations involve relations of relative position. 
 
Global and local spatial hypothesis. Scene and graphical interpretation often require 
tracking objects at different levels of granularity. A number of studies provide evidence 
that VSTM simultaneously represent global (i.e. a group of visual objects) and local 
information (individuals or subgroups of visual objects) (see Kong, Schunn and 
Wallstrom, 2010). The model of VSTM proposed by Kong, et al. (2010) proposes that 
the cognitive system represents objects in VSTM at different levels of granularity using 
the same VSTM capacity resources of a few item/object slots. Their model also proposes 
that the cognitive system encodes global information first and uses this information to 
guide the encoding of local information whilst maintaining the global information in 
VSTM and thereby keeping track of the bigger picture. 
 
Model. The extended architecture includes a spatial buffer, which holds a chunk 
containing four slots that reference attended visual-location chunks. Note that each 
visual-location chunk encodes position in a retinotopic co-ordinate system, so this 
information can be viewed as a perceptual base representation. The visual-location slots 
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have roles that identify the currently attended object (target) and one or two previously 
attended objects (referents). The location chunks of visual objects can only be indexed 
in the spatial buffer when the corresponding visual object is attended to. In the model, 
this indexing is done automatically by a modular function (that is not part of standard 
ACT-R) in response to an update request by an attention production. 
 
In addition to slots holding the locations of objects, the spatial chunk also holds a 
transient representation of the spatial configuration between corresponding target object 
and one or two referent objects. This information is a representation of the relative 
position of objects. This is intended to model a specific representation of the spatial 
configuration between selected objects that functions as an information interface for 
productions of central cognition. In the model this is represented by a set of spatial values 
that are automatically computed by modular functions on attention shifts from the 
retinotopic position of location chunks indexed in the spatial buffer. Note that this spatial 
representation exists at a short timescale in the order of 100s of milliseconds because its 
content changes on each attention shift (the imaginal buffer is used to hold a more 
permanent representation of selected spatial information). The modular functions 
implemented in the model can be viewed to constitute visual routines (e.g. Ullman 1984) 
that are part of a visual spatial processing system. 
 
This spatial configuration representation provides conditions for abstract (e.g., left-of) 
conceptual spatial relations to be selected for purposes such as reasoning and 
communication consistent with Logan and Sadler's theory of spatial apprehension. In the 
model, the selection and mapping is carried out by productions. These productions 
respond to/recognise patterns of the spatial configuration and particular goal conditions 
and select a conceptual spatial relation appropriate to the goal context and generate the 
conceptual information in the imaginal buffer (which buffers conceptual information 
only in this model). In principle, the conceptual spatial relations could also be retrieved 
from declarative memory using configuration features as retrieval cues and memory 
instances that map configurations to stereotypical conceptual spatial relations, which 
would in turn be consistent with the template matching account of spatial apprehension 
theory of Logan & Sadler. However, given the theoretical assumption of 
proceduralisation in ACT-R, this would occur only if only one assumes that production 
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learning has not been achieved between spatial and goal context information, which one 
would assume to exist for common visual spatial contexts. 
 
In the model, the spatial processing is initiated by generic attention shifting productions. 
This is similar to a model of a spatial encoding task reported by Johnson, Wang and 
Zhang (2003) in which relations between concurrently attended objects are automatically 
generated on attention shifts. The request by an attention shift production results in the 
spatial buffer being updated with a chunk containing the spatial structure information 
while attention is being requested to an object. As the attention shift production/s are 
generic and depend on limited control information, the spatial update may be viewed as 
automatic and context independent. However, the content of spatial configuration 
information is controlled by central cognition in two ways. Firstly, the configuration 
information is local and between objects concurrently selected for visual attention by 
central cognition. Secondly, as will be shown, complex n-array spatial relations requiring 
multiple attention shifts that result from derivations of sets such as the union and 
intersection of subsets depend on specific search requests using spatially buffered object 
locations as operation arguments.  Note that the spatial representation is transient – as 
soon as attention is shifted to a new location the representation will change. Attention 
shift invariant spatial information needs to be encoded from the spatial buffer and 
updated in the imaginal buffer which is more like a working memory.    
 
The spatial chunks share a similar slot ontology of visual search requests that are part of 
the existing ACT-R framework. A distributed feature based representation is assumed to 
be consistent with most models of visual processing, but these features make up a 
specific representation. The spatial chunk uses the direction slots to indicate the results 
of the direction of the attention shift from the referent to the target represented by 
qualitative values (e.g. left-of). The module also computes relative differences in size 
between the target and referent represented by a numerical value that represents an 
analogical code (modelled as the target size divided by the referent size). These 
difference would be assumed to have a rough approximate value. To represent conditions 
for the derivation of relations of spatial containment, a single slot is used to represent 
boundary configuration values. When attention is shifted to an object whose region is 
fully inside the boundaries of the previously attended object, this will result in binding 
boundary: within. When attention is shifted to an object whose region overlaps with the 
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previous object, this will result in binding boundary: overlap. When the boundary is 
shared the binding boundary: connected will result. When there is no shared boundary 
the binding boundary: separate will result.  These slots always represent a binary relation 
between the current (targ-loc) and previously attended object (ref-loc1). One can view 
the contents of the spatial buffer as representing relations of attention changes between 
consecutive objects i.e. changes in reference, direction, boundary and size. 
 
Note that the use of linguistic notation for spatial attribute values in the spatial buffer is 
only for communication purposes – they are intended to model non-linguistic spatial 
codes computed from attention changes. These codes could be notationally represented 
in other ways that provide equivalent functionality to the model, including numerical 
codes or so called stacked relations.  The key hypothesis implemented in the model is 
that production rules can interpret the values of a specific representation of a spatial 
structure between two or a few selected objects. 
 
 
Figure 8.1.  Limited ontology of features employed to represent the spatial structure. 
 
  
Whenever a production attends to an object location in response to a search request, the 
spatial module updates the buffer with information designating the locations and spatial 
structure between the current and previously attended object/s. Hence, the relative size 
differences, boundary and direction values between external objects are generated in the 
spatial buffer automatically on attention shifts. Updating of locations operates by a first-
in-last-out policy in agreement with empirical justification of other models of working 
memory. Hence, on each attention shift the current location is bound to the target location 
slot and the previous target binding is bound to the next referent slot. 
 
 
Spatial index slots 
target-loc   (e.g. visual-location22) 
referent-loc1    
referent-loc2        
 
Spatial value slots 
 direction  (e.g. left-of) 
 relative-size         (e.g. .5) 
 boundary  (e.g. within, overlap, separate) 
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Spatially derived groupings. The derivation of object groups (union, intersection, 
complement) are determined by search processes of the visual module, which take the 
contents of the spatial buffer as search parameters. For example, in determining the union 
of two sets, the locations of the two spatial indexed sets maintained in the spatial buffer 
are used as parameters to search for an object that satisfies the grouping of the indexed 
objects in the spatial buffer. Hence, for a union of two sets, this involves a minimum of 
three attention shifts: to object A, then B, then the grouping corresponding to AUB. Note 
that the resulting location of the search request is always the approximate centroid of the 
visual group. When attention is shifted to the location of the derived visual group (e.g., 
intersection, union, etc.), the visual object chunk representing that group is generated in 
the visual object buffer and an imaginal buffer slot (e.g. members-union) with the 
reference to the visual group. Spatial buffer conditions are used to determine whether a 
derived grouping is possible.  For example, in determining the intersecting group, the 
binding boundary: overlap between spatial buffered referents must hold. 
 
8.2.3. Meta-cognitive and control operations 
 
A second important issue in the modelling work is concerned with the requirements for 
meta-cognitive processing. Meta-cognitive processing requirements in this model 
include the selection of goal requirements and task strategies, the co-ordination and 
keeping track of online processing, the interruption and diversion of cognitive activities, 
and the interrelation of information in reasoning/argumentation.     
 
Strategy tracking The chunk in the goal buffer has slot values that reflect strategic 
variables that designate what the system is doing at different time-scales. The top level 
subtask slot holds information about the subtask strategy being performed (e.g., 
counting, reading, identification, etc.), the step slot holds abstract information about the 
step in the subtask (e.g., starting, scanning, checking, complete, etc.) and the more fine 
grained operation slot holds the module operations being performed (e.g., retrieving, 
searching, updating, attending, etc.). Operation and step slots are modified directly by 
productions of routines that generate the slot values. The content of the subtask slot may 
be copied from a declarative memory chunk and interpreted by generic interpretation 
productions or may be directly produced by a production.      
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Role (slot) Meaning Example 
Subtask 
 
The subtask strategy being  
executed 
e.g., Subtask: counting 
Step  The step in the subtask 
strategy 
e.g., Step: start 
Operation The operation requested for 
processing by a module 
e.g., Operation: retrieving 
 
Table 8.2. Levels of strategic control information represented by goal chunks used in 
the model. 
 
 
Meta-role bindings 
The goal chunks also represent the meta-cognitive role of the problem roles bound in the 
imaginal buffer. Recall the imaginal buffer holds a representation of a perceived or 
imagined environmental problem state. The control buffer chunk, in contrast, holds 
meta-role slots. These slots include goal information, for example, whether a type of 
information is a requirement or result of some subtask. They also include self-
argumentation information, for example, whether some information is tagged as a 
rejected, given case, conclusion, exception, etc. The value of meta-role slots are values 
that are slots in the imaginal buffer and are typically matched in dynamic binding 
productions. The scheme implemented in the goal buffer uses a slot-to-variable-slot 
binding and matching as illustrated in Figure 8.2. 
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Figure 8.2. Illustration of slot-to-variable-slot matching in the goal buffer in which 
meta-roles are matched to problem-role slots and values in the imaginal buffer 
 
 
This scheme is a candidate model of the requirement to represent recursive relations of 
meta-cognitive information in working memory. It is proposed that such meta-relations 
must be represented in a buffer in order to be used to trigger productions by providing 
conditions for decision making and the selection of actions.  
 
Intention/goal tracking.   
The goal buffer also holds goal information which represents an abstract functional 
interpretation of the goal that is independent of the strategy for acquiring the information. 
The need to represent and dissociate goal and strategic meta-cognitive information is a 
functional requirement. For example, if the goal is to get the number of queried 
possibilities one could implement different strategies such as counting or subitizing 
elements in a diagram, retrieving the value from memory if present or reading the 
number from a text based instruction if given. Whatever the case the same abstract goal 
concepts would apply which constitutes context independent schematic knowledge. Goal 
information is structured according to the following meta-roles by binding the meta-role 
to the identity of problem role in the imaginal buffer. These include: (1) the role of the 
required data (e.g., Require [part-frequency]), the role of the data that the requirement is 
derived from (e.g., Object [queried-possibilities]) and the function interpretation of the 
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procedure (not the strategy) for getting the requirement (e.g., SP [frequency]). When the 
requirement is achieved its status is set as a result by binding the role of the requirement 
to the result (e.g. Result [part-frequency]).  The goal scheme is used by the system to 
designate and track over time the goal focus and meta-role of role bound problem 
information in the imaginal buffer via slot-to-variable-slot binding.  The goal meta-roles 
and their definition are listed below in Table 8.3.        
 
Functional 
correspondence 
Meta-Role Meaning 
Output Require The role of the data whose value is required. 
Result The role of the data whose value has been achieved. 
Function SP The relational definition of the procedure for determining the 
result/requirement. 
Input Object The role of the data that the result/requirement is derived from using the 
SP 
 
Table 8.3.  Descriptions of goal meta-role slots in the imaginal buffer. 
 
Argument tracking The unpractised nature of the task also requires participants to track 
the meta-role of problem information represented in the imaginal buffer in the process 
of reasoning. These requirements are consistent with verbal protocols as described in 
chapter 6 which suggest that participants engage in a form of self-argumentation. Recall 
that the meta-roles implied by participants’ verbal protocols include relations of 
exception, rejection/revision, explanation and case conclusions. Note that the function 
of the goal module is in establishing and tracking the interrelation between problem roles 
that are proposed to underpin reported self-argumentation.  Rather than the goal module 
actually carrying out the reasoning, inferred or acquired information is generated and 
selected for imaginal representation by perceptual and the declarative modules but the 
units of role specific information are tagged with meta-roles and maintained in the goal 
buffer via a slot binding of the form meta-role [problem-role].  Implementing the 
hypothesis that such meta-roles are managed by a meta-cognitive control subsystem is 
consistent with the general functional meta-cognitive role ascribed to the goal module in 
ACT-R models. These meta-roles are used to constrain the appropriate selection of 
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productions in reflective/meta-cognitive processing in a way that allows the system to 
respond in non-reactive way to perceptual and problem states.    
 
Role Meaning 
Unexpected The role of the data whose value is unexpected. 
Rejected The role of the data whose value is rejected. 
Case The role of the data used to infer or derive a conclusion. 
Conclusion The role of the inferred or derived information 
Normally The role of the requirement normally employed given no data exception. 
Exception The role of the data that is a condition for making an exception. 
Explanadum The role of the data or case that needs explaining 
Explanan The relation of the case or law that explains some data 
 
Table 8.4. Example of how the meta-role slots in the goal buffer express a meta-role of 
an attribute and its values in the imaginal buffer. 
 
Self-instructions. As described in Chapter 6, certain regularities in the execution of 
subtasks were observed. Some of these regularities partly derived from information and 
instruction constraints, others are clearly choice based. In addition, participants show 
recognition and learning of sub-problem experiences, which appear to be used in 
decision making and reasoning. In order to account for these observations, the model 
implements a form of instance based memory of goals. In the model, these previously 
constructed instances can be retrieved and used to make a decision about what to do next, 
judge whether problem features are unusual or familiar and, if so, how they were 
previously used. We will call these instance based representations self-instructions that 
are hypothesised to be initially constructed in practice trials, but are continually modified 
over the course of the experimental trials as participants are confronted with more 
complex instances of sub-problems that require changes to SPs and requirements. The 
main slots used in the self-instructions are a subset of those of the goal chunks. 
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Slot Meaning/function 
Result The type/role of result of the last goal. 
Require The role of the requirement to be achieved. 
SP The relational definition of the procedure for determining the 
requirement. 
Object The role of the data the requirement is derived from. 
Subtask The subtask strategy used to determine the requirement. 
 
Table 8.5. Descriptions of main self-instruction slots in a goal chunk. 
 
These chunks are retrieved from declarative memory by a generic production Retrieve-
next-step when a result has been achieved and there are no pending subgoals or 
processing requests (Goal> step [complete], operation [nil], pending [nil]). Retrieve-
next-step simply uses the current problem role bound to the result in the goal buffer and 
requests retrieval of a goal using the current result value as a retrieval constraint for next 
goal (+Retrieval> result [=result]). This is basically a generic production firing to recall 
what is normally required after the current result has been achieved. When the self-
instruction chunk is retrieved and condition constraints match, a subtask specific 
production fires to initiate the goal by mapping the slot values of the self-instruction in 
the retrieval buffer to the goal buffer (e.g., =Goal> require [=require], SP [=SP] subtask 
[=subtask], object [=object], etc.). Note that the productions for implementing retrieved 
self-instructions are specific to the subtask type because they test matching requirements 
of the self-instruction in their conditions. 
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The analysis described in Chapter 4 indicates that the problem can be decomposed into 
a set of interdependent information requirement goals. So, for example, one information 
requirement is to interpret the queried outcome, another is to determine the queried 
possibilities from the queried outcome, and another is to determine the part frequency 
from the queried possibilities.  Transitions between subtasks are mediated by the retrieval 
and interpretation of self-instructions, when available, that identify the required class of 
information given the acquisition of a known class of information. This network of self-
instructions can be viewed to model the prior episodic knowledge of the self-instruction 
dependencies formulated by participants that is initially constructed in the practice trials 
and modified over the course of the experimental trials. This network, which is 
implemented in the ACT-R model, is shown in Figure 8.3. Note that the order of 
scheduling given by the conditional goals states of the self-instructions were designed to 
match the canonical sub-task scheduling observed by participants.   
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Figure 8.3.  PPS self-instruction network. 
 
 
8.2.4. Problem representation and knowledge 
 
The cognitive model integrates accumulated information about the problem that it 
gathers over the instruction and diagram comprehension episodes using chunks which 
are incremented in the imaginal buffer. Each imaginal chunk contains two levels of 
information. At the top level, all imaginal chunks contain an abstract problem role and 
case problem role, which represent a classification of the information content of the 
chunk in relation to the problem or task. The lower order slots designate specific problem 
information about environmental referents using role-to-referent binding slots. Imaginal 
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chunks are hierarchically organised so that subordinate chunks are related to super-
ordinate chunks semantically by their matching problem roles. 
 
This representational scheme for accumulated problem information can be viewed to 
result in a kind of meta-memory of problem state information in which the system is able 
to know the kind of information that it has acquired without knowing the particular data. 
To access the data from a sub-chunk, the system must retrieve the sub-chunk containing 
the target information. Retrieval occurs by domain specific productions using the 
problem role as a retrieval cue in conjunction with other information depending on the 
type of subtask. 
 
The model implements the assumption that participants solve the probability problems 
by classifying and assigning known problem roles to data derived from the instruction 
and diagrams. These problems roles are intended to be the declarative part of the models 
schematic knowledge. As the problem roles are used to frame specific problem data in 
terms of their categorised role in the probability problem, they are assumed to apply to 
different problems varying in terms of data, structure and problem scenario. The 
cognitive model uses and modifies such problem roles for different experimental 
problems. The existence of such roles in the model is considered a functional 
requirement in order to connect problem data to prior declarative and procedural 
knowledge employed to solve a problem. 
 
As an example, the problem role labelled queried-outcome represents the generic role of 
a model of an outcome being queried in a probability problem. The problem roles are 
intended to represent a higher-order classification of a combination of abstractions (e.g., 
outcome (x), category (y), probability (z), has (x, y), has (x, z), situation (x, y, z), 
supposed (x, y), unknown (z), queried (z), etc.) that are compressed through prior 
learning. The use of problem roles such as queried-outcome in the model are not a 
pragmatic modelling convenience, but are based on the hypothesis that conceptual 
knowledge is available and often used as units of working memory states that carry 
compressed content. 
 
Recall that all imaginal chunks are assigned a problem role and case values, which 
identify the overarching classification of chunks of information constructed in the 
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imaginal buffer resulting from some subtasks. Table 8.7 reviews the main PPS problem 
roles and Figure 8.4 gives an example of their potential reference. 
 
Problem Role Meaning 
Priors An interpretation of the prior probabilities.   
Stated-outcome An interpretation of the stated outcome. 
Queried-outcome An interpretation of the queried outcome. 
Universe-trial-
possibilities 
The initial universal set of trial possibilities. 
Limited-trial-possibilities The reduced/limited set of trial possibilities given 
conditional information 
Queried-possibilities The set of all possibilities of the queried outcome. 
Limited-queried-
possibilities 
The reduced/limited set of queried possibilities given 
information about a unique outcome category. 
Part-frequency The frequency of the part set of the proportion. 
Whole-frequency The frequency of the whole set of the proportion. 
Part-set The part set of the proportion. 
Whole-set The whole set of the proportion. 
Proportion-sense The relative value of the proportion. 
 
Table 8.6. Main problem roles and their meaning. 
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Figure 8.4. Example of the potential reference of the problem roles on the 
conditional/overlap problem. 
 
8.2.5. Declarative Inference 
 
A canonical ACT-R model performs a task with a goal and/or imaginal chunk that 
contains slots that are incrementally filled in the course of the task or subtask. Such 
chunks are often used to specify binding requirements and indicate the status of bindings. 
These functional assumptions are consistent with models of practiced performance 
specific to a task. 
  
As the model is concerned with un-practiced performance it requires a more flexible and 
incremental way of determining the contents of goal and imaginal representations (i.e. 
slot and values). In the model when declarative semantic knowledge is required to frame 
referents via role-to-referent slot bindings that are not available in a self-instruction such 
roles needs to be retrieved from declarative memory. The process can be viewed as 
declarative inference making. This process is modelled by productions that respond to 
specific problem state conditions in the imaginal or perceptual buffers and retrieve a 
chunk containing the sematic role/s applicable to framing the context. These roles are 
value/s of the retrieved chunks that are converted to slots and bound to designated 
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referents in the imaginal buffer by dynamic binding productions. At least two production 
steps are needed to infer new roles because the semantic knowledge needs to be retrieved 
and evaluated before being bound to some value in the imaginal buffer. The semantic 
knowledge employed in inferences are chunks representing conceptual transformations 
which specify the new role to bind and the currently represented role of target referent 
that is the recipient of the new binding.   
 
 
8.4 Basic subtasks 
 
In this section, we discuss some of the basic subtask strategies that are implemented by 
the PPS model. These strategies constitute general skills or schemas recruited and 
scheduled during the task such as instruction comprehension, identifying set members 
and relations, determining possibilities, enumerating sets and deriving proportions.  The 
control structure of each subtask gives rise to a finite set of paths of strategic possibilities 
that are realised in various problem simulations. 
 
8.4.1. Instruction interpretation 
 
The model does not attempt to capture the intricacies of reading and comprehending the 
problem statements because text processing is not central to the research. Several 
constraints exist that follow from an analysis of available processing strategies with the 
text frame and strategies suggested by participants’ protocols. 
 
Each statement of the text frame expresses a particular type of problem information 
allowing participants to familiarise and anticipate the expected type of information after 
completing practice trials. Evidence that participants quickly learn the type and case of 
the problem information associated with a text frame is discussed in Chapter 6. The types 
of text frames are available at fixed spatial locations of the problem presentation 
allowing participants to learn where to look for particular types of problem information. 
The permanence of the location of the text frames can function as a mnemonic aid for 
accessing information. Evidence that participants learnt where to look for types of 
problem information is suggested by the experimental data. 
 
Text frame structures are a ubiquitous way of economically presenting information (e.g., 
forms, specification lists, programming and mathematical notations, etc.); hence, 
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participants would be expected to have existing knowledge of them and cognitive 
strategies for processing them. Protocols indicate that participants recognise 
immediately when the value of a statement is familiar/usual or not. This is described in 
Chapter 6.    
 
In interpreting text statements, the model encodes the frame entry and then the frame 
values. When the lexical meanings of the frame entry are encoded, the model retrieves a 
previously constructed interpretation of the frame entry meaning and its associated 
problem role and uses the memory to classify the problem role of the frame values. When 
encoding the lexical meaning of the frame values, the system incrementally builds the 
chunk representing an interpretation of the statements meaning. When a statement has 
been interpreted, the system evaluates the familiarity of the statement with respect to the 
problem. When a statement has been encoded, the system moves on to the next 
statement. 
 
Lexical encoding routine.  In reading the statement at a lower level, the model runs 
through basic lexical encoding operations. From the left, the model iteratively finds a 
neighbouring word (find-first-word-in-text-line, find-next-word-and-update), attends to 
the word (attend-unattended-word), retrieves and verbalises the lexical meaning of 
words (retrieve-lexical-meaning), updates the lexical meaning in a lexical buffer (find-
next-word-and-update), and processes the sound of the verbalised word (searching-
vocalisation).  The lexical chunks include a slot for the text form, semantic attribute and 
value of the word (e.g. text: “blue”, attribute: colour, value: blue).  The strategy is 
consistent with the observation that participants tended to read aloud the problem 
instructions word-for-word in experiment 2 as required by the experimental instructions. 
The control structure for these lower level routine productions is shown in Figure 8.5. 
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Figure 8.5.  Flow for lexical encoding routine. 
 
Statement categorisation. When the lexical meanings of the words in the text frame 
(i.e. Probabilities are [   ] , The spinner falls on [  ] , What is the probability of a [   ]) 
have been encoded, the generic production Retrieve-frame-entry-expectation fires and 
retrieves a memory of a previous interpretation experience of the corresponding text 
entry using the buffered lexical elements (+Retrieval> lexical1 [=lexical1], lexical2 
[=lexical2], etc.). When retrieved, the interpretation chunk includes previously inferred 
information about the statement's problem role in the task. (=Retrieval> role [=role]. 
Hence, the problem role in the interpretation chunk of priors statement is represented by 
the binding role: priors, of the outcome statement role: stated-outcome and of the query 
statement role: queried-outcome. If the chunk is retrieved, Set-requirement-for-
expected-frame-role fires and sets an intention to classify the interpretation of the 
subsequent text value/s in terms of the currently retrieved problem role by updating the 
requirement state in the goal buffer (Goal> require[=role]). This process corresponds 
to the goal directed and problem specific framing of the values of the corresponding 
statements. 
 
Statement interpretation.  After encoding the lexical meaning of text entry value/s, the 
system constructs a single interpretation chunk in the imaginal buffer holding the 
meaning of the statement which includes the referred categories and the problem role of 
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the interpreted objects. The interpretation is carried out by a class of meaning specific 
interpretation productions that bind the updated meaning in a lexical buffer of the 
retrieved lexical chunks to the interpretation chunk. In addition, this class of 
interpretation productions also bind the encoding location of the text interpretation from 
the visual module. Statement interpretation is an ongoing/incremental process that 
includes syntactic interpretation hence the one shot interpretation strategy reported in the 
model is a simplification of the process that abstracts over the syntactic processing 
requirements.   
 
Examples of the chunks containing interpretations of the different kinds of problem 
statements are shown below. Note that slots containing a pointer to the encoding location 
of the interpretation are also present, but omitted from the figures below. In interpreting 
the prior statement, the model will construct a chunk containing information about the 
relative probability of two categories of letters (as in the biased problem instruction) or 
about the equiprobability of letters (as in the remaining equiprobable problems).   
 
 
Figure 8.6. Chunks holding information about a model interpreted from the prior 
probability statement for statements designating (A) unequal and (B) equal 
probabilities, left and right, respectively. 
 
In interpreting the category of the stated-outcome, the chunks created are of the 
following form: the chunk will contain information only about the type of object in non-
conditional problem instructions (see Figure 8.7A) or hold additional information about 
an attribute of the object in conditional problem instructions (see Figure 8.7B). 
 
role   priors 
case              equal-priors 
---- 
universe-kind  PS-letters 
for   all 
attribute relative-
probability 
relative-probability 1-to-1 
 
 
 
“the probabilities are |equal for all| 
letters” 
role   priors 
case              unequal-priors 
----- 
universe-kind  PS-letter 
for    all 
if-attribute   colour   
colour   blue 
then-attribute relative-
probability        
relative-probability 2-to-1 
 
“the probabilities are |double for blue| 
letters” 
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role   queried-outcome 
case  single-category  
------ 
 
outcome  spinner-fall-on 
universe-kind   PS-letter 
for    individual 
if-attribute  colour 
colour   blue 
queried-attribute probability 
   
queried-outcome 
single-queried-outc me 
queried-attribute 
y-attribute 
role   stated-outcome 
case  categorised-outcome 
 
--------- 
outcome  spinner-fall-on 
for    individual 
kind    PS-letter 
attribute  colour 
colour   blue 
 
“the spinner falls on a |blue letter|” 
 
 
Figure 8.7. Chunks holding information about a model interpreted from the conditional 
statement for unconditional (A) and conditional (B) examples – left and right, 
respectively.   
 
In interpreting the category of the queried-outcome, the chunks created are of the 
following form: the chunk will contain either a single attribute, or a conjunction of 
attributes (for conditional and conjunction problem instructions). 
 
role  queried-outcome 
case conjunction-queried-outcome 
  
------ 
 
outcome  spinner-fall-on 
universe-kind   PS-letter 
for    individual 
queried-attribute colour 
queried-attribute2 height 
colour    blue 
height   large 
query-attribute probability 
role  stated-outcome 
case universal-outcome 
   
--------- 
outcome spinner-fall-on 
for   individual 
kind   PS-letter 
 
 
 
“the spinner falls on a | letter|” 
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role   queried-outcome 
case  single-category  
------ 
 
outcome  spinner-fall-on 
universe-kind   PS-letter 
for    individual 
if-attribute  colour 
colour   blue 
queried-attribute probability 
   
disjunction-queried-
outcome  
------ 
 
outcom  spinner-fall-on 
universe-kind  PS-letter 
for   individual 
queried-attribute colour 
colour   red 
query-attribute probability 
   
 
Figure 8.8. Chunks holding information about a model interpreted from the outcome 
statement for unconditional (A) and conditional (B) examples. 
 
The chunks holding an interpretation of the priors and the stated outcome are interpreted 
from their corresponding frame statement in isolation. However, the queried-outcome 
chunk is also constructed from the outcome and query statements because both refer to 
the same outcome token. Namely, when participants comprehend “the spinner falls on a 
[e.g., letter/red letter]” followed by “what is the probability the letter is “[e.g., red]” 
they are proposed to infer that the outcome referred to in the query statement is the same 
individual as referred to in the last statement, and so, combine the models. Specifically, 
in interpreting the queried-outcome, the model retrieves the stated-outcome 
interpretation chunk and increments it with the category information of the queried 
statement so that it also inherits the category of the stated-outcome chunk. This encoding 
process is used to explain why participants showed little or no deliberation in limiting 
the queried possibilities to A∩C when required as described in Chapter 6.   
 
Statement evaluation. When an interpretation has been constructed the model evaluates 
the familiarity of the statement interpretation. This is carried out by the production 
recall-if-im-familiar-with-case, which attempts to retrieve a previous self-instruction, 
which includes the categorised case and role of the statement (Retrieval> case =case role 
=role). The evaluative production familiar-case fires when a retrieved goal/self-
instruction matches the current case and role. The production unfamiliar-case fires when 
the retrieval fails and notes that the problem case is unfamiliar by binding the particular 
case categorisation to the meta-role exception in the goal buffer (e.g., Goal> 
role queried-outcome 
case conditional-queried-outcome 
  
 
 
outcome  spinner-fall-on 
universe-kind   PS-letter 
for    individual 
queried-attribute colour 
stated-attribute height 
colour    blue 
height   large 
query-attribute probability 
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exception[categorised-outcome]). When the interpretation is complete, the production 
recall-where-i-was-at retrieves the superordinate problem chunk and represent-and-
update-where-i-was-at dynamically binds the problem role of the interpreted chunk as a 
slot of the problem chunk with the encoding location of the interpretation as its value. 
Binding the encoding location serves as a cue to retrieve the interpreted chunk and to 
locate its corresponding text externally in the superordinate problem chunk.    
 
8.4.2. Identifying member sets 
 
Participants derive sets of possibilities in the diagram based on category membership.  
The interpretation of eye-movement data and cognitive modelling analysis suggest the 
following modelling constraints: 
 
• The greater relative frequency of attention on PS-units compared to set-markers 
suggest participants use the iconic representation of PS-units as the main source 
to identify corresponding sets, but may use set markers in complementary way 
to check and possibly support the apprehension set relations. 
• Participants' eye-movements suggest they tend to iteratively scan groups of PS-
units making sequences of fixations on consecutive neighbours, in both, left to 
right and right to left directions. These fixations are typically short in length.   
• The diagram is composed of visual grouping of PS-units and it is assumed that 
these groups support visual pop-out/pre-attentive processes that can be used to 
guide attention to perceptual groups. 
• Participants appear to notice set relations between referred groups immediately 
after first pass instruction encoding/initial inspection of the diagram. 
• Research in visual working memory suggests visual-spatial encoding of 
groupings proceeds by initially attending to target groups globally before 
encoding local elements of that group. 
• Participants should have generic knowledge for understanding the role of the 
marker lines and label in the diagram. This is because information presentations 
commonly employ highlighting of text and graphics by underlining or circling 
and/or labelling to support comprehension.   
 The set identification subtask is carried out in four phases: (1) setting the goal, 
(2) globally identifying the exhaustive set and ruling any other members, (3) 
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scanning the group to encode its detail, and (4) checking the consistency of the 
group with its corresponding marker lines. 
 
Whist it is possible to create a model in ACT-R that solves the problem by simply 
selecting and encoding perceptual groups in one shot attention shifts, the amount of eye-
movements exhibited by participants and short length of the fixations are inconsistent 
with this kind of visual encoding model. Two additional assumptions about group 
identification strategies can be made to reconcile these issues. Firstly, after participants 
initially identify a required perceptual group, they serially scan the group to encode the 
detail of subgroups or sub-elements. This is done in a left-to-right or right-to-left fashion 
and is consistent with eye-movement protocols. This kind of visual interrogation may 
result from highly practised routines that support a requirement of increasing the detail 
of a visual representation that is difficult to model in ACT-R's visual representations. 
Secondly, the model assumes participants attend to the group of PS-units outside the 
identified group in order to attentively check that there are no remaining members of a 
target category. In ACT-R, productions can detect whether individuals in a specified 
region do not have a value of a visual property from the module state (i.e. state = error) 
that results on a failed search.  It seems reasonable that attention shifts should also be 
used to confirm the absence of individuals having category but by attending globally to 
groups of observed candidates.     
 
Setting the goal The goal to initiate identifying sets of referred categories is made by 
productions in response to a retrieved self-instruction to determine the possibilities of 
targets sets, i.e. universe-trial-possibilities and queried-possibilities. The production fires 
and binds the requirement and subtask to the goal buffer (e.g., Goal> subtask [search], 
require [queried-possibilities], object[queried-outcome]). The category information 
used to search for the set is contained in the chunks interpreted from the text statement, 
which are retrieved from declarative memory in response to the self-instruction. 
 
Global identification When a chunk containing the identity of the model is successfully 
retrieved, one of a set of search productions fires (e.g., find-kind-with-single-property, 
find-kind-with-conjunction-property) to initiate the search for a group. These search 
productions bind attribute types to argument slots in the goal buffer and send a request 
for a visual location containing the visual category or categories of the particular kind. 
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The search productions use dynamic binding. When the search starts, the goal buffer sets 
the state of the search to none (i.e. Goal> step[none]). If the visual module returns a 
location, a generic attention production fires to attend to the group and updates the spatial 
buffer (i.e. attend-to-unattended-location-and-update-spatial). If the features of the 
attended group match the selected search features in the imaginal buffer, a production 
(e.g., update-and-find-next-group) updates the location of the group to a members slot 
in the imaginal buffer and the state of the search to some (e.g., Goal> step[some]; 
Imaginal> members[=screen-pos]) and makes a requests to the visual module for 
another group matching the set. 
 
If after finding and initial group the search request for an additional group fails 
(indicating that no other objects matching the attribute can be detected pre-attentively), 
one of a class of production fires to attentively check the remaining group/s (e.g. check-
left-side, check-right-side). These productions use peripheral information in the currently 
attended visual chunk to decide where to look and request a location of the largest 
remaining group to either side of the attended group (e.g., +Visual-location> segments 
[largest], kind[=kind], > screen-x [current], screen-y [current]). If the attended 
remaining group has a uniform value of the searched property that does not match the 
search criteria, a production (e.g. return-back-to-single-category-group) update the step 
to indicate that the search has been exhausted (=Goal> step [exhausted]) and requests 
re-indexing of the previously indexed location of the visual group bound to the imaginal 
buffer (+Visual-location> =members). 
 
Scanning. When the exhaustive group has been determined (=Imaginal> members 
[=members], Goal> step[exhausted]) at a global level, the scanning subroutine is 
initiated to interrogate and encode details of the perceptual group. The production find-
first-left-subgroup fires in response to the exhausted state and a property discontinuity 
as indicated by an absent perceptual binding of the attended visual object group, which 
signals the existence of differing subgroups and requests the location of the first 
subgroup on the left (+Visual-location> kind [=kind], objects [largest], > screen-x 
[current] < screen-x [current], screen-y [current]).  When a subgroup is attended the 
production find-next-subgroup keeps firing until a visual location is not returned at which 
point completed-subgroup-scanning responds to the failed module state of the search 
request and set the subtask step to scanned. 
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Figure 8.9. Control flow of scanning routine used to identify subgroups. 
 
 
Marker and label checking. As part of the subtask, the model may also check that the 
marker lines and label are consistent with the group. In response to the step binding and 
the absence of a binding of the label and marker lines in the imaginal buffer the 
production find-marker-label fires and request the visual-location of the vertically 
corresponding label then retrieve-label-meaning fires retrieves the lexical meaning of 
the text. Update-matching-label fires in response to the matching category of the search 
set and retrieved text attribute/value meaning and then binds the location of the text to a 
label role in the imaginal buffer thus indexing the role of the text.  The production find-
marker-line then requests the location of the neighbouring marker-line. After attending 
to the marker-line the production Update-and-return-to-members re-indexes the 
members and matches-marker-set-dimensions fires in response to the direction and 
relative size in the spatial buffer indicating the marker matches the horizontal position 
and extension of the target set and sets the step to check.    
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Figure 8.10. Control flow for checking marker line and label. 
 
    
8.4.3. Possibility derivation 
The model implements productions for determining possibility. Constraints on 
possibility are listed below: 
 
• Analysis of the model requirements indicate that unless participants have learnt 
instances that map particular solutions to set structure and instruction conditions 
then they must determine what individuals are possible in order to assign the 
frequency roles of the probability proportion to those derived sets. 
• Observed verbalisations indicate that participants (at least sometimes) ascribe 
possibility to relevant sets. Verbalisations indicating construals of possibility 
occur most often in conditional problems requiring the limitation of trial 
possibilities from U to C. 
• There is analytical and empirical support for the proposal that the operators, rules 
or mechanisms involved in the derivation of possibility operate on input models 
of individuals or sets rather than internal category descriptions (unless data 
specific instances have already been learnt).   
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• Determining the possibility of a set is a process that appears to require deliberate 
initiation, but whose probability is influenced by external information cues. 
 
Model. 
The model implements inference productions for testing and ascribing roles of 
possibility. This means that inferences of possibility are with respect to models of 
individuals assigned particular problems roles and the inferences of possibility are 
particular possibility problems roles. The productions have goal and problem state 
dependent conditions and make case inferences using specific retrieval constraints. The 
model of inferences of possibility is based on the assumption that participants will have 
learnt particular cases through prior educational and cultural experiences and that 
reasoning about possibility based on more primitive and generic knowledge and 
cognitive strategies would on reflection imply more complexity and time consumed than 
was observed in derivation of possibility by participants in the experiment because it 
would imply the requirement to conceptualise and determine how to connect problems 
roles of sets of individuals that would be novel to the system   
 
The possibility inference productions in the model make inferences based on the roles 
of co-referred models of sets of individuals. In the modelling framework the mental 
models are deictic/indexical representations of individuals in the imaginal buffer that 
bind problem roles to the reference of individuals in the diagram. The functional 
character of the representation is a requirement for the possibility inference productions 
that compute co-reference constraints between roles of referred sets in their conditions.  
For example, the production limit-universe-trial-possibilities respond to the condition 
that there exists a universe of trial possibilities a set of members of a stated outcome 
category and that the former is a subset if the latter (i.e. =Imaginal> universe-trial-
possibilities: [->U], stated-outcome: [->O], members: [->C], members-of: [->Q] subset 
[->C], subset-of [U]. 
 
8.4.4. Proportion 
 
Another important subtask of the modelled PPS task is framing, computing and 
evaluating proportions of the sets of possibilities. The model is based on the following 
constraints as listed below: 
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• Participants typically frame the probability proportion spatially. This is suggested 
by the percentage of verbal protocols where the reported solution was described 
using spatial relation terms such (“three out of six” or “three in six” rather than 
fraction terms such as “three sixes” or “point five”. 
• Participants frame the problem role of derived frequency as soon as they are 
determined. This is suggested by participants who made verbalisations indicating 
whole frequency (or denominator) framing of enumerated possibilities (e.g., “its 
out of six”).   
• Participants compute and evaluate the sense of a proportion and do so as soon as 
the part and whole frequency values are made available as suggested by 
participants that abandon a proportion based on it being too high or not summing 
to unity. 
• Participants evaluate proportions as too high suggesting some geometrical sense 
of a proportion must be used a bases for the judgment. 
• Participants selectively report proportion senses from computed from different 
inputs. As well as from frequencies, some participants appear to derive 
proportions from the geometrical size of proportion sets. The latter strategy was 
only used for high visual fidelity fractions (e.g., ½). 
• Participants appear to compute the geometrical structure of a proportion as a 
matter of course as suggested by the selective ability to report it numerically and 
the ability to evaluate frequency derived proportions.  
 
Model. 
The model's representation of the probability proportion includes the roles that hold a 
representation of the reference of the corresponding spatial part and whole roles of the 
sets (i.e. whole-set and part-set) of the proportion from which the frequencies are derived 
from. The roles of the derived values of the proportion frame are the part-frequency, 
whole-frequency and proportion-sense.   
 
When both, the part-frequency and whole-frequency values are available in the imaginal 
buffer, the production retrieve-proportion-sense fires and attempts to retrieve a 
proportion instance from declarative memory using the frequency values as retrieval 
constraints (+Retrieval> part-frequency [=part-freq], whole-frequency [=whole-freq]). 
If successful, update-relative-quantity production fires and updates the retrieved 
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proportion-sense value in the imaginal buffer (=Imaginal> proportion-sense 
[=proportion-sense]) allowing it to be evaluated. In addition, the proportion-sense, 
which is assumed to be a spatial code, may also be represented with some fidelity in the 
spatial buffer if the groups indexed in the part-set and whole-set roles are simultaneously 
also indexed in the spatial buffer (and therefore have their relative size computed). If the 
fidelity of the computed relative-size is familiar, the production retrieve-proportion-
fraction fires to get the component frequencies by retrieving a proportion instance with 
the relative-size value as a retrieval cue (+Retrieval> proportion-sense [=relative-size]) 
in order to bypass deriving the frequencies of component sets. 
 
 
Figure 8.11. An example of roles and bindings used in determining a proportion. 
 
Despite the proportion-sense being analogical, when the inputs are numerical symbols 
the model attempts to retrieve a proportion instance from declarative memory using the 
semantic codes for the numerical values as retrieval cues. The retrieval assumption is 
motivated by the reasoning that if a proportion-sense value is repeatedly computed from 
scratch by mapping counts to modelled analogical input then memory instances of these 
mappings are likely to be generated for common cases such as small number 
numerator/denominator proportions. The availability of such chunks allows instance 
based retrieval strategies as commonly assumed for arithmetic facts in ACT-R models.     
 
8.4.5. Enumeration 
 
To acquire the part-frequency and whole-frequency values, the system needs to 
implement an enumeration procedure on sets of linearly arranged letter units. The 
protocol's data identifies three main kinds of common enumeration strategies that are 
selected depending on the task requirements and problem context: (a) subitizing for 
small sets, (b) counting of individual objects in a linear direction for large sets, and (c) 
part-frequency [two] 
part-set [=part-location] 
whole-frequency [four] 
whole-set [=whole-location] 
proportion-sense [0.5] 
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weighted counting using a count twice strategy for double probability PS-units in biased 
probability problems (see below).   
 
• Participants show evidence of using subitizing strategies for small sets such as 
A, B, C or D. 
• Participants show tendency to serially count in a spatially linear manner for large 
sets such as U using left to right or right to left strategies. 
• Participants employ one of two strategies for counting units on biased problems: 
(a) double-count strategy and the (b) add-count strategy. 
• Participants employ add numerator strategies in disjunction problems.   
 
Subitizing. The model of subitizing implements a model similar to the recognition 
account of object groupings as reported by Peterson & Simon (2000). As linear 
configurations of objects are commonly observed structures, it is assumed that 
participants have generic enumeration instances for linear configurations in declarative 
memory that can be generalised to the arrangements of PS-units in the diagram. These 
chunks relate an object segmentation pattern with a semantic count value and the vocal 
code of the count (e.g., segments: 2, count: two, vocal “two”). For simplicity, numbers 
are used in the model to stand in for the cardinality of the object segment pattern. If the 
system is attending to a visual group and has set the subtask to enumerating and the 
visual-object chunk indicates that a number of segments is less than 5 (=Visual> 
segments [=segments], < segments [ 5]), then the retrieve-subitized-count production 
fires and requests retrieval of the numerical count of the object grouping matching the 
segments value (+Retrieval> segments [=segments]) and modifies the subtask (Goal> 
subtask [subitize]). If the retrieval is successful, the production update-done-subitize-
count fires and dynamically updates the retrieved count (=Imaginal> =requirement 
[=count]), vocalizes the count (+Vocal> string [=vocal]) and updates the subtask step 
and result state in the goal buffer (=Goal> step [complete], result [=requirement]). 
 
Serial counting.  The production find-first-left-to-count fires and requests the visual 
location of the first left object in the indexed array.  The count strategy uses chunks in 
declarative memory that hold the semantic codes of the current count, next count and a 
vocalisation code of the next count number (e.g., current-count[two], next-count [three], 
vocal [“three”]). Initially, the retrieve-first-count production fires to retrieve the first 
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count chunk (+Retrieval> current-count [start]), then on each subsequent count 
iteration the retrieve-next-count production fires when a newly attended visual-object 
appears in the visual buffer and requests retrieval of a chunk containing a count that is 
equal to the current count (+Retrieval> current-count [=current-count]). The hold-
current-count-and-find-next-right fires to update the imaginal buffer with the next count 
value (=Imaginal> count [=next-count]), makes a request to vocalise the count number 
(+Vocal> string [=vocal-count]) and requests the visual location of the next visual object 
to count (+Visual-location> kind [=letter-unit], > screen-x [current], nearest [current]). 
When a new visual location cannot be found in the array, the production done-count fires 
to update the final count value, terminate the routine and dynamically updates the result 
binding in the imaginal buffer (=Goal> step [complete], result[=required]; =Imaginal> 
=required [=count]). The flow diagram in Figure 8.12 summarises the strategy. 
 
Figure 8.12. Flow of serial count strategy. 
 
Weighted count strategy. The double-count strategy involved counting each item the 
weighted number of times (i.e. twice for letters with double probabilities) before moving 
on to the next item. Although this was not the only strategy observed for the biased 
probability problems, only this strategy was implemented because of the more peripheral 
importance of the count strategy to the research aims. The implemented strategy uses the 
letter category of double probability letters as a condition for determining whether to 
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double weight a count for that object or not. In interpreting the self-instruction, the 
imaginal slots containing the identity of the count condition and the number of times to 
count are set to the goal buffer and these variable slots and their values are bound to the 
imaginal buffer (i.e. =Goal> arg2 [=times], arg4[=category]; =Imaginal> =times 
[=times-value], =category [=category-value]). If the attended visual object chunk does 
not match the condition in the imaginal buffer, the retrieve-next-count-for-unweighted-
object fires to retrieve a count. When the count is retrieved, the production update-count-
and-find-next-object fires and requests the location of the next count object. If the visual 
object does match, the condition retrieve-next-count-for-weighted-object fires and sets 
an iteration goal state so, when the count is retrieved, update-and-retrieve-next will keep 
firing until the value of the iterate-state (i.e. =Imaginal> iterate-state [=times-value], 
=times [=times-value]) slot matches the value of times slot. When this occurs, update-
last-count-and-find-next-object fires, which updates the last count and requests the 
location of the next count object.  Figure 8.13 shows the control flow of the strategy. 
 
 
Figure 8.13. Flow of weighted count strategy. 
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8.5. Unpractised models of correct performance 
 
The aim of the section is to discuss the models of unpractised problem solving developed 
to understand the process of identifying sub-problem exceptions, instruction 
interpretation and solution framing in the process of solution procedure formulation as 
suggested by the protocols observed in the experiment. The issues to be addressed 
concern the nature of the model of the task and its implications. The research presented 
attempts to create a model of canonical problem solving strategies observed by a subset 
of participants.    
 
8.5.1. Practice 
 
As well as the experimental instructions, participants had three practice trials to construct 
reusable self-instructions in the goal buffer. The simulation of completing a practice trial 
that lasts approximately 21 seconds. The details of subtasks can be interpreted from the 
preceding sections on subtasks. The task model of the simple problem provides a 
template and point of reference to understand the task models of the experimental 
problems because it results from a subtask schedule encoded in its self-instruction 
network and because a subset of subtasks of the simple problem are reused in the all 
experimental problems. The task model goes through the following steps where each 
step corresponds to a particular requirement/sub-goal in the model. 
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Step Main role bindings 
1. Encode prior statement and interpret a priors chunk role [priors] 
priors [->P] 
2. Encode the outcome statement and interpret a stated-
outcome chunk 
role [stated-outcome] 
stated-outcome [->O] 
3. Encode the queried statement and interpret a queried-
outcome chunk 
role [queried-outcome] 
queried-outcome [->Q] 
4. Indexes the array of PS-units and interpret it as the 
universe-trial-possibilities 
universe-trial-possibilities[->U] 
5. Interpret the whole-set of the proportion from the 
universe-trial-possibilities, then enumerate them and 
interpret the result as the whole-frequency 
role [probability-proportion] 
whole-set [->U] 
whole-frequency [=whole-freq] 
 
6. Re-encode the stated-outcome  
 
role [queried-outcome] 
queried-outcome [->Q] 
7. Index members of the queried-outcome in the diagram 
and interpret them as queried-possibilities 
queried-possibilities [->A] 
members [->A] 
members-of [->Q]   
8. Interpret the part-set of the proportion from the queried-
possibilities then enumerate them and interpret the result as 
the part-frequency 
part-set [->A] 
part-frequency [=part-freq] 
9. Retrieve the proportion-sense of the part-frequency 
relative to the whole-frequency and evaluate the frequency 
proportion against it geometrical structure.  
sense [=proportion-sense] 
 
Table 8.7. Main steps and role bindings for practice problems. Key: [=?] = semantic 
binding, [->A] =spatial index binding. 
 
8.5.2. Conjunction 
 
Participants appear to solve the conjunction problem with little deliberation.    
 
Model 
The model runs though the subtasks in the same way as the simple problem with minor 
differences (see appendix 3.a. for a model trace). The model interprets the queried-
outcome as involving a conjunction of unique categories and proceeds as normal. When 
the self-instruction to determine the queried-possibilities is retrieved, the model 
implements a goal to determine members of the category of queried-outcome as normal. 
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The only deviation of the default solution path occurs when the model is confronted with 
the conjunction/disjoint problem.   
 
 When the system has established that there are no members matching the queried-
outcome categories but that there are members of each category of the queried-
outcome the production note-disjoint-pattern-implies-empty-set fires and binds 
the members slot in the imaginal buffer to empty. In interpreting the result of the 
requirement the production update-no-queried-possibilities fires and interprets 
that there are no queried-possibilities by binding the empty value to the queried-
possibilities role.   
 When the self-instruction is retrieved to quantify the queried-possibilities the 
enumeration production retrieve-empty-set-count fires and retrieves the zero 
count semantic mapping of an empty set and the enumeration production update-
zero-count dynamically updates the zero count to the variable of the requirement 
in the imaginal buffer which is the part-frequency in the particular case.  
 In response to the zero part-frequency binding in the imaginal buffer the 
production retrieve-zero-proportion fires and retrieves the proportion chunk 
containing the zero proportion sense (+Retrieval> part-frequency [zero)]. The 
production update-zero-proportion then updates the analogical proportion sense 
in the imaginal buffer (=Imaginal> sense [0]).  After retrieving the self-
instruction to report the result a series of routine productions proceed to report a 
zero proportion result.  
8.5.3. Conditional  
 
The strategic model of the conditional problems was developed in accord with the 
following constraints.    
• On conditional/subset and conditional/overlap problems some participants 
incorrectly omitted limiting the trial possibilities despite evidence of processing 
the conditional information. These participants also tended not to deliberate 
about the conditional information.   
• On conditional/subset and conditional/overlap problems some participants 
appeared to initially omit limiting the trial possibilities consistent with the default 
procedure but later corrected the omission. Some protocols are consistent with a 
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co-ordinated delay in framing the limitation on trial possibilities. Other protocols 
are consistent with abrupt recognition of a framing requirement.       
• On the conditional/disjoint problem some participants immediately detect 
disjoint relations between members of the stated and queried outcome categories 
upon initial inspection of the diagram. 
• On condition/overlap and conditional/disjoint problems all participants provide 
solutions consistent with correctly interpreting the constraints of the stated 
outcome category on queried possibilities when required - including those 
participants who omitted limiting the trial possibilities. This suggested all 
participants interpreted the conditional information from the stated outcome but 
some had problems judging whether its full implications were considered. 
• Some participants who recognised the limitation in trial possibilities spent 
additional time reflecting on its implications in determining the quantification of 
the target probability.    
• Participant’s verbalisations are consistent with considering taking the whole-
frequency from |U| as default and treating the conditional information as an 
exception condition to this procedure. 
• Participant’s verbalisations indicate a series of steps in self-argumentation 
including verbalising an exception relation. 
• After limiting the trial-possibilities on the first occasion, some participants 
verbalised recognition of this requirement upon reading the stated outcome on 
the next conditional problem. 
• After limiting the trial possibilities on the first occasion participants did not apply 
the incorrect default procedure of taking the whole-frequency from |U| on the 
next conditional problem.       
 
The main features of the implemented strategy are shown in Table 8.8. (see appendix 
3.c. for a model trace) 
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Step Imaginal role bindings 
Encode prior statement and interpret a priors 
chunk 
role [priors] 
priors [->P] 
 
Encode the outcome statement and inter-
pret a stated-outcome chunk 
role [stated-outcome] 
stated-outcome [->O] 
 
Encode the queried statement and inter-
pret a queried-outcome chunk 
role [queried-outcome] 
queried-outcome [->Q] 
 
Indexes the array of PS-units and interpret it 
as the universe-trial-possibilities 
universe-trial-possibilities[->U] 
 
Interpret the whole-set of the proportion 
from the limited-trial-possibilities, then enu-
merate them and interpret the result as the 
whole-frequency 
whole-set [->U] 
whole-frequency [=whole-freq] 
 
Re-encode the stated-outcome role [queried-outcome] 
queried-outcome [->Q] 
 
Index members of the stated-outcome in 
the diagram and interpret them as lim-
ited-trial-possibilities 
members [->C] 
members-of [->O] 
limited-trial-possibilities [->C] 
 
Reinterpret the whole-set of the propor-
tion from the limited-trial-possibilities, 
then enumerate them and interpret the 
result as the whole-frequency 
whole-set [->C] 
whole-frequency [=whole-freq] 
 
Re-encode the queried-outcome role [queried-outcome] 
 
Index members of the conditional que-
ried-outcome in the diagram and inter-
pret them as queried-possibilities 
queried-possibilities [->A&C] 
 
Interpret the part-set of the proportion from 
the queried-possibilities then enumerate 
them and interpret the result as the part-fre-
quency 
part-set [->A&C] 
part-frequency [=part-freq] 
 
Retrieve the proportion-sense of the part-fre-
quency relative to the whole-frequency and 
evaluate the frequency proportion against it 
geometrical structure. 
sense [=proportion-sense] 
 
Table 8.8. Steps and main role bindings on conditional/subset and conditional/overlap 
problems assuming un-practiced model. 
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Instruction encoding. The model implements the assumptions that the probability query 
is interpreted as conditional on first-pass instruction comprehension. Recall that 
participants tended to provide answers and verbalisations consistent with limiting 
queried possibilities when required irrespective of whether they omitted limiting the trial 
possibilities.  When the task model interprets the chunk of the probability query it 
retrieves the stated-outcome chunk and creates a chunk with the category of both the 
stated and queried-outcome. The resulting chunk represents an interpretation of a queried 
outcome that has both categories. The justification for this modelling assumption is that 
both statements express reference to the same individual. 
 
Incorrect framing and execution of universe-trial-possibilities. The task model 
initially determines the universe-trial-possibilities then proceeds to determine the 
whole-frequency from it by using the default self-instructions in steps 4 and 5. Obtaining 
the whole-frequency from |U| thus occurs as normal because the system has not yet 
interpreted the implication of the stated outcome category on the trial possibilities. 
 
Inferring limited trial possibilities. The model implements the assumption that the 
target exception is recognised after recalling the stated outcome information and 
referring to the statement and the corresponding members in the diagram. It is not clear 
from the protocols whether recall of the information is cued by observing the 
corresponding diagram set or is planned by the agent because it is implicated in 
determining the queried possibilities. The model implements the latter assumption. 
Productions create a subgoal to recall details of a frame statement when addressing the 
probability query (i.e. when the self-instruction to re-encode the probability query is 
retrieved) if its role is tagged as unexpected. A second subgoal is initiated to index 
members of the category in the diagram. 
 
The model implements the hypothesis that the conditional inference of limited-trial-
possibilities is triggered conditionally after binding the universe-trial possibilities role 
on first exposure to the problem because it is an inference that overrides or revises this 
initial belief. This is consistent with participants only making this inference after 
appearing to initially consider the universe-trial-possibilities. After identifying the 
members of the stated-outcome the production detect-limited-trial-possibilities fires and 
retrieves the case from declarative memory. An update production fires in response to 
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the retrieved case and dynamically binds the limited-trial-possibilities role to the 
reference of members of the stated-outcome in the imaginal buffer. The detect-limited –
trial-possibilities production is shown in Figure 8.16. Note that the production condition 
fires in response to abstract roles bound to the reference of individuals and sets (i.e. a 
model) rather than particular category information and outcome instances and is 
therefore capable of generalising to different contexts using this frame.   
 
 
Figure 8.14 The production detect-limited-trial-possibilities 
 
The inference provides conditions for meta-roles bindings associated with exception 
processing (normally, exception) for the revised interpretation which are implemented 
by detect-limited-trial-possibilities and a subsequent update production frame-limited-
trial-possibilities. This is because the inference overrides a default goal requirement. 
These information states represent the rejection of the initially intended universe-trial-
possibilities (i.e. Normally [universe-trial-possibilities]) but exclusively to the 
information context (i.e. Exception [given-outcome]) and relates it to a revised 
conclusion (i.e. Conclusion [limited-trial-possibilities]). This meta-cognitive relation is 
used to represent the change in the subtask requirement over the course of the subtask.        
 
Recall that on subsequent conditional problems some participants show immediate 
recognition of the requirement to limit the trial possibilities on first-pass instruction 
(p detect-limited-trial-possibilities 
   isa meta-cognitive 
   step demonstrated 
  =imaginal> 
   isa pps-image   
   universe-trial-poss =universe 
   given-outcome =given-outcome  
   members =given-members 
   members-subset-of =universe 
   members-of =given-outcome  
  ?retrieval> 
   state free 
==> 
  =goal> 
   step interrupting 
   operation retrieving 
   normally universe-trial-poss 
   exception given-outcome 
  +retrieval> 
   isa case-relation 
   relation trial-poss-of-stated-outcome) 
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comprehension and do not verbalise an exception argument when determining the trial 
possibilities, if done on the first occasion.  In the model this can be replicated by simply 
retrieving the self-instruction (meta-role features of the goal) created on the initial 
problem that will have the limited-trial-possibilities requirement. This means that the 
model bypasses the need to make the limited trial possibilities inference and engage in 
exception processing instead relying on a form of instance based goal memory.    
 
Limiting queried-possibilities. The retrieved default self-instruction chunk is used to 
identify the exhaustive set of member of the queried outcome. As the queried-outcome 
is interpreted as a conditional model of an individual containing the category of both the 
queried and stated-outcome and the default self-instruction specifies a requirement to 
determine members of the queried-outcome (i.e. require [queried-possibilities], SP 
[members-of], Object [queried-outcome]) then normal interpretation productions are 
able to apply the default self-instruction. This leads to a conjunction search in which 
only referents that match the queried category that are also in the set of the conditional 
category get selected. The behaviour of the model is consistent with the observation 
above that all participants made this inference because the text frame more explicitly 
specifies this information and that participants tend to make this inference without signs 
of deliberation. 
 
8.5.4. Biased probability 
The experimental data suggested the role of the diagram in framing a solution on biased 
problems. 
• The mapping of the geometrical probability of PS-units was not specified in the 
experimental instructions and needed to be interpreted by participants.   
• The verbal protocols of some participants suggest that they employed the geometrical 
representation of probability in the process of solution interpretation as indicated by 
verbal protocols suggesting the conceptualisation of double probability icons 
(representing token outcomes) as equivalent to two non-double probability icons. 
• Some participants also determine the probability proportion from the geometrical 
fraction scheme when its visual fidelity is high. The verbal protocols indicate that 
geometrically derived proportion appeared to be suddenly recognised rather than 
being the result of a deliberately planned strategy. 
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• Some participants use a particular strategy which we called weighted-count in which 
double probability units are serially counted twice. 
Model  
An overview of the main steps on the biased problems for an unpractised model of the 
problem is shown in table 8.9 (see appendix 3.b. for a model trace).  
Step Main imaginal role bindings 
Encode prior statement and interpret a priors chunk role [priors] 
priors [->P] 
Encode the outcome statement and interpret a stated-
outcome chunk 
role [stated-outcome] 
stated-outcome [->O] 
Encode the queried statement and interpret a queried-
outcome chunk 
role [queried-outcome] 
queried-outcome [->Q] 
Indexes the array of PS-units and interpret it as the 
universe-trial-possibilities 
universe-trial-possibilities[->U] 
Interpret the whole-set of the proportion from the universe-
trial-possibilities, then enumerate them  
whole-set [->U] 
whole-frequency [=whole-freq]  
Re-encode priors role [priors] 
priors [->P] 
Index members of the double and non-double 
probability icons and detect their size difference 
double-size-parts[->D ] 
single-size-parts[->S] 
Hypothesise a representational correspondence and 
explain the correspondence by assuming a fraction 
scheme 
fraction-scheme [->U] 
Interpret normalized frequency units from the diagram 
and use weighted-count strategy to determine the 
whole-frequency 
frequency-units[->S] 
whole-frequency [=whole-freq] 
Re-encode the stated-outcome  
 
role [queried-outcome] 
queried-outcome [->Q] 
Index members of the queried-outcome in the diagram and 
interpret them as queried-possibilities 
queried-possibilities [->A] 
members [->A] 
members-of [->Q]         
Interpret the part-set of the proportion from the 
queried-possibilities then apply a weighted count and 
interpret the result as the part-frequency 
part-set [->A] 
part-frequency [=part=freq] 
Retrieve the proportion-sense of the part-frequency relative 
to the whole-frequency and evaluate the frequency 
proportion against it geometrical structure.  
sense [=proportion-sense] 
 
Table 8.9. An overview of the main steps on the biased problems for an unpractised 
model.  
  
237 
 
As the interpretation of the priors statement is a comparative relation between categories 
of individuals; the system initiates a goal to reference members of the compared 
categories. Set-goal-to-find-compared-objects selects the subtask whilst productions 
Find-comparison-set, find-compared-set and update-compared-set with visual attention 
productions implement the demonstrative routine and binds the reference of the sets to 
compared-set and comparison-set roles in the imaginal buffer. 
 
Detecting icon size differences. The icons size difference could have been initially 
detected at different points in the problem solving process and using different strategies 
or cognitive resources such as pre-attentive pop out, memory expectation mismatch and 
spatial processing. The model implements the latter case because it is assumed that 
comparisons based on visual-spatial processing strategies would still be required to get 
relative size information and therefore involves the least commitment. In the process of 
relating the sets of icons the spatial structure between them is computed and the relative 
size differences between them is made available in the spatial buffer. This is 
implemented by low level productions that compare the size of instances in both sets 
(find-size-object-in-compared-set, find-size-object-in-comparison-set). This result 
provides conditions for the production detect-double-size-difference to fire in response 
to the difference in the relative size between PS-unit icons in the diagram and 
comparative roles of focal target sets. The retrieval request produces a double-size-
difference case relation. The roles of the chunk (i.e. single-size-part, double-size-part) 
are then incrementally converted to slots in the imaginal buffer and bound to indexes of 
attended visual instances by a series of productions (index-single-size-parts, index-
double-size-parts). This process demonstratively implements the interpretation of the 
diagram being composed of double and single size unit parts which is consistent with 
the verbal protocols of some participants. 
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Figure 8.15. The production detect-parts-size-difference. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(p detect-double-size-difference 
   =goal>  
    isa meta-cognitive 
    step compare-size 
   =imaginal> 
    isa imaginal 
    compare-members =targ-set 
    comparison-members =ref-set 
   =spatial> 
    isa spatial 
    relative-size 2 
    loc =targ 
    ref-loc =ref 
   ?retrieval> 
    state free 
==> 
   =goal> 
    operation retrieving 
    step interrupting 
   +retrieval> 
    isa case-relation 
    relation double-size-difference) 
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ER-scheme interpretation. Indexing the different size parts provide conditions for the 
production detect-representational correspondence to fire in response to the analogical 
correspondence between the represented relative size differences of the PS-units parts 
and the relative probability of the referred categories. When fired, this production 
retrieves the fraction-scheme-mapping case to explain the double size difference case 
and changes the meta-role of the case relation to the explanandum slot. When this 
categorisation is retrieved indexing and update productions (index-whole-scheme, 
update-whole-scheme) attribute the scheme to the diagram by dynamically converting 
the scheme role value to a slot and binding the attended reference of the diagram in the 
imaginal buffer (i.e. =Imaginal> =er-scheme [=diagram-location]) and updating the 
fraction-scheme-of-mapping explanation by binding the relation to the explanan slot.       
 
 
Figure 8.16. The production detect-representational-correspondence. 
 
Interpreting normalised frequency units. The model implements the hypothesis that 
interpreting the diagram as a part-whole fraction scheme in which the size (in this case 
width) of parts represent a fraction of a whole allows schematic knowledge of the use of 
the scheme to be employed to solve the sub-problem of quantifying the probability 
proportion. The model makes use of the knowledge that the whole-frequency for 
(p detect-representational-correspondence 
   =goal>  
    isa meta-cognitive 
    step interrupting 
    case-relation double-size-difference 
   =imaginal> 
    isa magnitude-comparison 
    then-attribute =relative-probability 
    =relative-probability 2-to-1 
    compare-members =targ-set 
    comparison-members =ref-set 
    double-size-parts =targ-set 
    single-size-parts =ref-set 
   ?retrieval> 
    state free 
 ==> 
   =goal>  
    step reflecting 
    operation retrieving 
    case-relation nil 
    explanandum double-size-difference 
   +retrieval> 
    isa case-relation  
    relation fraction-scheme-mapping 
) 
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determining the proportion is a number of equal size parts of the whole that are 
divisible/normalised to the part and whole of the target proportion. 
 
The critical issue for this sub-problem is defining a solution procedure for determining 
the proportion as the requirement for the sub-problem (i.e. whole-frequency).  Access to 
this knowledge is modelled using inference and update productions. The model has a 
production hypothesise-normalised-frequency-units which retrieves the case of 
normalised-frequency-units if the goal is to determine a proportion and the 
representation is a fraction scheme. Subsequent productions (update-normalised-
frequency-units) bind the relation normalised-frequency-units to the SP slot in the goal 
buffer which specifies a solution procedure interpretation. A subsequent production 
select-single-whole-freq-units dynamically binds a whole-frequency-units role slot to the 
spatial index of the single-size-parts set in the imaginal buffer and requests visual 
attention to the set.  These productions demonstratively implement the interpretation of 
single size PS-units as common units for determining a whole-frequency/denominator. 
The declarative knowledge and associated productions are considered part of a schema 
for the part-whole fraction scheme.  The production implementing the initial inference 
hypothesize-normalized-frequency-units is shown Figure 8.17. The inference occurs 
after interpreting the fraction scheme. 
 
 
 
Figure 8.17. The production hypothesize-normalized-frequency-units 
 
(p hypothesize-normalized-frequency-units 
   =goal> 
    isa meta-cognitive 
    step reflecting 
    require whole-freq 
    SP ?                    
   =imaginal> 
    isa imaginal 
    fraction-scheme =diagram 
    whole-freq-units ? 
   ?retrieval> 
    state free  
==>  
   =goal> 
    operation retrieving 
   +retrieval>  
    isa case-relation 
    relation normalized-frequency-units) 
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Implementing the count strategy. Given that the system has now interpreted a solution 
it needs to select and plan a task strategy for implementing the solution procedure. Only 
one strategy is implemented in the model termed the weighted-count strategy.  Whilst 
the self-instruction part of the goal has the requirement, SP and object values reflecting 
a complete solution procedure interpretation, it still does not have a subtask strategy. The 
subtask strategy is initially selected by the production select-weighted-count-strategy 
and this selection involves binding the count-weighted value to the subtask slot in the 
goal buffer. The additional parameters of the subtask strategy include the perceptual 
condition for the repeated count and the number of repetitions. These parameters are 
implemented by a series of productions set-weighted-object-condition, retrieve-
multiplier and update-multiplier. The resulting settings corresponds to a plan of counting 
a unit twice if it has the double probability category. 
 
8.5.5. Disjunction problem 
 
The model of performance on the disjunction problem was developed to satisfy the 
following constraints. 
• Participants determine the reference of each referred set of the disjunction query one 
set at a time as exhibited by eye-movements 
• On subset and overlap problems some participants appear to initially employ an 
incorrect add-probabilities procedure (i.e. P(A) + P(B) +P(A&B)) which suggests 
they interpret the possibilities of the disjunction query as a conjunction of members 
of each model (instead of the union of members)     
• All participants who appear to incorrectly employ the add-probabilities procedure 
latter abandon it because they judge the resulting value as greater than unity and/or 
too high.    
• Participants tend to make a high number of repeated eye-movements back and forth 
between the disjunction query and its referred sets suggesting bidirectional 
interpretation of the correspondence between the interpretation of the probability 
query and the structure of the data in the diagram in order to determine the form of 
the correct SP for the queried possibilities requirement (i.e. the union) 
Model 
An overview of the main steps on the disjunction/subset and disjunction/overlap 
problems for an unpractised model of the problem is shown below in Table 8. 10 (see 
appendix 3.d. for a model trace)  
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Step Main imaginal role bindings 
Encode prior statement and interpret a priors chunk role [priors] 
priors [->P] 
Encode the outcome statement and interpret a stated-
outcome chunk 
role [stated-outcome] 
stated-outcome [->O] 
Encode the queried statement and interpret a queried-
outcome chunk 
role [queried-outcome] 
queried-outcome [->Q] 
Indexes the array of PS-units and interpret it as the 
universe-trial-possibilities 
universe-trial-possibilities[->U] 
Interpret the whole-set of the proportion from the universe-
trial-possibilities, then enumerate them and interpret the 
result as the whole-frequency 
role [probability-proportion] 
whole-set [->U] 
whole-frequency [=whole-freq]  
Re-encode the stated-outcome  
 
role [queried-outcome] 
queried-outcome [->Q]  
Infers members-of-each SP and indexes each model of 
the queried outcome 
queried-possibilities [->A] 
members [->A] 
queried-possibilities [->B] 
members2 [->B] 
queried-possibilities [->A&B] 
members3 [->A&B] 
members-of [->Q]  
Infer sum-of-each SP and enumerate each set then and 
interpret the sum as the part-frequency and the part set 
as the union of the sets 
part-set [->AUB] 
part-frequency [=part=freq] 
Retrieve the proportion-sense of the part-frequency 
relative to the whole-frequency and evaluate the 
frequency proportion against it geometrical structure 
and interrupt because of a mismatch 
sense [=proportion-sense] 
Elaborate and explain the mismatch and hypothesise a 
union SP and backtrack to the queried-possibilities 
requirement 
too-high [=part-freq] 
repeated-count [->AUB] 
Demonstrate the union interpretation of the SP union-members [->AUB] 
Use the model of the union correspondence to infer and 
test an alternative meaning of the instruction 
queried-possibilities[->AUB] 
Interpret the part-set of the proportion from the revised 
queried-possibilities then enumerate them and interpret the 
result as the part-frequency 
 part-set [->AUB] 
 part-frequency [=part-freq] 
Retrieve the proportion-sense of the part-frequency relative 
to the whole-frequency and evaluate the frequency 
proportion against it geometrical structure.  
 sense [=proportion-sense] 
 
Table 8.10. An overview of the steps on the disjunction/subset and disjunction/overlap 
problems for an unpractised model of the problem.  
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Addition procedure. The model implements the hypothesis that the initial choice to use 
the add-probabilities SP is based on an incorrect interpretation of what counts as 
possibilities of the disjunction query. It is proposed that participants who use this 
procedure interpret the disjunction query as implying possibilities that are referentially 
equivalent to the conjunction of members of each model in the disjunction query. This 
incorrect interpretation is insensitive to the particular set structure between members of 
the disjunctive models and it is assumed that the implications of different set structure 
possibilities are not considered by participants when forming this interpretation.  
Quantifying the probability of these queried possibilities appeared to be carried out using 
either one of two equivalent procedures (a) by adding together members of each set to 
get the part-frequency (i.e. |A| + |B| + |A&B| / |U|) or by forming a probability proportion 
for each set and adding them together (i.e. |A|/|U| + |B|/|U| + |A&B|/|U|)   
 
Interrupting and rejecting the add-probabilities. The model implements the 
hypothesis that abandonment of the add-probabilities procedure is made as a result of 
comparing the summed probabilities to the geometrical proportion of the union of 
disjunction sets.  There are two cases (1) when the resulting proportion is judged as too 
high when less than unity and (2) when the resulting proportion is judged as too high 
and is greater than unity.  The model contains a production detect-part-freq-too-high 
which fires if the proportion sense derived from a part-frequency and whole-frequency 
is “roughly” higher than the geometrical proportion irrespective of the context and 
retrieves the part-freq-too-high case. When retrieved an update production evaluates the 
match and binds the too-high role to the part-frequency value in the imaginal buffer. 
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Figure 8.18. The production detect-part-frequency-too-high. 
 
Explaining the outcome. The modelled strategy assumes that participants explain that 
the part-frequency is too high because the count is derived from repeated counting of 
overlapping sets and then use the explanation to infer an alternative SP (i.e. Sum-of-
union) to replace the current SP (i.e. sum-of-each). Seeking the explanation is triggered 
by an inference production retrieve-counting-overlap-case that retrieves a case to 
explain (i.e. part-frequency-too-high) and sets the case relation value to the explanandum 
slot. A subsequent production (i.e. update-overlap-explanation) evaluates and updates 
and binds the retrieved relation (repeated-count-of-overlapping-sets) to the explanan 
slot. 
 
Given an explanation for the part-frequency being too high is hypothesised to provide 
conditions to infer the sum-of-union relation as the new SP. The production Retrieve-
non-repeated-count-of-overlapping-members-case fires and retrieves a case containing 
the sum-of-union action role given a retrieval constraint of non-repeated-count outcome 
role. A subsequent update production (update-action-hypothesis-for-case) evaluates the 
matching case (i.e. overlapping-members) and binds the action role sum-of-union to the 
SP slot. A series of production backtracking to the previous dependent requirement. (i.e. 
queried-possibilities) and infer the dependent sub-procedure (i.e. union-of-each).   
 
(P* detect-part-frequency-too-high 
       =goal> 
        isa meta-cognitive 
        require sense  
        step demonstrated 
       =imaginal> 
        isa imaginal 
        part-set  =part-set 
        whole-set  =whole-set 
        sense =sense 
       =spatial> 
        isa spatial 
        relative-size =relative-size 
        loc =part-set 
        ref-loc =whole-set  
        !eval!( >  (-  =sense =relative) 0.1) 
       ?retrieval> 
        state free 
      ==>  
       =goal> 
        operation retrieving 
        step interrupting 
      +retrieval> 
        isa case-relation 
        relation part-freq-too-high 
        ) 
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Demonstrating the union. The production select-union-correspondence initiates a 
routine to demonstrate the new solution procedure and a series of productions then 
demonstrate the union correspondence between referred categories in the diagram. This 
involves making a correspondence between each referred category and set in the union 
by re-indexing their locations in the imaginal buffer.  This is consistent with observed 
repeated eye-movements between referring terms and sets of the disjunction query. 
 
Reinterpreting the instruction meaning. It is hypothesised that participants use the 
hypothesised union solution interpretation of queried possibilities to reinterpret the 
instruction meaning consistent with a referential interpretation of the solution.  The 
model includes a production detect-each-or-meaning-mismatch that detects the 
mismatch between the each-or interpretation and its referential union interpretation. This 
production fires and infers an alternative case of the “or” relation (i.e. any-or) that is 
consistent with the union correspondence.  The retrieved case then triggers the 
productions update-any-or-meaning-match which evaluates the match to the union 
correspondence and sets the value to the conclusion meta-role slot and modifies its 
semantic interpretation.  A subsequent production map-instruction-interpretation-to-
result fires in response to the case match and updates the union interpretation of the 
queried-possibilities as the new result.  With the revised interpretation of the queried 
possibilities the model proceeds with the remaining steps as normal.  
 
8.5.6. Evaluation 
 
The evaluation of the model is targeted at the components of the modelling framework 
as presented as well as the implementation of the problem specific strategic knowledge 
as described. The evaluation is considered with respect to the competence and generality 
of the model, its simplicity and parsimony, its ability to explain and make predictions 
about experimental performance, its consistency or match to the experimental data and 
existing empirical research. Sample protocol traces generated by the model are shown in 
appendix 3 and the detailed ACT-R traces of the model output on all problems are 
available on the accompanying disk. 
 
Problem solving time. The model generates problem solving times comparable to the 
times taken by participants.  Figure 8.19 shows a line graph expressing median problem 
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solving times of participants on each problem and the problem solving times generated 
by the model assuming practice on only the practice problems. The correlation 
coefficient between the two data sets is .9. Similarities between the model and data can 
be accounted for by similar times in subtask processing and subtask requirements of a 
problem. Note the use of median comparison times are intended to indicate the extent 
that the model is in the range of comparable processing times rather than to test 
predictions of performance of an average participant. As presented, the problem solving 
times were highly variable between subjects.  
 
 
 
Figure 8.19. Median problem solving time for each participant on each experimental 
problem in comparison to problem solving times generated by model.  
 
Visual attention. The model generates traces of attention shifts to presentation elements 
(see appendix 3). Whilst the mapping between attention and fixations is not one-to-one 
there is a close enough correspondence to consider comparisons. Whilst the model 
generates a large number of attention shifts simulating the observed scanning behaviour, 
the number is still not comparable to the fixations produced by participants on the same 
problems. One reason for this is that some attention shifts generated by the model whilst 
carrying out other operations are unrealistically long (up to approximately 2 seconds in 
some cases).  Fixations may result from wondering as well as goal directed behaviour 
and no attempts were made to implement such mechanisms because of a lack of 
explanatory information. The average number of fixations to PS-units on a problem in 
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the experiment was 45 which compares to an average of 28 (ranging from 15 to 40) 
generated by the model.   
 
The average numbers of attention shifts between text and diagram elements generated 
by the model on a problem was 5 (ranging from 3 to 11) compared to an average of 15 
saccades observed between the same elements on a problem in the experiment.  Figure 
8.20 shows the relative time attended to interest areas for the different problems (see 
figure 6.5 for a comparison).  Consistent with the experimental data, the amount of 
attention time on a particular instruction element increased when that element contained 
solution critical referred categories.  The amount of time on an instruction element is 
also determined by solution difficulty. So for example simulated attention time to the 
query statement was highest for the disjunction problem, a pattern reflected in the 
experimental data. However, the absolute average simulated value of 13 seconds of 
attention time was still less compared to an observed mean of 17 seconds of fixation time 
for a disjunction query in the experiment.  
 
 
 
Figure 8.20. Simulated attention time for each problem generated by the model. 
 
Spatial processing The addition of the spatial buffer, representation scheme, 
architectural processing functions as well as strategic knowledge, although limited, is 
able to provide spatial processing competences sufficient for carrying out the task and 
processing spatial information that the empirical data suggests participants engage in. 
The model of spatial processing is parsimonious because its shares or is compatible with 
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existing assumptions in ACT-R. The feature based representation has similar attributes 
to the existing ACT-R ontology for visual search hence the features that are represented 
after an attention shift from one object to another are equivalent to the spatial feature 
possibilities for specifying a search request. Moreover, higher-level spatial strategies 
such as relative magnitude comparisons, finding a grouping (union) or spatial overlap 
(intersection) rely on the use of existing visual module functions in conjunction with the 
spatial buffer. 
 
The assumption that the representation is specific but local to objects is consistent with 
recent empirical evidence on VSTM. Note however that the assumption that multiple 
spatial relations or features are computed in parallel is consistent with but undetermined 
by evidence that spatial memory representations are specific.  However, this additional 
assumption makes the critical prediction that the parallel generation of a specific but 
local spatial representation in response to selectively attended objects provides 
unrequested spatial information as a side effect that can aid recognition of goal relevant 
but not necessary pre-considered information. This can explain why a diagram can 
facilitate inference and reframing of the problem attributes thus providing an 
accessibility advantage conferred by diagrams. Parallel generation of alternative visual 
features of objects is proposed in theories of visual attention and ACT-R. Parallel 
processing appears to be a general feature of sub-systems within the cognitive 
architecture (ACT-R for example assumes this for all within-module processing).          
 
Self-instruction. The self-instruction scheme is used by the system in all problems.    
The scheme is motivated by and predicts or is in principle capable of making predictions 
about participants’ protocols and solutions. The existence of the scheme in the model 
predicts and explains regularities in subtask scheduling observed from experimental 
protocols, the incorrect transfer and inappropriate interpretation and execution of 
procedures to sub-problems. It also provides one operational conception of a default 
solution procedure that is overridden only when conditions are recognized to interrupt. 
Such a scheme is required to explain how participants can process a particular solution 
interpretation as an exception (as observed in participants’ protocols) because exception 
recognition implies consideration of what is default or normal (i.e., a retrieved self-
instruction in the model).   
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The attributes of self-instruction were used for all subtasks in the model problems 
suggesting some scope for generality. Whilst this tentative processing scheme has not 
been tested on other types of problems there is good reason to suppose that the constant 
attributes would generalize to other problem domains (with possible extension) because 
they constitute the fundamental types of goal information. The processing scheme can 
be viewed as simple or minimal because it involves a chunk with a small number of 
constant attributes and associated productions. The processing scheme is parsimonious 
because the same attributes are a subset of those used in the goal buffer. Reusing the self-
instruction would increase its base level activation and adapting or creating a new self-
instruction will result in a new self-instruction chunk in declarative memory. Therefore, 
goal tracking, goal formation and goal memory are part of the same parsimonious system 
using an invariant representation.           
       
Argument structure The system of representing and processing meta-relations is used 
across different problems as the roles of meta-relations reflect generic information states 
used in tracking reasoning and self-argumentation. The existence of meta-relations in the 
model is motivated by self-argumentation evident from participants’ verbal protocols. 
Hence, the generation of the states roughly correlate with the main problem states 
verbalized in protocols.  The states are given a functional role in constraining production 
selection in the model and are therefore explanatory in modelling unpractised cognition. 
Although not modelled the existence of this information can in principle be used to select 
future actions by serving as learnt declarative rule instances in memory. This is consistent 
with protocols of some participants who after verbalizing a state of exception on 
detection of a new trial problem feature, when presented with the same problem feature 
on a subsequent trial, express recognition of what to do but without again verbalising a 
state of exception.     
 
Deictic problem representation The system of representing and processing framed 
environmental information is used across different problems. The system is a 
functionally required part of the model that provides conditions for inference generation 
and action selection that depend on the co-reference of role slots bound to pointer 
representations of individuals.  This model is consistent with empirical findings and 
theories of deictic representations that propose higher-level concepts and programs can 
be bound by pointer representations to environmental objects. It is also consistent with 
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accounts of cross modal episodic representations that propose that visual and spatial 
features of an encoding site are bound together with interpreted semantic or conceptual 
features.  
 
8.6. Discussion 
 
The discussion reviews the main challenges addressed by the model and findings derived 
from the modelling activity as well as implications and limitations of these findings. The 
discussion will consider in the following order findings and implications concerning the 
roles of diagrams in PPS, the nature of visual spatial processing in the diagrammatic PPS 
task, unpractised problem solving, the modelling approach employed and general 
conclusions. 
 
8.6.1. Diagrams and PPS 
 
Co-reference constraints. The ACT-R model derives probability by testing what is 
possible based on set membership and assigning respective possibility roles. Hence, like 
other analytical reasoning domains, the cognitive model needs to use a token model of 
the data in order to analytically derive a solution consistent with the structural constraints 
of the problem. The PS-diagram used is token referential, in which diagram tokens stand 
in for possible outcomes. The requirement for the use of token referential representations 
of possibilities have an empirical and theoretical basis. This proposal is supported by and 
consistent with the mental model theory and nested set accounts of extensional reasoning 
about probability.  It is also consistent with broader evidence and theoretical proposals 
that the human mind tends to employ specific representations/models in reasoning about 
states of affairs (e.g., Johnson-Laird, 1983; Stenning and Oberlander, 1995).   
 
The possible requirement for the representation of token models in reasoning about 
probability (like many other analytical problem domains) may depend in part on the need 
to process co-reference constraints on individuals in reasoning. The cognitive model uses 
a deictic problem representation in which role ascriptions are bound to a representation 
of the reference of sets (i.e. location chunks) of possibilities in the diagram, which 
function as indexes. This deictic character of the problem representation is connected to 
how inferences are computed by the model. Productions that initiate inferences do so by 
recognising patterns. The pattern matching is not just based on semantic matches to roles 
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or attributes, but also on the co-referential bindings to individuals indexed by the 
problem representation. Hence, the production triggered to infer limited trial possibilities 
involves recognising from the problem representation state that X are members of the 
stated outcome, that Y is the universal set, and that X is a subset of Y thus using the co-
reference of X and Y in different roles. 
 
The computationally efficient exploitation of co-reference constraints in reasoning as 
implemented in the model may explain performance advantages and the proposed 
efficacy of reasoning about probability with diagrams or model like representations. 
Using indexes to external individuals, as implemented in the model, appears to be the 
most algorithmically simple and a direct way of exploiting co-reference constraints on 
individuals in reasoning. This is also a plausible hypothesis because it is coherent on a 
semantic level. Note the cognitive capacity and ubiquity of demonstrative thought is 
evident by the existence and use of demonstrative terms in language (e.g., “this”) and is 
consistent with developments of mathematical formalisations of thought employed in 
logic and knowledge engineering that use deictic or referential variables (e.g. ∃x, letter 
(x), blue (x)). 
 
This proposal is similar and related to proposals made by Larkin and Simon (1987) in 
their analysis of the advantages of location indexing in diagrams. Recall that Larkin and 
Simon's analysis of processing advantages were concerned with the constraint that the 
representing properties of diagrammatic objects are co-located.  The model has shown 
how location indexing supports co-reference constraints involving propositions about 
projected meaning (e.g. possibility) that are modelled by problem roles about 
representing diagrammatic objects in the cognitive model.  In simple terms, this view 
holds that deictic reference is a generic information processing competence conferred by 
diagrams. Diagrams thus support reasoning in PPS because they exploit a deictic 
competence in the representation of co-reference constraints that are used in pattern 
matching for inference generation. 
 
This co-reference hypothesis has implications in understanding performance in 
conditional reasoning tasks. The debate about whether nested sets, frequency formats, or 
whole object properties of the representations of problem data are responsible for 
performance facilitation observed in conditional probability reasoning tasks was argued 
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to be problematic because of the potential role of each of these different kinds of 
information in the reasoning task (i.e. set structure vs frequency). If the co-reference 
hypothesis property is correct then understanding the facilitation effects of diagrams is 
not just a matter of what particular content of the domain expressed by a representation 
is responsible for performance facilitation, as implied by nested set accounts. It also 
provides an alternative re-framing of the hypothesis that whole object representation is 
responsible for performance facilitation as reported by Brase (2009). Rather than having 
anything to do with the theoretical proposals proposed by ecological rationalists/natural 
sampling, the effect would be an implicated result of the token referential property of the 
representation of outcomes and the appropriate conceptual framing (by the diagram 
semantics) of the opportunities for direct deictic representation and required inferences 
exploited in determining co-reference constraints. Under this view the difference in 
performance observed between icon and Venn diagrams in Brase's study would therefore 
correspond to differences in the framing of these deictic processing opportunities as the 
icon diagram represents the sample individuals by tokens, whereas the Venn diagram 
more abstractly frames sets by enclosed regions. 
 
Prior diagrammatic knowledge. The model implements the hypothesis that (at least 
some) participants exploited prior knowledge of diagrammatic schemes in the process 
of solution procedure formulation. This was demonstrated with a model of solving the 
biased probability problems, in which recognition of the unequal size PS-units provides 
conditions for hypothesising a potential mapping of their size difference and 
categorisation of the implicated diagram scheme (i.e. fraction-scheme). Interpreting the 
new mapping and framing the scheme interpretation, in turn, provided conditions to 
interpret an equivalent whole-frequency set of equiprobable possibilities and a procedure 
for deriving a normalised frequency from this set. 
 
This process can be viewed as involving an accessibility effect of the particular 
diagrammatic scheme on prior knowledge or schemas for common diagrammatic 
schemes. Note that this kind of account can be distinguished from diagram configuration 
chunk accounts (e.g., Koedinger and Anderson, 1990; Lane, Cheng and Gobet, 2000) 
and other accounts that assume exemplar/instance based knowledge of diagram 
configurations (e.g., Stenning and Oberlander, 1995) because it is not the recognition of 
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a learnt configuration instance that is the critical source of knowledge, but instead,  the 
classification and framing of a more abstract system or scheme of representation.  
 
This kind of activity modelled in the biased problem would be expected in a number of 
PPS studies described in Chapter 3 because the diagrams employed are often novel, ad 
hoc representations that incorporate familiar representation schemes and there is no 
reported instruction administered to participants on the semantics of the representations. 
Hence, participants would need to make sense of the mappings and infer implications of 
the framing of the diagrammatic scheme as implemented in the cognitive model. 
 
The strategic characterisation of performance can be viewed as a framing effect of the 
conceptual structure expressed by the diagram. Recall that the conceptual structure 
encoded in a representation is hypothesised to aid problem solving and reasoning and is 
proposed to be connected to the apprehension of the underlying represented laws that 
underpin the modelled domain (e.g., Cheng 2002). In the cognitive model, representing 
laws that underpin the domain are not explicitly derived or declaratively represented. In 
the cognitive model, such laws are tacit in the inferential competence associated with a 
diagrammatic scheme as implemented in the pattern matching conditions of productions 
that initiate inferences. In our view, explicating such laws into declarative 
representations would require explicit educational instruction or engaging in the kind of 
analytical activities and goals attributed to a semantic analyst. However, behaving in 
accordance with an understanding of such laws, only requires the know-how knowledge. 
As stated, this know-how knowledge that is tapped into constitutes a more generic and 
perhaps more primitive prior knowledge of diagrammatic schemes.         
 
Specificity, demonstration and semantic interpretation. An important role of the 
diagram modelled in the disjunction problem was the use of the diagram in facilitating 
the correct interpretation of the specific meaning of a given problem instruction or self-
generated solution procedure instruction. The modelled strategy depended on 
interrelating several sources of information, including ruling out and explaining the fault 
of the add-probabilities procedure, hypothesising an alternative union interpretation and 
an alternative instruction interpretation. One of the important abstractions of this process 
account is that the specific nature of the diagram was exploited in demonstratively 
interpreting the implicated meaning of the add-probabilities procedure (i.e. 
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understanding that it implies the repeated inclusion of possibilities for overlapping sets) 
and demonstratively interpreting how an alternative interpretation of the disjunction 
problem instruction was consistent with the union solution procedure. It was 
hypothesised that this was achieved by actively interpreting and testing the 
correspondence between referred categories and corresponding sets in the diagram.   
 
The processing requirements of this strategy were consistent with the extended reflection 
time and larger number of observed eye-movement switches between instructions and 
referred sets in the diagram, which results from attention being devoted to interpreting 
the target correspondences. The potential of the diagram to be used to investigate, 
elaborate and evaluate the implied meaning of a self-instructed solution procedure or a 
given problem instruction through action and feedback interactions with the diagram, is 
an important problem solving role that can be exploited in diagrams. It assumes that the 
conceptual interpretation of a solution procedure that constitutes part of a self-instruction 
may be vague in the sense that it could imply more than one different solution procedure 
with different consequences.   
 
8.6.2. Deictic representation and processing 
 
The cognitive model can be viewed to provide a distributed account of the cognitive task. 
Rather than represent a complete model of the diagram, the cognitive model holds a 
deictic representation in the imaginal buffer comprising of indexes to the locations of a 
limited set of visual objects. Productions automatically initiate attention to the referred 
objects when the chunks of these roles are being processed. Visual properties of an object 
are only available for one object/group at a time in the visual buffer and are accessed as 
needed. The deictic use of external information is consistent with theories of spatial 
indexing that have been proposed to explain how the cognitive system is capable of 
processing environmental information in situated cognitive tasks in a way that is more 
computationally efficient, representationally leaner and can be viewed to connect or 
ground the relation of internal cognitive information (e.g., symbols, programs, etc.) to 
external objects (e.g., Pylyshyn, 2000; Ballard et al., 1997). 
 
The ACT-R model solves the problems by demonstratively assigning conceptual roles to 
referent groups in the diagram. These role bindings, in turn, provide the conditions for 
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connecting knowledge, inferring new knowledge and deciding on actions. The modelled 
strategies incorporate a set of demonstrative routines associated with interpreting the 
requirements and results of a diagrammatic subtask. These demonstrative routines 
instantiate the referential meaning of a computed relation. For example, in the proportion 
subtask a demonstrative routine binds external referents of the problem roles whole-set 
and part-set as arguments to determine values of their corresponding whole-frequency 
and part-frequency. This is a functional requirement and consistent with the 
phenomenology of thinking “its this set relative to that set”. When the proportion sense 
is computed from the part-frequency and whole-frequency values, a strategy is initiated 
to automatically re-index the referents of these roles to relate the objects of the proportion 
result thus providing referential meaning to the abstracted quantities. This, in turn, 
provides conditions for interpreting the geometrical proportion of the referent in 
conjunction with the proportion derived from the frequency. Such actions are implied by 
participants' data. For example, in the proportion case, some participants appear to 
selectively choose to report a geometrical fraction when its fidelity allows it to be 
mapped to reportable numerical representation of a fraction; thus suggesting the 
information conditions are sampled as a matter of course thus implying the existence of 
such demonstrative strategies.            
  
 
8.6.3. Visual and spatial processing in diagrammatic PPS 
 
Attention allocation. One of the challenges of the model was attempting to explain the 
frequency and nature of eye-movement patterns observed in the diagrammatic PPS task. 
The comparison of the model did not provide a close fit either in frequency or patterns 
observed. Whilst the correspondence between actual eye-movements as observed and 
attention shifts as modelled will not be one-to-one, there are other good reasons to 
explain a critical limitation of the model. Notably the patterns of eye-movements 
observed was substantially more stochastic than the attention shifts predicted by the 
model. 
 
In order to predict eye-movement patterns, the model incorporated: (a) lower level 
goal/requirement independent attention routines that scanned sub-groups to identify 
discontinuities when attention to a group had been made; (b) a search strategy that 
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involves attending to sets to rule out that they had properties as well as attending to sets 
that have target properties; (c) productions that automatically initiate attention to the 
location source of comprehended information when that information is retrieved; and (d)  
attention made as a result of strategies that make online demonstration of relations and 
attributions about representing objects in the diagram. All of these factors are empirically 
and analytically motivated and add to making attention shifts appear more cognitively 
plausible. Other possibilities include the existence of repeated eye-movements to support 
the rehearsal of visual and spatial representations in the diagram (e.g., Tremblay, Saint-
Aubin and Jalbert, 2006), to re-encode forgotten information (e.g., Peebles and Cheng), 
or to check retrieved information the system meta-cognitively deems unreliable. 
  
The hypothesis that when participants think about a piece of information they 
automatically index and attend to the encoding location of the information source is an 
established empirical phenomena reported in the research literature and proposed to  
result in part from the intra-modal nature of episodic representations such that the 
encoding experience results in an episodic representation that links visual-spatial and 
comprehended information that is later retrieved (e.g., Ferreira,  Apel & Henderson., 
2008). This hypothesis is also consistent with general findings of episodic encoding 
reactivation in the brain (e.g. Danker and Anderson, 2010). 
 
The model implements these attention shifts by productions that respond to the location 
information encoded in the retrieved chunks and sends attention requests to the retrieved 
location. An alternative model of this phenomena would involve an architecture in which 
retrieval requests produce the modality specific chunks in the buffers where they were 
created. This is unlike ACT-R, which holds retrieved chunks in an abstract retrieval 
buffer. If the alternative model was correct, associated actions would then be a side-effect 
of cognitive architecture constraints rather than learnt procedural knowledge. The 
hypothesis was implemented to partly explain the large number of corresponding eye-
movements between task related information such as corresponding referred categories, 
their sets and marker-lines in the diagram. This hypothesis may also help explain eye-
movement changes in other diagrammatic reasoning tasks. For example, Stocco and 
Anderson (2008) reported an inconsistency in the eye-movements predicted by their 
model and the larger quantity of eye-movements observed by participants in a geometry 
theorem proving task. 
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Perceptual grouping. The model incorporates the visual capacity for perceptual 
grouping which, like individual visual objects, is generated by the visual module in 
response to search and attention requests. The development of the model explicated three 
main processing advantages of perceptual grouping in the PPS task. Perceptual grouping 
provided simpler parallel rather than serial operations for identifying task relevant sets, 
is used to determine relations of set membership by their spatial structure, and simplifies 
the internal problem representation and the tracking of sets into a minimal number of 
location indexes. The model explicitly incorporates all three processing advantages that 
depend on the use of representations that exploit perceptual grouping and the visual 
system's capacity for processing such information. These advantages are also arguably 
exploited in the reported PPS studies that use diagrams, such as the roulette wheel 
diagram (Yamagishi, 2003), the Venn diagram and grouped icons diagram (Brase, 2009). 
 
Visual salience. The model does not incorporate pre-attentive processing or explicitly 
model the effects of perceptual salience of diagram features because this was not a 
developed property of the ACT-R architecture. A recent visual attention module for ACT-
R incorporating pre-attentive vision has been proposed by Nyamsuren and Taatgen 
(2013). Their module incorporates a visual icon memory, which holds peripheral/pre-
attentive visual objects and a stochastic model of search that uses top-down (production 
specified) and bottom-up (salience based activation) information to determine what 
object locations of the limited icon memory are selected. It should be noted that, in our 
model, a restricted advantage of pre-attentive processing competence is assumed in the 
capacity of the visual module to accept requests for search and attention to perceptual 
groups because the existence of perceptual groups in the model are created based on their 
assumed salience (only perceptual groups formed by an invariant value of a visual 
dimension across its elements are specified in the model's visicon). 
 
An arguably potential limitation of the lack of pre-attentive mechanisms is the possible 
attentional biasing effect of visual salience that may influence cognition to positive or 
negative ends in the task. For example, additional features such as discontinuities in letter 
properties and marker line patterns in peripheral vision may bias attention and, therefore, 
influence higher-level processing of those visual features. Such effects can however be 
matched by productions that choose to scan letters and diagram elements as a general 
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heuristic strategy, which is incorporated in the existing model. The assumption that 
information in the diagram is encoded as a result of active visual-spatial engagement is 
consistent with the requirements of developing a coherent cognitive model of the task 
and explaining some of the experimental observations as discussed. It is unclear to what 
extent pre-attentive vision could play a bottom-up role in influencing the content of high-
level thought. However, it is proposed that pre-attentive vision may provide a more 
realistic prediction about eye-movement patterns, but may, in turn, require more 
sophisticated strategic knowledge for error correction to cope with the stochastic nature 
of location selection on attention shifts. The prediction of incorporating a pre-attentive 
model would be expected to contrast with the attention shifts generated by our model, 
which follow somewhat rigid strategically predictable patterns. 
 
Spatial processing. A further modelling challenge was to develop a spatial processing 
system that would satisfy modelling requirements of the diagrammatic PPS task, explain 
assumed accessibility advantages of diagrams whilst being consistent with empirical 
research on visual spatial processing. The model implements the hypothesis that a 
specific non-conceptual representation of the spatial structure between selectively 
indexed objects is processed and generated automatically on attention shifts in a spatial 
buffer. Whilst the referents of the spatial structure are selected in a top-down way via 
productions; the actual processing of the structure is assumed to be local to a spatial 
subsystem or module in response to location indexing/attention changes. 
 
The model of spatial processing system provides information advantages in the 
diagrammatic reasoning task. The representation of spatial structure is specific and 
generated automatically on attention shifts. The main functionally important abstraction 
is that it provides conditions for the selection of goal relevant conceptual spatial 
relations. This is because the system does not need to serially test for relations that may 
not exist, as the information of any abstraction is implicit, it provides the opportunity for 
spatial pattern recognition. This property would be true of any perceived base 
representation just so long as there are the appropriate pattern matching operators 
available. This property means that the system can notice abstract conceptual spatial 
relations as a result of selecting concurrent objects for attention in the same way that the 
system can notice when searching and attending to a large letter that it happens to be 
blue as a side-effect, because the results of the search request is a specific representation 
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of the letter. It is proposed that this advantage in spatial processing is general in 
diagrammatic reasoning and can be considered an important accessibility advantage 
exploited in diagrammatic PPS. 
 
8.6.4. Unpractised problem solving 
 
Another challenge was the attempt to model the unpractised character of the problem 
solving process. There are three main co-dependent features of the model that are central 
to the modelling of unpractised problem solving: (1) the meta-cognitive representations 
of the goal buffer, (2) the self-instruction scheme, and (3) the dynamic binding 
mechanisms involved in knowledge integration. 
 
Reasoning and argumentations. ACT-R's theoretical commitments are generally 
focused towards modelling routine action based behaviour, which is perhaps why it has 
minimal commitments for modelling high-level reflective processing compared to 
cognitive architectures like SOAR (Newell, 1990). The model implements the process 
of generating declarative inferences using hypothesis specific retrieval productions. 
These productions are intended to model hypothesis generation in which the retrieved 
content is intended to represent a conceptual case applicable to the internal problem state. 
The conditions of these productions are specific to the case. One possible limitation of 
the model is the absence of the use of bottom-up activation based processing in 
reasoning. Whilst spreading activation and instance based memory are features that can 
be used in hypothesis generation, it appears difficult to implement with complex 
heterogeneous knowledge. In diagrammatic reasoning tasks it is possible to imagine how 
bottom-up activation could influence/bias the retrieval contents from activation 
emanating from perceptual, spatial and imaginal buffers containing processed 
environmental representations. This could also be viewed to constitute an accessibility 
effect not addressed by the research. The potential role of bottom-up activation of 
diagrammatic information on the accessibility of perceptual inferences is an interesting 
line of future research on the role of diagrams in supporting solution interpretation.    
 
Argumentation tracking The model included the use of meta-roles in the goal buffer 
to track the argumentation relations of acquired information in the course of solution 
interpretation. These were motivated by the observed protocols, their functional role in 
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cognitive control and the requirement for a more detailed purposive representation of the 
use of task knowledge. Rather than just accumulating slot bindings, the use of meta-roles 
structure the use of problem information in the task model. It also provides abstract 
conditions for productions that operate at the level of meta-relations (meta-cognitive),  
which is a functional requirement and logical implication in unpractised reasoning and 
problem solving tasks.  The model provides a novel way of characterising the 
representation of reasoning/argumentation in the ACT-R architecture as it frames 
argumentation, in part, as a meta-cognitive tracking process. Such roles can be seen to 
correspond to meta-cognitive relations of knowledge when their meaning is analysed 
from an information processing perspective (e.g. doing something normally or 
something being an exception requires a meta-cognitive judgement about remembered 
experiences). Brain imaging research on reasoning could be an important source of 
evidence in testing this kind of model, namely that such representations are meta-
cognitive and processed in a different subsystem to other kinds of conceptual knowledge. 
 
Self-instructions. The model uses generic productions to retrieve declarative goal 
instances containing self-instruction information to determine what to do next based on 
what was done before. Some form of instance based memory would be predicted for 
such a task before proceduralization could take place and is supported by suggested cases 
of negative transfer evident from solutions in the pilot and main experiment. 
 
The scheme in the model is similar to the declarative operator scheme reported by 
Anderson (2007), where operator chunks are taken to be decoding’s of task instructions 
that are interpreted by generic dynamic binding productions to control task execution. 
One key difference with the self-instruction scheme is that it is part of the goal chunk 
containing the invariant parameters required to carry out its corresponding subtask. This 
arguably makes the self-instruction scheme a more parsimonious explanation of the 
kinds of activities supported because both creation, encoding, use and reuse are part of 
an interrelated system. Although not tested, it would also imply predictions about 
negative transfer, confusion errors and concurrent changes in the subtask requirements 
as more self-instructions are adapted and goal chunks are dropped into declarative 
memory over problems. 
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A second key difference in the self-instruction scheme is that the information contained 
in the chunks are subtask specifications rather than specifications of individual operators. 
This is considered more cognitively plausible because it is proposed that instructions are 
not likely to be interpreted by people at the level of individual operators, but instead at 
the level of subtask goals. In addition, unlike the operator scheme, self-instructions can 
be abstract and potentially vague with respect to their detailed strategic implementation 
such that strategic details of a self-instruction may be filled in on the go. This reflects 
the assumption that the cognitive system uses its existing knowledge resources to 
implement self-generated and given instructions in a flexible and context sensitive way.   
 
Knowledge integration. Another important information processing competence 
required to explain unpractised problem solving is the arbitrary (or near arbitrary) 
capacity to integrate information about the problem in the problem representation. This 
capacity appears to be uncontroversial given the imaginal buffer is viewed as working 
memory resource, but ACT-R chunks are typed and productions respond to chunk types 
(however, in ACT-R 6.1, released in December 2014, chunk types are explicitly no 
longer part of the model, but only exist as part of the modelling notation). The model 
makes use of dynamic binding productions to add slots to an imaginal chunk, but this 
involves suspending the type restriction for problem chunks so that productions can 
respond to the contents of the chunk rather than its type. This is done by predefining the 
space of all possible required slots in an imaginal chunk even though most will be 
dynamically bound and only a subset will have bindings at any given time. 
 
Dynamic binding productions are a recent feature of the ACT-R architecture that have 
been used to model the translation of retrieved declarative operator representations into 
actions within the system's own cognitive repertoire (Anderson, 2007). The use of 
dynamic binding in the PPS model is used for a range of purposes, including inference 
generation strategies, strategies involved in setting up, and responding to meta-cognitive 
binding (i.e. meta-roles to problem role relations) in argumentation and intention 
tracking. 
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8.6.5. Modelling methodology 
 
The reported cognitive modelling research has focused on modelling the strategies 
inferred from participants’ performance data. Creating a model of inferred strategies 
enforces the need to specify particular knowledge and information requirements and the 
processes involved in transitions between concurrent cognitive states. Whilst developing 
a coherent runnable model is an overarching goal, the approach taken has also attempted 
to develop strategic models that satisfy a number of principled modelling constraints. 
These include: 
 
The model assumes that subtask action strategies (e.g., searching, counting, reading) 
have an autonomous control structure and that the systems must integrate these different 
knowledge domains in unfamiliar/non-optimised problem tasks in order to reach a 
higher-order goal. This assumption about the nature of knowledge is implied by the 
requirement for any system to recruit knowledge in novel ways in an unfamiliar task – a 
type of flexibility which constitutes a fundamental human cognitive competence. 
 
The model explicitly proposes modular specific representational formats, which provide 
a structured representational system for the cognitive architecture and constrains 
modelling possibilities. These formats are empirically and analytically motivated and 
can be seen as compatible with a number tacit assumptions that already exist about the 
nature of knowledge and processing in the cognitive architecture. Tentative generic 
strategic knowledge has been implemented for various types of purposes including 
visual-spatial and meta-cognitive processing. Although preliminary, these 
representations have been developed to generalise across tasks rather than be ad hoc. 
 
The focus of generic representation and strategies or routines were prevalent in earlier 
cognitive modelling research (e.g., Newell, 1990; Anderson, 1978), but became de-
emphasized; perhaps influenced by the development of the rational analysis theory, 
which views the structure of knowledge as highly adaptive and context dependent 
(Anderson, 1990). An abstract assumption made in the development of the model is that 
the existence and use of context independent knowledge is a functional requirement of 
unpractised cognition so must also co-exist with highly context specific knowledge 
acquired through practice. More recent research has returned to considerations of generic 
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forms of knowledge, for example, as discussed, Anderson (2007) reported generic 
operator representations for implementing a task from instructions. Taatgen (2014) has 
appealed to the modelling of generic primitive operators that can be used as constraints 
in a model, like features of the cognitive architecture. The modelling approach developed 
here is therefore timely and compatible with very recent theoretical aims and 
developments in the cognitive modelling community. 
 
Modelling evaluation. The evaluation of the model considers the matching of temporal 
data, behavioural profiles, as well as explanatory properties of the cognitive model. The 
evaluation choices were motivated by several factors. The unfamiliar nature of the task 
requires a greater focus in providing a coherent underlying task model and making the 
coherence of the task model an important part of the evaluation. A principled modelling 
approach has been attempted proposing a number of separate processing schemes that 
come together in simulating task performances. The complex, extended and 
heterogeneous data profiles of the small sample of participants require a focus on 
detailed cognitive properties of the task performance that are common to participant 
subgroups such as the conceptual knowledge, strategies and argumentation. The general 
aims of research are focused on understanding the process of interpretation in the task as 
well as attempting to develop a model using structured representations and processes. 
 
The emphasis of the evaluation is arguably different to current trends, especially with 
ACT-R that focus on data fitting of gross temporal behavioural patterns using statistical 
measures. Temporal data fitting may be viewed as appropriate to modelling short 
optimized task performance where the strategic possibilities are limited and where 
(normally) sub-symbolic and other constraints of the cognitive architecture are the focus 
of the modelling explanation. Not all contemporary cognitive modelling research is 
concerned with temporal data fitting, especially when the research is aimed at 
understanding high-order cognition rather than routine action oriented cognition. For 
example, research with alternative cognitive architectures such as CLARION (Sun, 
2002) and Polyscheme (Cassimatis, 2006) focus on qualitative results and broader 
competence implications. Whilst temporal data fitting can be an important evaluation 
constraint, a number of researchers have pointed to other factors that are important in 
evaluation. Cassimatis, Bello, Langley (2008) for example propose additional criteria 
  
264 
such as breadth, ability and parsimony of cognitive models, which in their view, can be 
used in a complementary way or as an alternative to data fitting evaluation. 
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Chapter 9: Conclusions 
 
The remaining chapter will consider some of the main findings and their broader 
implications.  Three findings will be discussed in the following order: (1) the cognitive 
roles of the diagram in the task, (2) the multi-component nature of diagrammatic 
accessibility (3) the nature of PPS competence  
 
9.1. Diagrammatic roles 
 
At an abstract level, the experimental protocols of participants and the cognitive 
modelling used to investigate explanations of participants’ performance suggest the 
diagrams in the study supported three main roles in the problem solving and reasoning 
process: (a) the demonstrative routines and visual-spatial competences of the cognitive 
architecture support sub-problem identification and solution procedure adaptation; (b) 
prior instrumental knowledge of representing sub-schemes expressed by the diagrams 
support the framing of a solution interpretation; and (c) the specific representational 
property of the diagram supports the opportunity to demonstratively elaborate and test 
out the specific meaning and implications of a comprehended or self-generated 
instruction interpretation. 
 
These main findings are sufficiently abstract that they are not likely to be specific to the 
domain of PPS, but have requirement contexts that are likely to apply to other problem 
solving and reasoning domains, particularly involving mathematical word problems. The 
requirement contexts of diagrammatic problem solving tasks are summarised as follows. 
  
 Sub-problem identification would be required in any context where a model of 
the data needs to be inferred from an abstract description or used where a 
description is incomplete and where the particular structure of the model 
determines whether default assumptions need to be revised. 
 The exploitation of prior knowledge of representational schemes will be required 
where a particular way of representing a model of the problem situation provides 
one or more familiar sub-schemes that support framing of the problem data and 
also of the interrelation between equivalent ways of framing the problem data in 
a solution interpretation. 
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 Demonstratively testing the meaning of a comprehended or self-generated 
instruction will be required whenever the instruction may tend to be interpreted 
in a vague or abstract way by a user and where the specific nature of the diagram 
is capable of unambiguously expressing the determinate implicated meaning 
corresponding to a single or alternative interpretations of the vague or abstract 
instruction. 
 
9.2. Diagrammatic accessibility and advantages   
 
The empirical and modelling research findings have provided a context for 
understanding the multi-component accessibility of diagrams. The research has shown 
that performance on the PPS task exploits properties of diagrams and their accessibility 
in task execution and directly or indirectly influences the interpretation of a problem and 
solution. In Chapter 2 several kinds of accessibility were reported based on a review of 
the empirical literature.  We compare the findings of this research with issues considered 
in the literature.      
 
Perceptual grouping. The role of parallel processing and visual grouping is well 
documented in the diagrammatic reasoning literature. These considerations appear to be 
concerned with the issues of high-order meanings expressed by the perceptual form of 
grouping, such as the shape of a scatter plot, or form of a configuration and the ease of 
recognition of such information (e.g., Larkin and Simon, 1987; Shimojima, 1999; 
Koedinger and Anderson, 1990). The research goes further in considering additional 
functions, including simplifying the referential requirements of an internal problem 
representation, and thus, supporting the process of keeping track of goal relevant 
information. The model also implements the hypothesis that, for the modelled problems, 
perceptual groups are an additional information condition required to generate inferences 
that depend on co-reference constraints of demonstratively referred sets. 
 
Proof, explanation and evaluation. Theoretical discussion regarding the use of 
diagrams in proof and explanation was considered. The central claim that is derivable 
from the theoretical literature is the role of structural constraints of diagrams in being 
able to observe and understand in an explanatory way why some proposition must hold 
(e.g., Sloman, 1971; Lindsay, 2002).  The hypothesis that participants exploited the 
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determinate and token referential character of the diagrams in elaborating and evaluating 
problem and self-generated solution instructions is consistent with this line of reasoning.   
Eye-movements of participants are also consistent with the constraints of online 
interpretation of problem and solution information.  The cognitive model offered an 
explicit characterisation of this observation by proposing a demonstrative form of 
problem representation in the imaginal buffer that connects conceptual knowledge in the 
form of abstract problem roles to the spatial reference of attended objects in the 
environment,  productions that elicit attention to referenced objects when meanings 
about those objects are being processed and demonstrative strategies and related roles 
that frame the referential context by referring to objects in deriving abstract information.  
These acts of deictic reference coupled with the specific nature of the diagram provide a 
range of information conditions that are critical to solving the tasks that can be directly 
observed and are likely to be motivated by the need to demonstrate that an interpretation 
is valid and consistent with the structural constraints on data.        
 
Spatial processing. The role of spatial processing competence in diagrammatic 
accessibility has been considered by researchers investigating the facilitations of 
diagrams and PPS. The exploitation of the spatial processing system in reasoning with a 
diagram is typically attributed to the processing efficiency of the visual-spatial 
processing system. This rather unspecific characterisation is due to a lack of explicit 
models or theories of spatial processing of the kind required in diagrammatic reasoning. 
We have already discussed the hypothesised role of deictic spatial processes and co-
reference constraints in reasoning. The research also suggests two additional proposals 
about this. Firstly, the model includes the proposal that the implemented spatial 
processing system generates specific representations of the local spatial structure that 
provides information conditions for the recognition of more abstract conceptual and 
spatial relations used in higher cognition.  Secondly, implementing the task model 
demonstrates that even with this spatial processing advantage the system need to actively 
employ demonstrative routines to relate target set and individuals in the process of 
framing and reasoning about the data.  
 
Although there exist diagrammatic reasoning systems incorporating spatial processing 
competencies, the empirical bases for the systems as well as the capacity to make any 
kind of experimental predications are lacking. Although the main assumptions in the 
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implemented model of spatial processing reported here are abstract and tentative, they 
are analytically motivated and have theoretical and empirical support and could be 
potentially tested though further experimentation. 
 
Knowledge accessibility. In Chapter 2 we discussed the role of prior knowledge in 
diagrammatic accessibility. Spatial schemes are ubiquitous in diagrammatic 
representation and everyday thought more generally. The interpretation of some 
participants protocols suggested they use prior knowledge of the diagrammatic fraction 
scheme in interpreting the mapping of the scheme and framing the represented data in a 
solution interpretation.  A cognitive model of the strategic process was developed.  Our 
analysis suggests that the particular phenomena addressed can be differentiated from 
instance/exemplar based diagram configuration accounts which involved the more 
concrete knowledge structures derived from highly practised contexts. The research 
reports findings that a more abstract form of diagrammatic knowledge exists that applies 
to categories of schemes rather than configuration instances per se. Such categories are 
hypothesised to provide conditions for recruiting instrumental kinds of knowledge 
associated with the scheme. The nature of such knowledge is not well understood and 
has only been addressed in very abstract terms in the model.  This is no doubt an 
important avenue of future research.  
 
9.3. The Nature of PPS competence 
 
The data and interpretation of modelled strategies provided information about the goals, 
declarative knowledge and strategies employed in the PPS task. 
 
Problem frames. The protocols of participants indicate that (at least sometimes) they 
derive the proportion from the sets they interpret possible given the problem instruction 
and data. Verbal reports identifying possibility interpretations were most prevalent on 
conditional problems where the ruling out of possibilities was required. The framing of 
the problem in terms of a proportion of possibilities is consistent with mental models 
theory (Johnson-Laird, et al., 1999) and the partition-edit-count model (Fox and Levav, 
2004) and with empirical research suggesting that such framing is present in early 
childhood (Girotto and Gonzales, 2008). The verbal protocols also indicate a tendency 
to determine the probability proportion from the frequency of the target sets, which 
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requires the assumption of equiprobability. This is also consistent with mental models 
theory and the partition-edit-count model and research on probability intuitions (e.g., 
Shimojo and Ichikawa, 1989). 
 
Errors. The small group of participants made an assortments of errors on different 
problems.  These errors result from a failure to consider or correctly interpret either the 
problem instruction, problem data or solution procedure. The incorrect solutions of some 
participants suggest that they may also make errors by incorrectly generalising previous 
solution procedure instances. The assortment of these different classes of errors are 
similar to the findings of O'Connell (1999), although our categorisation is different. The 
different kinds of observed errors that are related to different features of the problem 
presentation supports a broader approach to understanding the role of representation in 
PPS in comparison to the majority of research on this issue that is arguably overly pre-
occupied with conditional probability problems. 
 
Generic knowledge. Participants did not initially recognise the solution procedure 
requirement upon reading the instructions but instead tended to work it out with the aid 
of the diagram; suggesting participants were initially unfamiliar with the solution 
procedure to particular sub-problems. Some participants’ protocols suggested they 
engaged in self-argumentation in the process of solving problems implying the meta-
cognitive requirement to track the interdependent roles of acquired information rather 
than simply execute a learnt procedure. Participants seemed to adapt solution 
interpretations and procedures to fit with their existing conception of the problem. To 
model the task depended on implementing a number of inferences and cognitive 
strategies that are independent or unrestricted to the domain of probability.  In addition, 
many of the adapted solution interpretations can be viewed as the results of establishing 
its equivalence to a known requirement. These observations suggest that participants 
solve the PPS problems using generic types of limited task knowledge and that their 
performance is consistent with a generic view of reasoning and problem solving 
competencies. This appears to rule out the need to allude to specialised modules or 
mechanisms for PPS and extensional reasoning about probability as proposed by 
ecological rationalist proponents.        
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Summary 
In summary the research has employed a converging approach to investigate the roles of 
diagrams in supporting solution procedure formulation in a PPS task. The experimental 
data has suggested abstract roles of the diagram in facilitating a correct solution 
procedure. It has also led to methodological developments of a novel visualisation for 
more clearly representing scan paths and a tentative classification system of tabulating 
verbalisations about the problem and self-argumentation. The cognitive modelling 
research has led to the development of a number of new proposals for modelling the task 
domain that could be applied to other domains.  These include the meta-cognitive 
processing scheme, self-instruction scheme, deictic processing scheme and spatial 
processing schemes. These specific proposals have been aggregated to produce cognitive 
simulations of the modelled PPS task that has been used to provide an account for 
observed performance and has generated insights about the nature of this distributed 
cognitive task.  
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Appendix 1. Main experimental instructions 
 
Data recording 
 
In this experiment the eye-tracking equipment will record your eye-movements, speech 
and video images of your facial area. The reasons for recording verbalisation and eye-
movement protocols is to allow us to acquire information on what people think about 
and look at as they are solving the problems. 
 
Concurrent verbalisation 
Whilst you are doing the experiment you are requested to try and verbalise your imme-
diate thoughts as soon as you become aware of them. You do not need to explain what 
you are thinking about or concern yourself with how your verbalisations may appear. 
Just try to verbalise whatever you are thinking about as soon as the thoughts come to 
your mind. Examples may include but are not restricted to 
 
 The things you are looking at or searching for 
 The calculations you are making 
 The reasoning you are doing     
 The plans you are making 
 The way you are thinking about things 
 
 
You will be given three practice trials to help you get familiar with doing this.  
 
Confidentiality 
Data concerning the identity of participants will be kept private and confidential. If you 
have any further questions or concerns please address them to the experimenter before 
you begin.  
 
 
Instructions 
 
In the following experiment you will be presented with a series of problems displayed 
on a computer monitor.  Each problem will require you to calculate the probability of the 
spin of a letter spinner.   A letter spinner is an object like that pictured in figure 1 which 
has several sides each containing a coloured letter of a particular size.  When a spinner 
is spun it can fall on only one of the several sides.  The number of sides and letters on 
the letter spinner will change for every problem you will be given. 
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Figure 1. Depiction of a six sided letter spinner 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Each problem display will involve a text section and a diagram as shown in figure 2.  
The text section states information about the spinner event and the probability that you 
are required to estimate.  
The content of the text boxes in each sentence of the text section changes over different 
problems.  All other text will remain the same for each of the different problems.  
 
The first sentence states what is known about the probability of each letter coming up. 
In the example below it states that all the letters have an equal probability.   In other 
problems it may say that some letters have double the chance of others. 
 
The second sentence says something about the outcome.  In the example in figure 2 it 
simply states the spinner falls on a letter.  In other problems it may say the spinner fall 
on a letter with a particular colour or size. 
 
The third sentence states the probability that you need to calculate.  In the figure 2 it 
simply asks for the probability of getting an F.  In other problems the questions may be 
about getting letters with different colours and/or sizes. 
 
 
  
284 
 
 
Figure 2.  Example of a problem display 
 
 
 
 
Below the text is a diagram that shows the letters on the spinner.   Letters stated in the 
text are highlighted by lines drawn below the letters (see under letter F in Figure 2).  
Look at figure 2 and familiarize yourself with the display. 
 
 
 
 
 
You should use the information presented in the text and diagram to help 
determine the correct answer.  When you are confident that you know the 
correct answer click the mouse and then say the answer.    
 
You will be given three practice problems before you complete the 12 
experiment problems.   The experiment problems will be more difficult 
than the practice problems.  
 
 If you are unsure about anything or have any questions please ask the 
experimenter. 
 
 
 
    
All letters on 
spinner 
Problem text 
Lines highlights 
letter referred to 
in text 
Text in boxes 
change over 
trials  
Diagram 
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Appendix 3. Sample of model protocol traces 
 
 
Appendix 3.a. Model protocol trace for the conjunction/subset problem 
 
type time xpos ypos fixation object 
  
(eye 150 320 100 185 Probabilities are) 
 (eye 335 320 100 335 probabilities) 
 (vocal 470  probabilities) 
 (eye 670 382 100 1100 are) 
 (vocal 1370  are) 
 (eye 1770 500 100 200 equal for all) 
 (eye 1970 500 100 335 equal) 
 (vocal 2105  equal) 
 (eye 2305 542 100 450 for) 
 (vocal 2555  for) 
 (eye 2755 570 100 1500 all) 
 (vocal 2905  all) 
 (eye 4255 320 150 185 The spinner falls on a) 
 (eye 4440 320 150 335 the) 
 (vocal 4575  the) 
 (eye 4775 362 150 400 spinner) 
 (vocal 4925  spinner) 
 (eye 5175 413 150 500 falls) 
 (vocal 5475  falls) 
 (eye 5675 455 150 450 on) 
 (vocal 5925  on) 
 (eye 6125 476 150 535 a) 
 (vocal 6260  a) 
 (eye 6660 500 150 1500 letter) 
 (vocal 6810  letter) 
 (eye 8160 200 200 185 What is the probability the letter is) 
 (eye 8345 220 200 335 What) 
 (vocal 8480  What) 
 (eye 8680 248 200 400 is) 
 (vocal 8880  is) 
 (eye 9080 275 200 385 the) 
 (vocal 9215  the) 
 (eye 9465 330 200 350 probability) 
 (vocal 9600  probability) 
 (eye 9815 387 200 735 the) 
 (vocal 10350  the) 
 (eye 10550 425 200 400 letter) 
 (vocal 10700  letter) 
 (eye 10950 460 200 700 is) 
 (vocal 11250  is) 
 (eye 11650 500 200 200 blue & small) 
 (eye 11850 500 200 335 blue) 
 (vocal 11985  blue 
 
type time xpos ypos fixation object 
 
 (eye 12185 535 200 400 &) 
 (vocal 12385  &) 
 (eye 12585 549 200 685 small) 
 (vocal 12720  small) 
 (eye 13270 500 200 1200 blue & small) 
 (eye 14470 360 380 535 |J|O|W|Y|D|) 
 (vocal 14855  theres) 
 (eye 15005 160 360 450 J) 
 (vocal 15355  one) 
 (eye 15455 260 360 335 O) 
 (vocal 15740  two) 
 (eye 15790 360 360 350 W) 
 (vocal 16090  three) 
 (eye 16140 460 360 500 Y) 
 (vocal 16540  four) 
 (eye 16640 560 360 900 D) 
 (vocal 16940  five) 
 (eye 17540 500 200 185 blue & small) 
 (eye 17725 500 200 335 blue) 
 (vocal 17860  blue) 
 (eye 18060 535 200 400 &) 
 (vocal 18260  &) 
 (eye 18460 549 200 685 small) 
 (vocal 18595  small) 
 (eye 19145 500 200 950 blue & small) 
 (eye 20095 260 380 235 |J|O|W|) 
 (eye 20330 460 380 185 |W|Y|D|) 
 (eye 20515 260 380 185 |J|O|W|) 
 (eye 20700 160 360 185 J) 
 (eye 20885 260 360 185 O) 
 (eye 21070 360 360 235 W) 
 (eye 21305 260 380 185 |J|O|W|) 
 (eye 21490 210 380 1085 |J|O|) 
 (vocal 21625  both) 
 (vocal 22025  theres) 
 (vocal 22225  two) 
 (eye 22575 360 380 235 |J|O|W|Y|D|) 
 (eye 22810 210 380 1885 |J|O|) 
 (vocal 23195  so) 
 (vocal 23495  two) 
 (vocal 23845  in) 
 (vocal 24145  five) 
 
Reported answer:  two in five 
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Appendix 3.b.   Model protocol trace for the biased/overlap problem 
 
 type time xpos ypos fixation object 
  
(eye 150 320 100 185 Probabilities are) 
 (eye 335 320 100 335 probabilities) 
 (vocal 470  probabilities) 
 (eye 670 382 100 1100 are) 
 (vocal 1370  are) 
 (eye 1770 500 100 200 double for large) 
 (eye 1970 500 100 335 double) 
 (vocal 2105  double) 
 (eye 2305 549 100 550 for) 
 (vocal 2655  for) 
 (eye 2855 577 100 500 large) 
 (vocal 3005  large) 
 (eye 3355 500 100 1050 double for large) 
 (eye 4405 320 150 185 The spinner falls on a) 
 (eye 4590 320 150 335 the) 
 (vocal 4725  the) 
 (eye 4925 362 150 400 spinner) 
 (vocal 5075  spinner) 
 (eye 5325 413 150 500 falls) 
 (vocal 5625  falls) 
 (eye 5825 455 150 450 on) 
 (vocal 6075  on) 
 (eye 6275 476 150 535 a) 
 (vocal 6410  a) 
 (eye 6810 500 150 1500 letter) 
 (vocal 6960  letter) 
 (eye 8310 200 200 185 What is the probability the letter is) 
 (eye 8495 220 200 335 What) 
 (vocal 8630  What) 
 (eye 8830 248 200 400 is) 
 (vocal 9030  is) 
 (eye 9230 275 200 385 the) 
 (vocal 9365  the) 
 (eye 9615 330 200 350 probability) 
 (vocal 9750  probability) 
 (eye 9965 387 200 735 the) 
 (vocal 10500  the) 
 (eye 10700 425 200 400 letter) 
 (vocal 10850  letter) 
 (eye 11100 460 200 700 is) 
 (vocal 11400  is) 
 (eye 11800 500 200 1800 red) 
 (vocal 11950  red) 
 (eye 13600 510 380 535 |Q|S|G|M|V|T|) 
 (vocal 13985  theres) 
 (eye 14135 160 360 450 Q) 
 (vocal 14485  one) 
 (eye 14585 260 360 335 S) 
 (vocal 14870  two) 
 (eye 14920 410 360 350 G) 
 (vocal 15220  three) 
 (eye 15270 610 360 500 M) 
 (vocal 15670  four) 
 (eye 15770 760 360 350 V) 
 (vocal 16070  five) 
 (eye 16120 860 360 950 T) 
 (vocal 16470  six) (eye 17070 500 100 185 double for large) 
(eye 17255 500 100 335 double) 
(vocal 17390  double) 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
type time xpos ypos fixation object 
  
(eye 17590 549 100 550 for) 
 (vocal 17940  for) 
 (eye 18140 577 100 500 large) 
 (vocal 18290  large) 
 (eye 18640 500 100 1200 double for large) 
 (eye 19840 510 380 235 |G|M|) 
 (eye 20075 710 380 235 |M|V|T|) 
 (eye 20310 860 360 185 T) 
 (eye 20495 610 360 250 M) 
 (eye 20745 710 380 100 |M|V|T|) 
 (eye 20845 510 380 250 |G|M|) 
 (eye 21095 510 380 485 |Q|S|G|M|V|T|) 
 (vocal 21480  so) 
 (eye 21580 710 380 800 |M|V|T|) 
 (eye 22380 510 380 235 |Q|S|G|M|V|T|) 
 (eye 22615 160 360 335 Q) 
 (vocal 22900  one) 
 (eye 22950 260 360 350 S) 
 (vocal 23250  two) 
 (eye 23300 410 360 850 G) 
 (vocal 23600  three) 
 (vocal 24050  four) 
 (eye 24150 610 360 750 M) 
 (vocal 24450  five) 
 (vocal 24850  six) 
 (eye 24900 760 360 350 V) 
 (vocal 25200  seven) 
 (eye 25250 860 360 1000 T) 
 (vocal 25650  eight) 
 (eye 26250 500 200 1535 red) 
 (vocal 26385  red) 
 (eye 27785 310 380 235 |Q|S|G|) 
 (eye 28020 710 380 185 |M|V|T|) 
 (eye 28205 310 380 185 |Q|S|G|) 
 (eye 28390 160 360 185 Q) 
 (eye 28575 260 360 185 S) 
 (eye 28760 410 360 235 G) 
 (eye 28995 310 380 185 |Q|S|G|) 
 (eye 29180 510 380 185 |Q|S|G|M|V|T|) 
 (eye 29365 310 380 185 |Q|S|G|) 
 (eye 29550 310 580 185 ---) 
 (eye 29735 310 380 700 |Q|S|G|) 
 (vocal 30185  theres) 
 (eye 30435 310 380 235 |Q|S|G|) 
 (eye 30670 160 360 335 Q) 
 (vocal 30955  one) 
 (eye 31005 260 360 350 S) 
 (vocal 31305  two) 
 (eye 31355 410 360 1150 G) 
 (vocal 31655  three) 
 (vocal 32105  four) 
 (eye 32505 510 380 250 |Q|S|G|M|V|T|) 
 (eye 32755 310 380 1935 |Q|S|G|) 
 (vocal 33140  so) 
 (vocal 33440  four) 
 (vocal 33840  in) 
 (vocal 34140  eight) 
 
Reported answer:  four in eight  
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Appendix 3.c. Model protocol trace for the conditional/overlap problem 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
type time xpos ypos fixation object 
 
 (eye 150 320 100 185 Probabilities are) 
 (eye 335 320 100 335 probabilities) 
 (vocal 470  probabilities) 
 (eye 670 382 100 1100 are) 
 (vocal 1370  are) 
 (eye 1770 500 100 200 equal for all) 
 (eye 1970 500 100 335 equal) 
 (vocal 2105  equal) 
 (eye 2305 542 100 450 for) 
 (vocal 2555  for) 
 (eye 2755 570 100 1500 all) 
 (vocal 2905  all) 
 (eye 4255 320 150 185 The spinner falls on a) 
 (eye 4440 320 150 335 the) 
 (vocal 4575  the) 
 (eye 4775 362 150 400 spinner) 
 (vocal 4925  spinner) 
 (eye 5175 413 150 500 falls) 
 (vocal 5475  falls) 
 (eye 5675 455 150 450 on) 
 (vocal 5925  on) 
 (eye 6125 476 150 535 a) 
 (vocal 6260  a) 
 (eye 6660 500 150 200 red letter) 
 (eye 6860 500 150 335 red) 
 (vocal 6995  red) 
 (eye 7195 528 150 1500 letter) 
 (vocal 7345  letter) 
 (eye 8695 200 200 185 What is the probability the letter is) 
 (eye 8880 220 200 335 What) 
 (vocal 9015  What) 
 (eye 9215 248 200 400 is) 
 (vocal 9415  is) 
 (eye 9615 275 200 385 the) 
 (vocal 9750  the) 
 (eye 10000 330 200 350 probability) 
 (vocal 10135  probability) 
 (eye 10350 387 200 735 the) 
 (vocal 10885  the) 
 (eye 11085 425 200 400 letter) 
 (vocal 11235  letter) 
 (eye 11485 460 200 700 is) 
 (vocal 11785  is) 
 (eye 12185 500 200 1800 small) 
 (vocal 12335  small) 
 (eye 13985 360 380 535 |A|I|K|L|S|) 
 
type time xpos ypos fixation object 
 
 (vocal 14370  theres) 
 (eye 14520 160 360 450 A) 
 (vocal 14870  one) 
 (eye 14970 260 360 335 I) 
 (vocal 15255  two) 
 (eye 15305 360 360 350 K) 
 (vocal 15605  three) 
 (eye 15655 460 360 500 L) 
 (vocal 16055  four) 
 (eye 16155 560 360 900 S) 
 (vocal 16455  five) 
 (eye 17055 528 150 1435 letter) 
 (vocal 17190  letter) 
 (eye 18490 360 380 235 |I|K|L|) 
 (eye 18725 560 360 185 S) 
 (eye 18910 360 380 185 |I|K|L|) 
 (eye 19095 260 360 185 I) 
 (eye 19280 360 360 185 K) 
 (eye 19465 460 360 235 L) 
 (eye 19700 360 380 185 |I|K|L|) 
 (eye 19885 360 380 185 |A|I|K|L|S|) 
 (eye 20070 360 380 1750 |I|K|L|) 
 (vocal 20120  but) 
 (vocal 20470  only) 
 (vocal 21270  three) 
 (eye 21820 500 200 1535 small) 
 (vocal 21955  small) 
 (eye 23355 510 380 235 |L|S|) 
 (eye 23590 260 380 185 |A|I|K|) 
 (eye 23775 510 380 185 |L|S|) 
 (eye 23960 460 360 185 L) 
 (eye 24145 560 360 235 S) 
 (eye 24380 510 380 185 |L|S|) 
 (eye 24565 460 360 1085 L) 
 (vocal 24700  both) 
 (vocal 25100  theres) 
 (vocal 25300  one) 
 (eye 25650 360 380 235 |I|K|L|) 
 (eye 25885 460 360 1885 L) 
 (vocal 26270  so) 
 (vocal 26570  one) 
 (vocal 26920  in) 
 (vocal 27220  three) 
 
Reported answer:  one in three 
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Appendix 3.d. Model protocol trace for the disjunction/subset problem 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
type time xpos ypos fixation object 
  
(eye 150 320 100 185 Probabilities are) 
 (eye 335 320 100 335 probabilities) 
 (vocal 470  probabilities) 
 (eye 670 382 100 1100 are) 
 (vocal 1370  are) 
 (eye 1770 500 100 200 equal for all) 
 (eye 1970 500 100 335 equal) 
 (vocal 2105  equal) 
 (eye 2305 542 100 450 for) 
 (vocal 2555  for) 
 (eye 2755 570 100 1500 all) 
 (vocal 2905  all) 
 (eye 4255 320 150 185 The spinner falls on a) 
 (eye 4440 320 150 335 the) 
 (vocal 4575  the) 
 (eye 4775 362 150 400 spinner) 
 (vocal 4925  spinner) 
 (eye 5175 413 150 500 falls) 
 (vocal 5475  falls) 
 (eye 5675 455 150 450 on) 
 (vocal 5925  on) 
 (eye 6125 476 150 535 a) 
 (vocal 6260  a) 
 (eye 6660 500 150 1500 letter) 
 (vocal 6810  letter) 
 (eye 8160 200 200 185 What is the probability the letter is) 
 (eye 8345 220 200 335 What) 
 (vocal 8480  What) 
 (eye 8680 248 200 400 is) 
 (vocal 8880  is) 
 (eye 9080 275 200 385 the) 
 (vocal 9215  the) 
 (eye 9465 330 200 350 probability) 
 (vocal 9600  probability) 
 (eye 9815 387 200 735 the) 
 (vocal 10350  the) 
 (eye 10550 425 200 400 letter) 
 (vocal 10700  letter) 
 (eye 10950 460 200 700 is) 
 (vocal 11250  is) 
 (eye 11650 500 200 200 large or red or both) 
 (eye 11850 500 200 335 large) 
 (vocal 11985  large) 
 (eye 12185 542 200 450 or) 
 (vocal 12435  or) 
 (eye 12635 563 200 385 red) 
 (vocal 12770  red) 
 (eye 13020 591 200 350 or) 
 (vocal 13155  or) 
 (eye 13370 612 200 685 both) 
 (vocal 13505  both) 
(eye 14055 500 200 1200 large or red or both) 
 
 
type time xpos ypos fixation object 
 
(eye 15255 460 380 535 |Z|M|C|W|Y|R|H|) 
 (vocal 15640  theres) 
 (eye 15790 160 360 450 Z) 
 (vocal 16140  one) 
 (eye 16240 260 360 335 M) 
 (vocal 16525  two) 
 (eye 16575 360 360 350 C) 
(vocal 16875  three) 
 (eye 16925 460 360 500 W) 
(vocal 17325  four) 
 (eye 17425 560 360 350 Y) 
 (vocal 17725  five) 
 (eye 17775 660 360 400 R) 
 (vocal 18125  six) 
 (eye 18175 760 360 900 H) 
 (vocal 18475  seven) 
 (eye 19075 500 200 185 large or red or both) 
 (eye 19260 500 200 335 large) 
 (vocal 19395  large) 
 (eye 19595 542 200 450 or) 
 (vocal 19845  or) 
 (eye 20045 563 200 385 red) 
 (vocal 20180  red) 
 (eye 20430 591 200 350 or) 
 (vocal 20565  or) 
 (eye 20780 612 200 685 both) 
 (vocal 20915  both) 
 (eye 21465 500 200 1100 large or red or both) 
 (eye 22565 610 380 235 |W|Y|R|H|) 
 (eye 22800 360 380 185 |Z|M|C|W|Y|) 
 (eye 22985 610 380 185 |W|Y|R|H|) 
 (eye 23170 460 360 185 W) 
 (eye 23355 560 360 185 Y) 
 (eye 23540 660 360 185 R) 
 (eye 23725 760 360 235 H) 
 (eye 23960 610 380 250 |W|Y|R|H|) 
 (eye 24210 710 380 235 |R|H|) 
 (eye 24445 360 380 185 |Z|M|C|W|Y|) 
 (eye 24630 710 380 185 |R|H|) 
 (eye 24815 660 360 185 R) 
 (eye 25000 760 360 285 H) 
 (eye 25285 710 380 185 |R|H|) 
 (eye 25470 610 380 235 |W|Y|R|H|) 
 (eye 25705 710 380 250 |R|H|) 
 (eye 25955 710 380 485 |R|H|) 
 (vocal 26090  both) 
 (eye 26440 610 380 385 |W|Y|R|H|) 
 (vocal 26725  four) 
 (eye 26825 710 380 1050 |R|H|) 
 (vocal 27125  two) 
 (vocal 27475  is) 
 (vocal 27775  six) 
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Appendix 4.d. Model protocol trace for the disjunction/subset problem continued 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
type time xpos ypos fixation object 
 (eye 27875 710 380 1300 |R|H|) 
 (vocal 28175  two) 
 (vocal 28525  is) 
 (vocal 28825  eight) 
 (eye 29175 610 380 100 |W|Y|R|H|) 
 (eye 29275 710 380 150 |R|H|) 
 (eye 29425 610 370 235 HRYW) 
 (eye 29660 460 380 235 |Z|M|C|W|Y|R|H|) 
 (eye 29895 610 370 1435 HRYW) 
 (vocal 30480  no) 
 (vocal 30730  so) 
 (eye 31330 500 200 185 large or red or both) 
 (eye 31515 500 200 335 large) 
 (vocal 31800  large) 
 (eye 31850 610 380 185 |W|Y|R|H|) 
 (eye 32035 500 200 365 large) 
 (eye 32400 542 200 335 or) 
 (eye 32735 563 200 335 red) 
 (vocal 33020  red) 
 (eye 33070 710 380 185 |R|H|) 
 (eye 33255 563 200 365 red) 
 (eye 33620 591 200 335 or) 
 (eye 33955 612 200 335 both) 
 (vocal 34240  both) 
 (eye 34290 710 380 185 |R|H|) 
 (eye 34475 612 200 815 both) 
 (vocal 34890  no) 
 (vocal 35190  so) 
 (eye 35290 610 370 750 HRYW) 
 (vocal 35690  four) 
 (eye 36040 460 380 285 |Z|M|C|W|Y|R|H|) 
 (eye 36325 610 370 1935 HRYW) 
 (vocal 36710  so) 
 (vocal 37010  four) 
 (vocal 37410  in) 
 (vocal 37710  seven) 
 
Reported answer:  four in seven 
 
